Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

DEATH OF A MEMBER

Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Adam Storey McKinlay, esquire, Member for Dunbartonshire, West, and I desire on behalf of the House to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the honourable Member.

Oral Answers to Questions — FUEL AND POWER

Petrol Ration (Holiday Bonus)

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he will now make a statement as to the future of the standard petrol ration.

Wing-Commander Hulbert: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he will now make a statement with regard to increasing the basic petrol ration during the summer months.

Sir Ian Fraser: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he will now make a statement about the level of the standard petrol ration during the summer months.

Brigadier Medlicott: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he proposes to make an increase in the basic petrol ration for the summer months.

The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker): Last summer a special holiday bonus of petrol was granted; the same arrangement will be made this year. As in 1949, the value of the coupons for June, July and August in the next standard ration book will be doubled; that is to say, for these months each coupon will be worth its face value

in gallons, instead of half its face value, as it is now. This will increase the mileage allowed by the next standard ration book from about 540 miles to 810; motorists will be able, as they were last summer, to use all or any of the coupons in the books from early in May.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his failure to improve upon his predecessor's effort of last year will cause widespread disappointment, and can he explain why the motorist of this country is worse treated than in any other comparable country?

Mr. Noel-Baker: No one can be more disappointed than I am. Anyone holding my office desires to do as much as he can, but it is really a dollar question.

Sir I. Fraser: Could not the right hon. Gentleman extend the concession to include the month of September, because that month has a very important bearing upon the economics of seaside towns?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am willing to consider anything when we get to September but, in fact, these coupons can be used in any of the five months following the month shown upon them, and, therefore, I hope the hon. Gentleman's point is met.

Mr. R. S. Hudson: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider publishing some figures showing stocks and imports in order to try to persuade people about the position? We have only his statement and that of his predecessor in regard to the dollar position, and we are getting a little tired of that excuse.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The right hon. Gentleman calls it an excuse. He knows as well as I do that it is one of the harsh basic facts which we have to face. I will consider anything.

Steam Utilisation Refresher Course

Mr. John Hay: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power what is the cost of the steam utilisation refresher course being, held at Reading University under the auspices of the Regional Joint Education Committee of the Southern Region of his. Department; and how many applications have been received for the course.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Seventy applications were received for the refresher course on


steam utilisation now being held at Reading University; the attendance at the third lecture on Wednesday last was 60. The cost of the course to His Majesty's Government is£23 4s.

Area Electricity Boards (Contracts)

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that cases have arisen where an area electricity board has refused to honour a contract made with another.electricity board; and if he will make a statement as to the general directions which he will issue that they shall honour contracts entered into with any one of them by members of the public.

Mr. Noel-Baker: If an electricity board fails to honour a binding contract, the aggrieved party has a remedy at law. I presume, however, that the hon. Member is thinking of a consumer who ends his agreement with one area electricity board and moves into the territory of another. I am sure that the hon. Member will agree that, in such a case, the second board would be under no obligation to supply electricity or to hire apparatus to the consumer on the same terms as he had received from the first.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in the case of which I sent particulars to his predecessor, the gentleman in question had an agreement with the North-Eastern Electricity Board for the hire of apparatus at 8s. 6d. per quarter, and that he was told by the South-Eastern Electricity Board, to whose area he had moved, that:the hire for the same apparatus would be 28s.? Is that the kind of advantage to the consumers which his predecessor promised would be the sequel to electricity nationalisation?

Mr. Noel-Baker: No one ever promised that there would be standard charges for current, or the hire of apparatus. There may be variations in the charge according to the different districts, owing to the differing distance from the coalfields, and many other things. The hon. Member knows that the area electricity Boards are largely independent units which manage their own affairs.

Sir Herbert Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that his colleague the Foreign Secretary, speaking in Wandsworth in 1945, made a promise of the kind that he himself has just denied?

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that, however great the variations may be today, they are infinitesimal compared with the variations in pre-nationalisation days?

Mr. Walter Fletcher: Would the right hon. Gentleman explain why he says that there must be variations in the hire of apparatus? What has it to do with distance from the coalfield?

Mr. Noel-Baker: There is the hire of apparatus and there is the price of current. I have tried to find out the respective prices of current in those two areas, but I was not able to get the information in time.

Mr. R. S. Hudson: Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that the difference between 8s. and 28s. quoted by my hon. Friend is proportionate to the price of current?

Mr. Noel-Baker: No, but we have to consider the whole economic position of the board. Of course, in due process of time we shall advance, I hope rapidly, towards standardisation of tariffs. Considering the condition of the electricity industry when it was taken over and the very great variations in the efficiency of the plant, there must, for the present, be some anomalies in the prices charged.

Mr. Mikardo: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the Opposition are always calling for more de-centralisation in the nationalised industries and more delegation of powers to the area boards? Will he note that they are now demanding a highly centralised, bureaucratic standardisation?

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the change which he describes as a variation in fact amounts to an increase of more than 300 per cent., which is made more acute by the fact that the gentleman in question resides within a mile of the most modern power plant in the country?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I hope for that reason that he is getting very cheap current. He is, in fact, hiring, as I understand it, a


heater, a cooker, and an electric kettle for 28s. a year, which is not a very high charge.

Hon. Members: Per quarter.

Supplementary Petrol Allowances

Sir John Mellor: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power what method is adopted by his Department for determining whether or not the use of public transport is reasonably practicable by applicants for supplementary petrol; on what calculations of time and distance allowances are based; and if he will arrange for written rulings to be given on request from persons contemplating employment at a distance from their homes.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Whether it is reasonable to ask anyone to use public transport to go from his home to his work must depend on the special facts of each individual case. The regional petroleum officers are, therefore, given discretion to grant petrol for this purpose when they think it right. The circumstances of different cases vary so much that I could not adequately explain in this answer the principles on which the petroleum officers do their work. I will, however, be happy to discuss the matter with the hon. Baronet, if he so desires. The regional petroleum officers will certainly give their decisions in writing to people who are considering whether they will accept employment at a distance from their homes.

Sir J. Mellor: As apparently no rules have been laid down, does the right hon. Gentleman mean that these decisions are left to the sweet will of some minor official? Will he say whether we can have a prospect of improvement in supplementary allowances?

Mr. Noel-Baker: As to the supplementary allowances, of course we shall always do our best. As to the principles which are applied, the regional petroleum officer considers the time tables of buses and trains, the number of changes for a given journey, the time it takes, whether the persons concerned are engaged in heavy manual work or in sedentary employment, whether they are old people or suffering from physical disability—many other things. I will discuss the matter with the hon. Baronet.

Sir J. Mellor: Are there no rules laid down for the guidance of regional officers?

Sir J. Mellor: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power why he refused an allowance of petrol to enable Mr. T. R. Hodgetts, 36, Park Road, Sutton Cold-field, to drive six miles each way daily for his work, without spending approximately two hours in public transport and upon what formula of time and distance his decision was reached.

Mr. Noel-Baker: As my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to my Department explained in a letter to the hon. Member, the regional petroleum officer decided that Mr. Hodgetts could travel from his home to his work by omnibus, without suffering unreasonable inconvenience or delay. Though I regret that we could not meet Mr. Hodgetts' desires, I am satisfied that the decision was right.

Sir J. Mellor: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that half a gallon of petrol a day would save this gentleman one-and-a-half hours a day in time, and if no rules have been laid down for these decisions, how can this gentleman or the hon. Member representing him decide whether he is being fairly treated or not?

Mr. Noel-Baker: There are innumerable cases all over the country in which if we allowed petrol for home-to-work travel we should save time for the persons concerned, but it would cost hundreds of thousands of tons of petrol a year.

Diesel Oil

Mr. John Grimston: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he will consider freeing the sale of diesel oil for road vehicles, which will make a saving in administrative cost without incurring extra dollar expenditure.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I have considered the proposal to de-ration the sale of diesel oil with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport. We are agreed that, while the proposal has many attractions, it would, in fact, increase the consumption of diesel oil, and would thus cost more dollars. It would also discriminate unfairly against vehicles which run on petrol, and would create anomalies


of other kinds. For these reasons, I regret that I cannot adopt the proposal made by the hon. Member.

Mr. Grimston: While thanking the Minister for that answer, may I ask whether it is not a fact that if we wish to make a saving in administrative expenditure here is one method which we can adopt?

Mr. Noel-Baker: If I thought that this suggestion would mean less use of petrol, I should think it extremely attractive, but I think it only means more use of diesel oil.

Sir H. Williams: Why does the right hon. Gentleman talk of dollars all the time? There is plenty of petrol from sterling areas, so why does he not get it?

Mr. Noel-Baker: The hon. Members knows that all the sterling oil is used.

Sir H. Williams: Where?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Any additional oil used here must cost dollars.

Sir H. Williams: Why?

Local Overseers

Mr. Edward Wakefield: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he will, in the interest of public economy, review the costly system of maintaining local fuel overseers.

Mr. Noel-Baker: As I have said in answer to other Questions today, there is unfortunately a shortage of the coal required for household use. Local fuel overseers ensure that each individual consumer receives a fair share of the available supplies, and I regard this as an essential service to the community at large. I am glad to tell the hon. Member, however, that in the last few months substantial savings in the cost of the service have been made, and to assure him that I will keep the matter under constant review.

Mr. Wakefield: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what worries consumers most now is not so much the amount of coal they get but its quality, and is he further aware that within the limit of a given allotment it is the coal merchants and not the local overseers who decide who shall get how much of the

Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes, Sir. If the hon. Member heard an earlier answer, he would know that I am aware of this point.

Mr. Hay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of these local fuel overseers have been resigning from highly paid jobs because they say that they have no work to do? Is that not another reason for abolishing the whole of this coal rationing system?

Mr. Noel-Baker: That is not my information.

Sir Wavell Wakefield: What is the cost of maintaining these overseers?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Perhaps the hon. Member will put that Question down.

Mr. De la Bère: Mumbo jumbo.

Domestic Coal (Supplies and Quality)

Mr. Hugh Fraser: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware of the short-fall in coal deliveries to coal merchants in Stafford over the winter months; to what extent this applies also to other areas in the West Midlands; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy these deficiencies.

Mr. Perkins: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware of the present shortage of coal in the Stroud district; and whether he has yet taken any steps to relieve the position.

Mr. Yates: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he is aware of the difficulty experienced by a large number of residents in the Ladywood Division of Birmingham in obtaining satisfactory supplies of coal; and if he will take the necessary steps to improve distribution.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he is aware that allocations of house coal to Towcester and district have fallen short of the consumer's needs; and what steps he is taking to ensure that this area and other areas in South Northamptonshire obtain their proper share of house coal.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware of the deteriorating supply of household coal, in the Kidderminster, Stourport and Bewdley areas, during the last few months; and what steps he proposes to take to alleviate the position.

Sir Ronald Ross: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that much of the coal supplied to Northern Ireland, both for industrial and private use, is of inferior quality and contains a high proportion of slate and other non-combustible matter; and what steps he is taking to remedy this.

Mr. Noel-Baker: As the hon. Members are well aware, there is unfortunately a shortage of the good coal required for household use, and the National Coal Board are, therefore, unable to meet the full demands which merchants have made. The main difficulty is in the quality of the coal available; much large coal is needed for the railways and for the export trade. For that reason, we have been obliged to allocate to merchants some coal of grades which would not be put to household use, if there were adequate supplies of better coal. These are general difficulties not confined to the districts mentioned in the Questions put to me by hon. Members. Therefore, as I am saying in answer to another Question today, I am taking up the problems of supply and quality with the National Coal Board as a matter of urgent importance.

Mr. Fraser: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in a town like Stafford only 70 per cent. of the coal was delivered and will he see that something is quickly done about it?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I have looked into a good many cases, but I have never found the percentage of delivery against allocation as low as that.

Sir R. Ross: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it was possible for a constituent, paying£4 18s. 0d. a ton for coal, to send me about nine pounds of slate and rock which came out of one single fire, and to make suggestions as to how I should use it?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I should first like to know the size of the fire, and also the name of the merchant.

Mr. Nabarro: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the shortage of household coal referred to in Question No. 14 is a direct result of the peremptory decision of the National Coal Board to shut the Bayton Colliery, and that has led in the last few weeks to widespread distress for household consumers and a great deal of inconvenience for the colliers formerly employed in the pit?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I always regret inconvenience to householders, and still more what might be hardship to miners, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that no pit is closed unless there are overwhelming reasons in favour of doing so.

Mr. Oliver Stanley: While not asking for anything as revolutionary as that consumers should not be asked to pay for slate and stone, could the right hon. Gentleman ensure that perhaps they do not pay the same price as is paid for top-quality coal?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman is not aware that coal is graded in price as well as in quality.

Mr. Stanley: I am talking about slate and stone, not coal.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the price of coal. [HON. MEMBERS: "Slate."] I recognise the difficulty about slate, but if he will wait for an answer which I am going to give a little later on, he will have further information.

Mr. Yates: Does my right hon. Friend realise that in the City of Birmingham large numbers of people have to queue with barrows and other receptacles and are only allowed a quarter to half a hundredweight at a time? Surely this is a situation which is very much worse than it was some time ago, and would my right hon. Friend make a serious investigation into it?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I have said that there is much in the situation with which I am not content. That is why I am taking the matter up with the National Coal Board.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a good many householders in South Northamptonshire have had no coal at all for some weeks, not even slate, and what hope can he hold out that they will get some coal?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I should like full details of that. I have heard many assertions of that kind made, and nearly always I have found that coal is available when it is really required.

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

16. MR. PETER ROBERTS—TO ask the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he will make a statement as to the general directions he will give to the National Coal Board to provide reasonably clean coal to the domestic consumers of this country.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. You may recollect that some supplementary questions were not put because the Minister stated that he would give his answer to Question 16. Can we have that answer either now or at the end of Questions?

Mr. Speaker: There have been plenty of supplementary questions today—a great number I think. I was trying to get on with Questions.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I should be glad to give the answer to Question 16 at the end of Questions if Mr. Speaker allowed me to do so, but I am in his hands.

At the end of Questions:

Mr. Stanley: On a point of Order. The Minister of Fuel and Power said that he would answer Question 16 after Question time. He volunteered to do so.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I said that I very much wanted to answer the Question but the hon. Member who put down the Question had not taken the trouble to be in his place to ask it. That being so, I said that I would place myself in Mr. Speaker's hands.

Mr. Stanley: Further to that point of Order. I have an exact recollection of what the right hon. Gentleman said, which was that provided that you, Mr. Speaker, allowed him, he would be only too glad to answer the Question. In view of that, perhaps you will allow him and accord him that gratification.

Mr. Speaker: It is not within my province to allow or not to allow a Question to be answered. It is entirely a matter for the Minister concerned.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The answer is as follows. If adequate supplies of good coat for household consumption could be ensured by the issuing of ministerial directions to the National Coal Board, I should be more than glad to give the hon. Member the fullest satisfaction. Owing to the deplorable condition of the industry when it was taken over, the Board now unfortunately have formidable difficulties to overcome. We are not yet producing sufficient coal of the grades required to meet our needs for domestic use, for the production of gas, for general industry and for transport, and to fulfil our commitments to export abroad. There is also a great shortage of plant to wash and prepare the coal for which the Board are in no way to blame. But I recognise the gravity of the question and I am asking the National Coal Board to review the problems of supply and quality with me as a matter of urgent importance.

Mr. Martin Lindsay: If the conditions. in the industry were so deplorable before it was nationalised, how was it that it managed to meet all its requirements. before the war?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Unfortunately, we had mass unemployment.

Sir R. Ross: Is not the Minister aware that the coal with which we are being supplied in Northern Ireland is getting worse than it was when the industry was under private enterprise?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I have no evidence of that. I have already answered many questions about it.

Mr. S. Silverman: Does my right hon. Friend realise that if we had not nationalised the coal industry, no one in this. House would have been able to answer the public's questions about this matter?

Mr. Keeling: Is the Minister not aware that those of us who were in the House before the war are now receiving far more complaints about the quality of coal than we were then?

Sir H. Williams: With regard to the Minister's statement about mass unemployment before the war, is he aware that there are fewer people employed in coal mining now than there were in 1939?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Of course, that is one of the difficulties. The conditions in the


industry under private enterprise were such that miners would not allow their sons to go into it.

Mr. John E. Haire: Will my right hon. Friend make it clear that there was dirt and slate in coal before the National Coal Board took over?

Oral Answers to Questions — LAW OF LIBEL (LEGISLATION)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Attorney-General if legislation will be introduced to give effect to those recommendations of the Porter Committee for the amendment of the law of libel to which it has not been possible to give effect by Rules of Court.

The Attorney-General (Sir Hartley Shawcross): This matter is under consideration, but I am unable to say when it will be possible to introduce legislation to deal with this very complex subject.

Mr. Driberg: Although it is admittedly extremely complex, is my right hon. and learned Friend aware how anomalous also the present situation is, and could he not give some assurance that he will try to expedite legislation which would, after all, be reasonably non-contentious as between parties—even though it would provide a wonderful field-day for all the lawyers and all the journalists in the House?

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

Apples, Northern Ireland

Professor Savory: asked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that in South Antrim and County Armagh there are 9,500 acres of orchards and that present growers are in a serious plight because, whereas in 1948, with an average crop, 18,019 tons had been exported by February, 1949, this year, after a bumper crop, only 10,382 tons had been shipped to this country, while shops in London are flooded with Italian or other imported apples; and what steps he proposes to take to safeguard the future of this industry, in view of its importance to our food supply.

The Minister of Food (Mr. Maurice Webb): The crop in Northern Ireland consists almost entirely of cooking apples.
The difficulty in marketing them was due, not to imported apples, which were mainly eating varieties, but to the heavy crop of cooking apples in Great Britain and the fact that much of the crop was of poor quality and had to be marketed quickly.

Professor Savory: Will the right hon. Gentleman make further inquiries? I think he will find that there was a very excellent supply of eating apples in Northern Ireland which could not reach the British market because of the importation of foreign apples.

Mr. Webb: I have made a good many inquiries into this and I am satisfied that the great bulk of the crop was cooking apples.

Catering Establishments (Fish)

Air-Commodore Harvey: asked the Minister of Food if he will now allow fish to be served as an extra course in hotels and restaurants.

Mr. Webb: The Meals in Establishments Order restricts the number of courses as well as the charge, and I shall be looking at this point when I make the general review I promised the hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Major Gates) on 13th March.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that in the last five months thousands of tons of fresh fish have been used as manure and have gone into fish meal factories, and will he treat the matter more urgently?

Mr. Webb: I am looking at the whole question of the price limit as a very urgent matter. It would obviously be silly to deal with one side until we have dealt with the whole problem.

Meat Ration (Pork)

Air-Commodore Harvey: asked the Minister of Food if he will give some indication as to when more distributions of pork will be made available on the meat ration.

Mr. Webb: Although pork is still relatively scarce we have been able to distribute on the meat ration 12,820 tons from December, 1949, to February, 1950, compared with 4,660 tons in the corresponding period a year ago. However, I am afraid


that for some time yet most of the pork which we get from abroad and from home farmers must still be used for making bacon, not for the meat ration.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his predecessor used to make similar statements but the housewives were never able to find it? Can he say to which part of the country this pork was allocated?

Mr. Webb: Not without notice. This is a little better. I do not make a very large claim for it but it is better than it was a year ago.

Rationed Foodstuffs

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Food if he is aware that the terms of Circular No. 3115 issued by his Department have been interpreted as an intention to reduce the cooking fat, the cheese, ordinary, and the bacon ration on 23rd April, 1950; and if he will give an assurance that it is not his intention to reduce the existing rations of these foodstuffs on that date.

Mr. Webb: I would rather not make any forecasts about future ration levels, because, especially for perishable foods like bacon, they depend so much on the rate of shipments and home marketing. But if there has been any misunderstanding about this routine circular, I should explain to the hon. Member that the amounts written on retailers' buying permits, which run for 16 weeks, do not always correspond with current ration scales, especially when there are short-term changes. When rations vary the permit is re-valued not re-written.

Mr. Nabarro: Arising from that answer, will the right hon. Gentleman, in view of his explanation, consider printing an annotation to this routine memorandum which would then have the effect of allaying a great deal of public alarm and, in addition, prevent persons in the retail food trade from being misled?

Mr. Webb: I cannot agree that there is a good deal of public alarm, but if it would help I should be glad to consider it.

Book "The Groundnut Affair"

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Minister of Food if he will make a statement as to why his Department gave directions to the Overseas Food Corporation to try to prevent the publication of the book entitled "The Groundnut Affair," by Mr. Alan Wood; and what action was taken.

Mr. Webb: No directions of any kind have been given by my Department to the Overseas Food Corporation about the publication of a book by Mr. Alan Wood. The second part of the Question does not therefore arise.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does it follow from that answer that the fact that the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor personally informed the publishers that publication would be stopped, while Sir Leslie Plummer personally informed the author to the same effect, was merely a happy coincidence? In view of the implications of this matter with respect to freedom of discussion, will the right hon. Gentleman arrange for a public inquiry into the whole case?

Mr. Webb: As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, if any representations were made I do not know about them; they would be personal representations. As head of this Department, I could not take any responsibility for that kind of representation.

Mr. Stanley: How is it possible for a Minister while he is still in office to make personal representations about a matter that intimately concerns his own Ministry? Surely he can only do so in his part as Minister, and he and his successor must take the responsibility for it?

Mr. Webb: I am sorry. Obviously I can only take responsibility for what the Department does, and I have made most careful inquiries into this and at no stage has any communication, written or oral, gone from my Department to any responsible person on this matter.

Mr. Stanley: Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that a communication went from his predecessor, who surely was part of the Department at the time, to the publishers, and does not that constitute an official act? Are we to understand that in future we may get letters


from Ministers written from their offices and afterwards be told, "This is only a personal thing; it is not a Department matter?"

Mr. Webb: I cannot deny anything on which I have no information. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Quite seriously, there is no record in my Department of any transaction of this kind. Therefore I have no record at all and I can neither deny nor affirm. All I can say is that my Department—and the Question is addressed to me on that ground—has at no time made any such representations.

Mr. Stanley: In view of the very unsatisfactory nature of this reply, may I ask the Prime Minister, who is responsible for all Ministries, whether he will look into this and see whether, in fact, any instructions were issued by the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor, whether unofficially or, as we are now told, in his personal capacity?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): I will certainly ask the Secretary of State for War about this point.

Fruit Canning

Mr. De la Bère: asked the Minister of Food why he has indicated to the fruit and vegetable canners of rhubarb that the most which canners ought to anticipate is enough sugar for a pack of 25 per cent. of last year's; and whether he has considered the unemployment this must cause and the shortage which the consumer will experience as a result.

Mr. Webb: I am informed that the canners expect to be able to maintain employment if we can, in fact, give them the larger allocation of sugar which I mentioned in reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Norfolk Central (Brigadier Medlicott) on 13th March. The hon. Member might like to know that the revised canning programme has been accepted by the canners.

Mr. De la Bère: Does the Minister realise that, if the reduced allocation is proceeded with, there will be hardship to the growers of the fruit, hardship to the employees in the canning factories, and hardship to the public and consumers because they will not be able to get any, and that the allocation is still far too low?

Mr. Webb: All I know is that the official representatives of the canners have accepted the programme.

Mr. De la Bère: Perhaps the Minister will have a talk to me afterwards?

Imports

Mr. Keeling: asked the Minister of Food if he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement showing what percentage of our imports of meat, bacon, butter, cheese and eggs came from foreign countries in 1948 and 1949, respectively.

Mr. Webb: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Keeling: Could the right hon. Gentleman say now whether the figures show that there was an increase in the proportion imported from foreign countries, and if so, can he explain why?

Mr. Webb: There was a slight increase, but the figures are so complicated that I would rather await examination of them, when possibly the hon. Gentleman will put down a further Question?

Following is the statement:

The amount of meat, bacon, butter, cheese and eggs imported into the United Kingdom from foreign countries as a proportion of the total imports of those foods for the years 1948 and 1949 respectively were:


—
1948
1949



per cent.
per cent.


Meat of all kinds (excluding bacon and ham but including the car-case weight equivalent of imported fat cattle)
38
43


Bacon and ham (including canned)
31
80


Butter
23
35


Cheese
24
36


Eggs in shell
45
60

Fruit and Vegetables

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Food (1) if he will consider the advisability of setting up a committee to consider a reorganisation of the distribution of vegetables and soft fruits, with a view to eliminating those who do no useful service but add to the cost to the consumer;
(2) what steps are being taken to control the price of market garden produce during the coming season; and to ensure


that the difference between the price paid to the primary producer and that charged to the consumer is not unreasonable.

Mr. Webb: These are difficult problems to which the Agricultural Departments and the Ministry of Food have in the past given a great deal of attention without, so far, having found any satisfactory solution. In consultation with my colleagues I intend to go into the whole matter myself as soon as possible and I would rather not make any pronouncement at the moment.

Mr. Awbery: Is the Minister aware that last year many complaints were made by hon. Members of this House that fruit was allowed to rot on the trees and that vegetables were ploughed back into the ground because the farmer could not find a market for his produce? Is not the time ripe for a committee to be set up to regulate the supply and demand, and is the Minister aware that lettuce sold by the primary producer at ½d. is sold in the market at 1s. and 1s. 3d.? Could my right hon. Friend tell us the number of people who get a rake-off between the ½d. and the 1s. 3d.?

Mr. Webb: I am aware of those facts and they are part of the matters now under review.

Russian Crab Meat

Brigadier Thorp: asked the Minister of Food why he is allowing the import of tinned Russian crab meat, when our own fishermen are unable to get a market for crabs.

Mr. Webb: There is a strong demand for canned crab meat, as well as for good quality home-caught crabs, and I can see no reason for limiting imports. If people like canned crab meat, I regard it as my duty to try to satisfy their demand. After all, as I said last week, "a little of what you fancy does you good."

Brigadier Thorp: Is the Minister accurate in his statement that there is a big demand for crab meat? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] Is he aware that at the present time fishermen have had to go on a quota because they cannot sell their crabs at the most important part of the season? Is he further aware that fishermen are getting only between

3s. and 4s. a pound for their crabs and that there is no demand at the moment? I am sure he is wrong.

Mr. Webb: I am sorry to find this opposition to a free market and to free competition from the other side of the House.

Mr. Erroll: Could not the demand for canned crab be met by canning home-caught crab?

Mr. Webb: That is another question.

London Tea Auctions

Mr. Arbuthnot: asked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the recommendation in the 13th Report of the Select Committee on Estimates in Session 1948–49 of the last Parliament that preparations should be made for an early re-opening of the London Tea Auctions, which would lead to administrative economies, he can given an indication of what progress has been made to this end; and whether he intends re-opening the London Tea Auctions in the near future.

Mr. Webb: As I told the House last week in reply to the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), I am considering this and relevant matters in the light of the Select Committee on Estimates' recommendation. These raise important issues of public policy which I desire to consider most carefully. I can only add that I am also considering the report I have just received from the Mission which went to India, Pakistan and Ceylon last month.

Mr. Arbuthnot: May we have some indication of when a decision is likely to be reached?

Mr. Webb: I could not say definitely; in a few weeks' time.

Sherry (Description)

Mr. Keeling: asked the Minister of Food what was the object of the letter addressed by his Department to Messrs. John Harvey & Sons, Bristol, as to their description of their sherry; and what action he proposes to take as a result of their refusal to omit the words "milk" and "cream."

Mr. Webb: When a trade mark application was made recently for "Bristol Milk" Sherry, an over-zealous official


wrote a letter to the company raising the question of whether such a trade mark might not be a misleading description of the product. He should not have done so and the letter was quickly withdrawn. The second part of the Question, therefore, does not arise. But I would like to apologise to the firm concerned for any inconvenience they may have been caused by this mistake.

Mr. Keeling: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that to connect Bristol Milk, which has been sold under that name for 300 years, with the product of the cow is quite idiotic, and ought he not to employ officials who have a little more knowledge of the matters they are handling?

Mr. Webb: Since I have apologised, I do not want to add anything to the answer have given.

Tea Contract (Price)

Mr. Remnant: asked the Minister of Food when he anticipates being in a position to inform tea growers in India and Ceylon what price he is prepared to offer for tenders to the 1950 bulk contract.

Mr. Webb: When our negotiations with their Governments are completed.

Mr. Remnant: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that the longer this decision is delayed, the less chance he will have of getting the qualities he requires at the price upon which his Department finally decides?

Mr. Walter Fletcher: Is the right hon. Gentleman taking care during these negotiations that the resumption of the London Tea Market is not being jeopardised in the price?

Mr. Webb: That is not being overlooked.

Processed Cheese (Emulsifying Agents)

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Food what are the usual contents of the emulsifying agent used in the manufacture of processed cheese; and in what proportion it is added.

Mr. Webb: I am told that these emulsifying agents are chemical salts and usually consist of di-sodium phosphate, sodium citrate or a combination of similar

salts. The quantity added depends upon the type of salts used but is not usually more than 3 per cent.

Mr. Vane: Could the right hon. Gentleman say why all this is done? is it intended to improve the cheese?

Mr. Webb: I think that both the hon. Gentleman and myself would do well to await the better definition now being worked on by a responsible committee.

Mr. Somerville Hastings: Is my right hon. Friend convinced that these emulsifying agents are in no way harmful to health?

Mr. Webb: So far as I am told, they are not but, quite frankly, I do not understand them.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOAP RATION

Mr. Arthur Lewis: asked the Minister of Food if he will increase the soap ration.

Mr. Webb: Certainly, when we have an adequate supply of raw materials. Nothing will make me happier than being able, when the time comes, to release more soap.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Minister bear in mind that there have been rumours in the Press that he intends to take soap off the ration and, before doing so, will he remember the experience of his predecessor with sweets?

Mr. Webb: Yes, Sir.

Sir H. Williams: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the raw material in question is groundnut oil?

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Ship Repairs (Dutch Yards)

Mr. Ralph Morley: asked the Minister of Transport if he is aware that ships have been diverted from British yards to Dutch yards for repair because the Dutch yards have more modern equipment; and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Barnes): British ships sometimes go to Dutch yards for repairs just as Dutch and other foreign ships sometimes come to the United Kingdom because it happens in


the particular case to be quicker or cheaper or more convenient to do so. There is no evidence that the equipment of the Dutch yards is superior to that of the British yards.

Mr. Morley: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Hilversum radio on 1st December last stated that British ships were being sent to Dutch yards because the Dutch yards have more modern equipment, and that this statement caused some anxiety?

Mr. Barnes: I am only too delighted to repudiate that because, as a matter of fact, there is much more foreign shipping repaired in British yards than British shipping in foreign yards.

Mr. Awbery: Can the Minister give us the proportion of foreign ships repaired in British yards and British ships repaired in foreign yards?

Mr. Barnes: I shall be delighted to give it if my hon. Friend will put down a Question.

Commander Noble: Can the Minister tell us the difference in repairing costs, if any, between the British and the Dutch yards?

Mr. Barnes: They vary, of course, according to the ships and from time to time.

Mr. Keenan: Can my right hon. Friend say, from the information he has had, whether it is because of the cheapness of repair work on the Continent that ships are repaired there instead of at home?

Mr. Barnes: That may be a factor, but it does not alter my other statement that, on balance, the advantage is with Me British yards.

Toll Bridge, Whitchurch

Mr. Hay: asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware of the hardship caused to the inhabitants of Whitchurch, Oxfordshire, by the continuance of toll charges at Whitchurch Bridge; whether he is aware that this is the only toll bridge still remaining over the Thames; and what steps he proposes to take to assist the local authorities concerned to free this bridge from toll.

Mr. Barnes: There is another toll bridge over the Thames at Swinford. It is my intention to free both bridges from tolls as soon as possible but owing to the pressing need for reducing Government expenditure I am unable to make grants for this purpose at the present time.

Mr. Hay: Does the Minister recollect that the Government are spending some£130,000 on three temporary bridges over the Thames for the Festival of Britain, and does he not think that some of that money might be better allocated for relieving the hardship which the continuance of this toll bridge imposes upon the inhabitants of this village?

Mr. Barnes: That is a matter of opinion. The other expenditure, of course, was decided upon by this House.

S.S. "Hopestar" (Loss)

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Transport if his attention has been drawn to the loss at sea of the s.s. "Hopestar," owing to the reduction of strength brought about by structural alterations; what action he is taking to prevent similar accidents in the future; and if he will set up a committee to review the whole question of the stress and strain on ships in rough weather, both when in ballast and carrying cargo.

Mr. Barnes: I ordered a formal investigation into the loss of this vessel and am at present considering the findings of the court, which were delivered on 9th March of this year. I propose to consult with the various shipping and other interests concerned on the court's recommendation that a technical committee should be set up to investigate the strains imposed on a vessel in the ballast condition in bad weather.

Mr. Awbery: Is it customary for a ship to proceed to sea after undergoing structural alterations, as in the case of the "Hopestar," without a re-examination by the Board of Trade?

Mr. Barnes: Of course, those examinations are carried out. As I have already stated, this matter is being thoroughly investigated.

Mr. Awbery: Did the Board of Trade make a thorough investigation before the "Hopestar" proceeded to sea?

Mr. Speaker: The investigation is still proceeding.

Oral Answers to Questions — MARRIAGE LAWS

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Prime Minister whether he will now reconsider the question of appointing a Royal Commission to investigate and report on the Marriage Laws.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir, I am not prepared to recommend the establishment of such a Royal Commission at the present time.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will my right hon. Friend look at this matter again if it becomes manifest that widespread nonparty opinion calls for some inquiry into the present unsatisfactory state of affairs?

The Prime Minister: I have looked at it again. Apart from the question whether this is the best way of dealing with the matter, I do not think it is advisable at present to set up another Royal Commission.

Oral Answers to Questions — DR. FUCHS

Mr. Henry Strauss: asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government received any warning regarding Dr. Fuchs from His Majesty's Government in Canada when the Canadian Royal Commission was sitting in 1946.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Sir W. Smithers: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has read the Report of the Royal Commission on the spy trial in Canada, and whether he is aware that in that report the Russian Ambassador in Canada was implicated, that this same Ambassador is now Ambassador here in Britain and that M. Zarubin has now gone to Russia; and is that the reason?

Oral Answers to Questions — GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when he intends to ask Parliament to ratify the United Nations Convention on Genocide.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Davies): The question is still under examination. No decision has yet been reached since there are a great many legal difficulties still to be solved.

Mr. Janner: In view of the fact that this is such a terrible crime and that as far back as December, 1946, the United Nations organisation unanimously agreed that there should be a Convention, will my hon. Friend say why he is holding this matter back, whether it is a fact that 43 nations have agreed to the Convention, and what he proposes to do in the matter?

Mr. Davies: It is not true that 43 nations have ratified the Convention. So far, only six ratifications have as yet been received. Legal difficulties which are involved prevent our taking any action as yet.

Mr. H. Strauss: Have His Majesty's Government ever approved this hopelessly illiterate expression "Genocide"?

Mr. Janner: I may have made a mistake in the wording. The Convention has not been ratified, but accepted, by the 43 nations. Is my hon. Friend aware that there is considerable anxiety throughout the world on this matter and that Australia has actually ratified the Convention?

Mr. Davies: The difference between agreeing to the Convention when it comes before the United Nations and ratification is considerable, and of those nations who agreed to it at Paris only six so far have ratified.

Mr. Janner: In view of the very serious nature of the matter which I have raised and the answer which has been given, I propose to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity.

Oral Answers to Questions — YUGOSLAVIA (BRITISH CLAIMS)

Sir H. Williams: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how, and when, the allocation will be made of the compensation to be paid by the Yugoslav Government in respect of British properties sequestrated by that country.

Mr. Ernest Davies: It will be necessary to establish a Claims Commission empowered to adjudicate claims and to distribute among successful claimants the amounts received from the Yugoslav Government under the terms of the


Anglo-Yugoslav Compensation Agreement of 23rd December, 1948, as well as other moneys. It is hoped to introduce legislation to this effect as soon as possible.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: In view of the complete control of that country by Russia, is the Yugoslav Government a free agent in this matter?

Mr. Teeling: Can the hon. Gentleman give us any idea how this legislation will be introduced and whether private firms and people with business interests in Yugoslavia will be considered equally with the larger concerns?

Mr. Davies: The Government will introduce legislation to set up a Claims Commission to adjudicate the matter.

Oral Answers to Questions — EMBASSIES, LONDON AND MOSCOW

Mr. Martin Lindsay: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the number of Russians in the Russian Mission in London and of British in the British Mission in Moscow.

Mr. Ernest Davies: The number of members of the Soviet Embassy in London whose appointment has been notified to His Majesty's Government at present totals 187. I have reason to believe, however, that this figure is about twice the actual one owing to the failure of the Embassy to notify departures as they have taken place. The number of British subjects employed in our Embassy at Moscow is 80.

Mr. Lindsay: Do those figures include the ancillary services which, in a telephone message to the secretary of the hon. Gentleman, I asked to be included in the answer?

Mr. Davies: I answered the question which appears on the Order Paper. The reply to the supplementary question is that, in addition to those employed at the Embassy, there are roughly 72 who are employed by Soviet Agencies in London, only two of whom have diplomatic immunity.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can my hon. Friend tell us what facilities for observation are given to our military mission in

Moscow and whether considerable economies could not be effected by bringing these military gentlemen home?

Mr. Davies: That is another question.

Oral Answers to Questions — JAPAN

Peace Treaty

Mr. Stanley Prescott: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has any statement to make on the possibility of a peace treaty being now concluded with Japan.

Mr. Ernest Davies: No, Sir. There are no developments to report other than those described by my hon. Friend the Minister of State, in reply to the hon. Member for the Pavilion Division of Brighton (Mr. Teeling) on 13th March.

Mr. Prescott: Will the hon. Gentleman undertake that the views of this country and the Dominions shall receive full consideration, and would he also agree that exploratory talks should be undertaken with the United States at the earliest possible moment?

Mr. Davies: I can certainly give an assurance to that effect.

Mr. Anthony Nutting: Does the hon. Gentleman recall that at the Canberra Conference some two years ago the delegates there present representing this country and the Empire countries involved expressed the hope publicly that the Japanese peace treaty would be signed at latest by mid-1948, and how much longer is this matter to be allowed to drag on?

Mr. Davies: As the hon. Member is aware, there have been certain developments and changes since then, and every effort is being made to bring about as early as possible discussions on the peace treaty.

Mr. Teeling: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Russia and the new Government of China are on the point of asking Japan for a peace treaty with them, and will he take care that the United States do not find themselves in a very invidious position and that we are left to follow the United States?

Mr. Davies: My right hon. Friend has no information to that effect. We are not responsible for the action which is taken by other Governments.

Mr. Prescott: Is it not a fact that no peace treaty can be signed by the United States by themselves?

Mr. Davies: Yes, Sir.

Congo Basin Treaties

Mr. Prescott: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any discussions have taken place between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America relative to inserting in any peace treaty with Japan provisions revising the effect of the Congo Basin Treaties in respect of Japan; and with what effect.

Mr. Ernest Davies: The answer to the first part of the Question is, "No, Sir." The second part does not, therefore, arise.

Mr. Prescott: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that in previous Parliaments when I asked similar Questions I was told that this matter could only be discussed when a peace treaty was under negotiation, and as it seems possible that negotiations to that effect may take place soon, will he take steps to discuss this very important matter with the United States?

Mr. Davies: I can add nothing to what I have stated. This matter will he discussed, quite clearly, when the peace treaty is under discussion.

Mr. W. Fletcher: When this is being discussed, will the hon. Gentleman make quite certain that the basis of the discussion is known to this House and that an opinion can be given, because the result of this treaty is going to have a very far-reaching effect in Lancashire?

Mr. Davies: I will convey that wish to my right hon. Friend.

Oral Answers to Questions — FRANCE AND THE SAAR (CONVENTIONS)

Mr. John Hynd: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1) whether His Majesty's Government was consulted by the French authorities concerning the new Saar Convention prior to that instrument being signed; and whether the French authorities were informed of the view of His Majesty's Government that this matter should not be further prejudiced prior to its proper settlement in a peace treaty;
(2) what representations have been received by His Majesty's Government from the West German authorities concerning the recent Convention signed between France and the Saar; and what reply has been made to such representations.

Mr. Ernest Davies: His Majesty's Government were kept fully informed by the French Government of their intentions in regard to the five Conventions which they recently signed with the Government of the Saar. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the Conventions, the effect of which is to place the existing state of affairs provisionally on a contractual basis, do not prejudge the final settlement of the Saar question in the peace treaty. This view was conveyed by the British High Commissioner to the German Federal Chancellor in reply to a letter in which Dr. Adenauer had expressed his misgivings on this point. I am arranging to circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT the texts of the exchange of letters between General Robertson and Dr. Adenauer on the subject of the Saar.

Mr. Hynd: Is it not quite clear that the effect of this is to prejudice the peace treaty, just as the effect of the Russian activities in the East have prejudiced the peace treaty? Is it not also a fact that the existing state of affairs which has been brought into practical effect by these Conventions has been in itself a step leading towards this situation? How does this contribute towards the reconciliation and co-operation in Western Europe which is so ardently desired?

Mr. Davies: My right hon. Friend does not agree that this has prejudiced the settlement of the Saar question. In our view this is a provisional decision and it is the peace treaty itself which will make a final decision.

Mr. Nutting: Will the hon. Gentleman assure the House that his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will in future reciprocate when the French Government does us the honour and courtesy of consulting us about matters which affect this country, for, if he will recall, we failed to consult the French on many occasions, in particular on devaluation.

Following are the letters:

9th March, 1950

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I acknowledge with my special thanks the receipt of your kind letter of today which has just reached me through your A.D.C.

I have learned with great interest of the substance of Lord Henderson's speech in the House of Lords yesterday. I venture, however, once more to draw attention to the fact that the view of the British Government that the Saar Conventions have been concluded without prejudice to some later and final arrangement in the Peace Treaty does not correspond with the facts as shown in the text of the Conventions which I have before me. As I have already told you yesterday in the General Convention between France and the Saar, which is the agreement which determines the political status of the Saar, there is no mention whatever of the Peace Treaty with Germany. From this I am obliged to draw the conclusion that this General Convention, which separates the Saar territory from Germany has been concluded without any reservation about later alterations as a result of the Peace Treaty, and for that reason is intended to have a definitive character.

I would be greatly obliged to you if you could draw the attention of your government to this fact which in my view is decisive, and if you could move your government to make clear their attitude as soon as possible on this question.

(Signed) Dr. ADENAUER.

9th M arch, 1950.

MY DEAR CHANCELLOR,

I am sorry to learn from your letter of today that the statement made by Lord Henderson yesterday does not meet your difficulty.

I appreciate that there is no mention of the Peace Treaty in the text of the General Convention. I feel safe in saying that the point has not escaped the attention of my government. However, my government has, in Lord Henderson's statement, declared that it is specifically laid down that the final status of the Saar can be determined only by the Peace Treaty. In this sense the agreements are only provisional, and are valid only until the Peace Treaty. That seems to me to be quite a clear statement of my government's attitude towards these conventions and you will note that it applies to all the conventions, making no distinction between them in this respect. It is quite certain that my government would sustain this attitude at the time of the Peace Treaty. You interpret the absence of a direct reference to the Peace Treaty in the General Convention as meaning that this particular convention is not valid only until the Peace Treaty. My government has by its statement shown clearly that it does not take this view. In any case in the General Convention it is merely stated that the Saar is autonomous in legislative, administrative and jurisdictional matters, which is not the same thing as stating that it is an independent country. I find it difficult to know what more could be done by my government to make their attitude clearer. 
However, I am telegraphing to them the text of your letter and of this my reply.

(Signed) BRIAN H. ROBERTSON (General).

10th March, 1950.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Your second letter of yesterday reached me in sufficiently good time to enable me to take your statements into account in the preparation of the government declaration. I should like to tell you that the definition of your government's attitude to the Saar question which you have conveyed to me in this letter has been of great value to the Federal Government and has greatly facilitated my statements to the Bundestag on the Saar problem. May I express my sincere gratitude for this letter. With the expression of my profound esteem.

(Signed) Dr. ADENAUER.

Oral Answers to Questions — HUNGARY (SENTENCED BRITISH SUBJECT)

Captain Waterhouse: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs where and under what conditions Mr. Sanders is suffering his sentence of imprisonment; and whether any representative of His Majesty's Government or any other British subject is allowed access to him.

Mr. Ernest Davies: I regret that, even after specific inquiry of the Hungarian Government, I have no information about the place or conditions of Mr. Sanders' imprisonment.

Captain Waterhouse: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this case has outraged the whole of the civilised world? Will he give three assurances, first, that he will continue his efforts to get into contact with Mr. Sanders; secondly, that he will continue his efforts to get release of Mr. Sanders, and thirdly, that as long as Mr. Sanders is in jail he will limit his connection with the Hungarian Legation here to the merest diplomatic formalities?

Mr. Davies: I can give the right hon. and gallant Member assurance on all those three points. Every effort will continue to be made to effect contact with Mr. Sanders and to do everything to amelioriate his conditions.

Oral Answers to Questions — U.S.S.R. (BRITISH SUBJECTS' PROPERTY)

Mr. Weitzman: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any claim has been made, or is proposed to


be made, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the payment of compensation to Mr. Yolles, a British subject, of 2 Wilderton Road, N.16, whose property in Rowne, Eastern Poland, to the value of£10,000, was taken over by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and who has been pressing his Department to make such claim since January, 1946.

Mr. Ernest Davies: I understand that the property claimed by Mr. Yolles was nationalised by the National Assembly of the Western Ukraine in 1939. In 1940 His Majesty's Government formally reserved their right to claim from the Soviet Government full indemnification in respect of property of British subjects affected by such nationalisation. Since then the whole question of private British claims against the Soviet Union has been under continual review, but I can make no statement about the posibility of settlement.

Mr. Weitzman: Is my hon. Friend aware that the Soviet Embassy informed this gentleman that they are awaiting negotiations to he opened by His Majesty's Government and that His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, through letters, have informed this gentleman from 1946 that the matter is under consideration? Is there any chance of it reaching finality in other near future?

Mr. Davies: It is not for an official of the Soviet Embassy here to decide when such negotiations shall be opened. It is a matter for Moscow, and these negotiations are not in course at the present time.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE (PASSPORTS)

Mr. Marples: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what negotiations are in progress to enable the peoples of Britain and France to visit each other without passports.

Mr. Ernest Davies: No negotiations on this subject are in progress.

Mr. Marples: In view oil the outstanding success of the recent visit of the French President to this country, does not the hon. Gentleman think it would be a nice gesture if negotiations were initiated by this country?

Mr. Davies: Yes, but as long as currency control exists it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to abolish passport controls.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Did not the Foreign Secretary state a few months ago that it would be an early objective of his to remove passports between us and the French?

Later:

Mr. Teeling: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise a point about Question 59. I did not wish to interrupt during Question Time. You may remember that a few days ago, Mr. Speaker, you said that Members make up their own minds whether, in regard to Questions, they would ask a lot of supplementary questions or not. Some days ago I had down a Question which was of vital interest to my constituency. It was Question 65 but we only reached Question 45, and therefore my Question was not called. I tried today to ask a question on Question 59 because the problem of channel boats going backwards and forwards is of vital interest to my constituency.

Mr. Speaker: I am sorry if I turned down a supplementary question which the hon. Member wished to put. He put down a Question previously and was not present when it was called. He had today asked three supplementary questions before the Question to which he referred was called. There must be some limit to supplementary questions if we wish to get through the Questions on the Order Paper. In the case of supplementary questions which I turn down, I have no doubt that the hon. Member concerned is disgruntled, but I have no doubt that it will please an hon. Member who has down a later Question. I have to consider all sides, and I do my best. I shall not allow unlimited supplementary questions because I do not think it is fair to those who put Questions down.

Mr. Teeling: Further to my point of Order. It would only have been my first supplementary question on this particular Question.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member was not here for the Question which he put down. I think I was not unfair over that.

Oral Answers to Questions — GERMANY

Disturbances, Salzgitter

Mr. John Hynd: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement concerning the recent disturbances at Salzgitter.

Mr. Ernest Davies: The disorders which occurred on the 6th and 7th March at the Hermann Goering Works at Salzgitter were directed against the demolition of the foundations of a coking plant which had previously been dismantled and removed.
The question of demilitarisation measures at Salzgitter has been under consideration for some time. For the past three months the German authorities have been urged to submit plans for the future use of the buildings of the works and for the elimination of certain obnoxious structural features. No such plans having been received, on 27th February the Land Commissioner communicated to the Land Government his detailed decisions for disarmament measures. On 1st March the Land Government protested that its plans for providing employment in the area were based on the use of the buildings listed for destruction, and at the same time submitted its first outline of a plan. The matter was discussed on the following day between the Land Commissioner and the German Minister President, and the Land Commissioner granted the Germans a further period in order to submit plans for demilitarisation. At the same time it was agreed that the demolition of the coking plant foundations should proceed since it would not affect the proposals for the future utilisation of the buildings.
In spite of this, demonstrations and disturbances occurred, but with the protection of British troops demolitions were commenced on 7th March and have been proceeding normally since. There has been no further resistance, the situation is quiet, and the troops have been withdrawn from the site. The Government of Lower Saxony has expressed its deep regrets at the events of last week and its intention of taking disciplinary measures against those responsible.

Mr. Hynd: If, as the Minister says, the situation is now quiet, it is not quiet in other parts. Disturbances are occurring in Hamburg and elsewhere. Can we

look to an early cessation of this destruction?

Mr. Davies: This Question applies only to Salzgitter and in this case the demolitions which had taken place were essential to eliminate the German war potential.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: Are the Government now prepared to reconsider their whole policy on demolition in Germany and, in particular, the demolition of buildings?

Heligoland (Frisians)

Professor Savory: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has now considered the petition, signed and handed in to the British Government Office in Hamburg on 10th January, 1946, by the Aldermen of Heligoland, asking to, be allowed to return to their native isle; and whether he is going to accede to their request.

Mr. Ernest Davies: I am having inquiries regarding this particular petition made in Germany and I will write to the hon. Member when a reply is received. As regards the second part of the Question, I have nothing to add to the statement made by my right hon. Friend on 29th June, 1949.

Professor Savory: Does the hon. Gentleman not realise that I have asked this Question again and again, and have implored His Majesty's Government to allow these Frisians, who were formerly British subjects, to return to their native land?

Oral Answers to Questions — SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN (REFUGEES)

Professor Savory: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that South Schleswig is already overcrowded with German refugees, most of whom are unable to obtain employment; and what steps he is taking to prevent any further influx of these refugees for whom it is not possible to find accommodation.

Mr. Ernest Davies: His Majesty's. Government are fully aware of the difficult situation in Schleswig Holstein, where, out of a total refugee population of just over a million, some 129,000 are unemployed. Energetic action is being taken by the German Federal and Land


authorities, upon the invitation of the Allied High Commission, to restrict the influx of refugees into the Federal territory.

Professor Savory: Does the hon. Member realise that these refugees are still pouring in, that they hide in the woods during the day-time and cross the frontier at night and that stringent measures must be taken to prevent this terrible overcrowding and flooding of this unfortunate province?

Mr. Davies: That may be so, but this is now the concern of the Federal Government. They have responsibility for dealing with this matter.

Professor Savory: But did not the hon. Gentleman's predecessor—whose absence we regret—say that responsibility for refugees coming into this country was that of His Majesty's Government and only the distribution of refugees was the province of the Federal Government?

Mr. Davies: Yes, Sir, the basic responsibility regarding the admission of refugees is that of the Allied High Commission, but once they are in the territory it is a matter for the Federal Government. We have laid down policy concerning admission.

Oral Answers to Questions — BURMA (PROPOSED LOAN)

Mr. Erroll: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the present position regarding a Common-

wealth loan to Burma; and what British participation is proposed.

Mr. Gammans: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the proposed loan to Burma.

Mr. Ernest Davies: A joint reply to the Burmese Government's request for financial assistance was handed to the Burmese Acting Foreign Minister in Rangoon on 7th March, 1950, on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. A joint statement will be issued when the Burmese reply has been received. A sum of three and three-quarter million pounds is proposed as the United Kingdom Government's share in this loan as provided in the Estimates for 1950–51.

Mr. Erroll: Can the Minister say what effect there will be on this Commonwealth loan through our granting the short-term loan announced in the Supplementary Estimates?

Mr. Davies: They are two separate loans.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered:
That this day, the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House)."—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[4TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — ARMY ESTIMATES, 1950–51

MR. STRACHEY'S STATEMENT

Order for Committee read.

3.37 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Strachey): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
In presenting the Army Estimates of last year, my predecessor began by reviewing the commitments and responsibilities of the Army. Unfortunately those commitments, though they have changed somewhat in the past year, have on balance grown rather than diminished. Our major new commitment has of course been the necessity to despatch to Hong Kong such reinforcements as would secure that Colony against the threat of external aggression. That responsibility has been discharged. Fortunately the threat did not materialise. We clearly do not wish to retain large Forces permanently in Hong Kong, but I cannot yet say when the situation in the Far East will allow us to return any of the troops 'stationed there to the United Kingdom.
The greatest problem which faces us in the Far East remains the campaign in Malaya against the organised terrorism, sabotage and murder which have as their object the disruption of the orderly life of the territory. Here the Army is acting in aid of the civil power. This is a campaign which has no fixed front but consists for the most part in isolated actions against bodies of terrorists whose tactics are to strike and then disappear deep in the jungle. In such a campaign there is no likelihood of spectacular successes on the part of the Army which could change the situation overnight. It is only by means of concerted action of all forces, civil and military, that progress is likely to be made.
In this difficult role the Army continues to play an essential part with great resolution, gallantry and efficiency. The House will have noted the recently announced plans to reinforce this theatre by the return of the 26th Gurkha Brigade together with additional air Forces. These

moves exemplify the Government's determination to spare no effort to eradicate terrorism and protect the life of the territory. The return of the 26th Gurkha Brigade will enable pressure to be maintained on the terrorists and at the same time will enable units to be withdrawn from operations for rest periods to a greater extent than hitherto.
Such constant and arduous operations as this cannot be sustained without appropriate provision for recuperation and re-training, and we shall now have the margin required to achieve this. We shall give the closest attention to the wellbeing of the troops engaged in this campaign. Unfortunately, their living conditions in many cases are primitive, and we hope to make progress in the construction of permanent accommodation during the year. For instance, the leave centre at Penang is being considerably extended and improved. Finally, I should like to assure the House that every suggestion for re-equipment or other forms of assistance, for example, for training facilities, which is made by the local commanders will receive the immediate attention of the War Office.
In the Middle East also a material reduction of our garrisons has not yet been possible. The withdrawal of our troops from Greece has been offset by the need to reinforce Somalia during the transfer of administrative responsibility to the Italians. We also had to reinforce Eritrea during the recent civil disturbances and our garrisons are still required in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. We do, however, hope and intend to reduce the Middle East garrisons and return troops to the United Kingdom as we can, including some units which should become available when we have handed over in Somalia. In Europe there is no change in our occupational responsibilities.
The tendency for a new overseas commitment to appear whenever an old one has come to an end has been most disappointing. It is this tendency which has largely precluded the building up of higher Regular Army formations in the United Kingdom. But that remains our aim and we hope to make progress towards it during the coming year. It is in this connection that I want to turn to the two main problems of organisation which face the Army this year.
The first problem is the organisation of the active Army, involving the relationship between its Regular and National Service elements. The second problem of organisation is the size and the shape of the Territorial Army and Supplementary Reserve which together form what might be called the Reserve Army. Let me deal first with the problem of the active Army. We are now emerging from the post-war period and we are reaching comparative numerical stability after a period of sharp decline. After all, as little as three years ago the strength of the Army was 862,000 all ranks. Since then some 923,000 men, including Regulars, have been released; some 341,000 have been called up under the National Service scheme and some 110,000 have been recruited on Regular and short service engagements or granted Regular commissions. The net result is that the total strength of the active Army today is 373,000.
Hon. Members will recall that the original intention was for the Regular element of the active Army to undertake our overseas commitments and to provide the Home base and training organisations; and for the National Service element to undergo intensive training, and thus provide a reserve against an emergency. The immediate post-war tasks were three; first, to reduce the Army from a strength of some three million, as it was at the end of the war, to whatever size proved necessary to meet its commitments; and this involved the release of all men called up prior to the operation of the National Service Act, 1948. The last of these men will in fact be released by the end of June, 1950. The second task was the reconstruction of the Regular Army; and the third task was to prepare for the introduction of National Service men into the post-war Army structure, including in particular their transfer to the Territorial Army or the Supplementary Reserve after their period of service. The first task has been virtually completed. The second task, namely the building up of the Regular Army strength is one of the two key problems of the present and the immediate future; for on our ability to solve this problem largely depends, it seems to me, the solution of our other problems.
I turn to the first problem of building up the active Army by means of Regular recruiting. The cessation of commis-

sioning and enlistment during the war left the Regular Army very depleted. In 1946 the other rank Regular strength was down to some 100,000. Moreover large numbers were due to complete their engagements shortly. The build-up of the Regular Army which had to be achieved was therefore very considerable. The process started well. The strength increased from 100,000 in April, 1946, to 178,000 in December, 1948. But since then the build-up has gone much more slowly. We have just had a surplus of recruiting over discharges but it has been a much smaller surplus and the net result on 1st April, 1950, will be a Regular strength of some 185,000 men.
Again these figures conceal a difficulty, that the short-service element in the Regular Army today is no less than 40 per cent. in the case of officers and 16 per cent. in the case of other ranks. This short-service element was introduced to provide during the period of reconstruction experienced officers and N.C.O.'s of at least two years' service and preferably with war experience. But the reservoir for short-service personnel is drying up. The other-rank short-service entry is due to close down in July, 1950. Thus we have succeeded in substantially increasing the numbers of the Regular Army, but not enough.
It is this fact as well as the undiminished burden of our overseas commitments which compels us to use National Service men, not only at home, but in all overseas theatres, including the Far East. They have done splendid service, but the disadvantage of the use of National Service men, especially in distant theatres, is very great. Trooping for such short periods is costly and inefficient: National Service soldiers cannot be expected in their 18 months of service to make a contribution to the need for more senior N.C.O.'s and there is not enough time to train them for the more highly-skilled trades in which we are very short. Finally, frequent moves upset the training and efficiency of both units and individuals.
Yet in spite of these disadvantages the help which the National Service men can give to the Army to meet its overseas commitments is indispensable and their use quite unavoidable, until and unless either our commitments decrease or we can increase substantially the numbers of


new Regulars. Therefore we are driven back to the conclusion that one key to the problem is to increase the size of the Army's Regular component. If this could be done our other problems would become solvable.

Mr. Hopkin Morris: Is it not a fact that some of these young men, before they have completed six months' service or reached the age of 19, are sent for service abroad?

Mr. Strachey: I cannot give the exact figures to the hon. and learned Gentleman without looking them up, but we do use National Service men during their 18 months of service in overseas theatres, as I have just said.
The average pre-war recruiting figure between 1930 and 1937 was about 25,000 men a year. The post-war figures have been as follows: 1946, 28,000; 1947, 39,000; 1948, 32,000; 1949, 21,000, including short-service men in each case. Recruiting then started to fall off towards the end of 1948 and dropped sharply in 1949. Of course, in comparing the pre- and post-war recruiting trends, we must remember that today we are recruiting direct from civilian life mainly from those below the age for the call-up for National Service. This group in fact has produced the bulk of the total Regular engagements; unfortunately only about 1½ per cent. of National Service men have been rejoining as Regulars. In the current state of a high level of employment it is not unreasonable to believe that recruiting direct from civil life may stabilise itself round about an annual figure of 20,000 or less unless something very definite can be done in the matter.
On this basis the prospect is not good. As well as the falling off in Regular recruiting, we face a run-down of Regulars during the next three years, due to men completing their initial engagements. Moreover, the standard engagement has changed from seven years Colour service to five years, so that 1951 and 1952 will see a double run-out of men to the Reserve and also a heavy run-out of short-service men. The net effect of all that is that the forecast strength, on the basis of present recruiting, of Regulars, including short-service officers and other ranks, is as follows: on 1st April, 1950, 185,000; and on 1st April, 1951,

178,000; with a probable further slow decline in the following two years. These figures may be measured against a requirement for the active Army of some 350,000. And there is little prospect of any very marked reduction in that total requirement up to 1953, at any rate.
These forecasts make it clear that unless the Regular strength can be substantially increased there is no immediate prospect of reducing the use of National Service men to help fulfil the Army's commitments. Yet to do that would be the way to get back to the original conception of National Service as a relatively brief period of intensive training preparatory to a man joining the Territorial or Reserve Army. Thus, whichever way we look at the matter, it is Regular recruiting that emerges as a key factor in the situation.
In order to prevent the actual falling off of Regular strengths, we should require direct recruiting from civil life at a rate of some 30,000 men a year. To continue a satisfactory build-up, the Regular Army would need some 35,000 direct recruits a year. Unfortunately, the indications are that recruiting figures like these, which are appreciably higher than the pre-war average intake, are unlikely to come of themselves. There is one other way, it is true, in which we may check the decline and eventually increase the strength of the Regular Forces, and that is by increasing the number of long-service men who contract for 12 or 22 years' service with the Colours. At present 15 per cent. of the Regulars are contracting for 22 years and 10 per cent. for 12 years. If those figures could be changed to 20 per cent. and 30 per cent. respectively, we might at least maintain the present strength in the Regular Army and improve its quality with an intake of only 20,000 men a year. Therefore, urgent measures have been put in hand to investigate what practical steps can be taken to increase the number of Regulars who contract for longer periods. It is as yet too early to say what the result of those investigations will be.
I find that the War Office view is that there are three factors which govern the size of the Regular Army. The first factor is the terms of service in the sense of the duration of Regular service. The second is conditions of service, and the third is the rates of pay. Expert opinion


is, I find, that the second of these factors—namely, conditions of service which includes such matters as married quarters, barracks, dress and avoidance of continual moving—is on the whole the most important single factor in making the Army an attractive career.
The House is aware that great efforts to improve conditions of service are being made, but the House will also be aware that this is a long-term problem the solutions of which are inevitably expensive. I have little doubt that accommodation both for single men and married men is the most important factor of all. The House knows that we are making determined efforts to complete married quarters. The figures are as follow: in the past financial year, we have completed just over 1,000 new married quarters at home and overseas; in the coming financial year, we hope to complete 1,700 married quarters at home and overseas; in the financial year 1951–52, we plan to complete 1,400 married quarters at home and a substantial number, which we cannot give yet, overseas.
This programme is designed to provide married quarters for every entitled officer and soldier in the United Kingdom by 1955. The overseas problem is complicated by the uncertainty as to our future overseas commitments. To cover the gap which exists between now and 1955, we have introduced emergency schemes, for example for the hire of furnished flats and houses, and by these schemes we have already provided 2,000 married quarters.
The third factor in making the Army an attractive career, is, of course, the rates of pay. In the opinion of the War Office authorities this factor is not, on the whole, as important as conditions of service. Here also, as the House knows, any attempt to increase markedly the number of Regulars by increasing pay would be an expensive matter, and the Estimates which I am presenting this afternoon are not small. To sum up, all we can say is that today the Government are paying the closest attention to this key question of increasing the size of the Regular Forces.
I now turn to the question of the organisation of the Reserve Army. The House will recall that the immediate post-war reconstruction of the Territorial Army and the Supplementary Reserve was on a

voluntary basis. It was intended as a first stage in the creation of the Reserve Army of the future. Now we have come to the second stage of that process. In July next men will have completed 18 months National Service under the Act of 1948, and they will begin to flow into the Territorial Army and Supplementary Reserve. Their statutory liability will be to serve for four years with one or other of these Forces. The Territorial Army, as re-organised, is essentially a framework of volunteers designed to receive these National Service men.
From July onwards, the Territorial Army will face the task of assimilating this inflow of National Service men and creating our Reserve Army out of a combination of its volunteers and these National Service men. This will be no easy task. To fulfil it, there are three basic requirements. The first is to produce at the end of four years, when the Reserve Forces will have been built up to their full strength, a balanced Reserve Army with units reasonably complete to their establishments. The second requirement is that for that purpose we must ensure that the right numbers of National Service men are allotted to the various Territorial Army units—who live within reasonable distance of a Territorial Army centre or drill hall—so that they can take part in the life of that unit and help to build up reasonably complete Territorial Army units. This is necessary so that these National Service men may be encouraged to become the Territorial Army volunteers of the future for their particular units.
The third requirement is that we must seek to ensure that the National Service men can use the kind of training which they have received in the active Army when they pass into the Territorial Army or Supplementary Reserve. For example, we must seek to ensure that a National Service gunner can join a Territorial Army gunner unit; a National Service R.E.M.E. can join a Territorial Army R.E.M.E. unit, and a National Service infantry man can join a Territorial Army infantry unit, and so on.
In order to tackle this triple problem, the War Office has for many months past been conducting an investigation into what can be done on the one hand to adapt the Territorial Army structure to the inflow of National Service men, and,


on the other hand, to adapt the inflow of National Service men to the structure of the Territorial Army. To that end, the War Office has made a detailed investigation into the manpower position of every Territorial Army unit throughout the country. They have reviewed the number and the character of the National Service men who will present themselves each year on release from the active Army within the area of each Territorial Army unit. They have also reviewed the power of each Territorial Army unit to attract volunteers, judged on the basis of its past record. On this basis, they can form an estimate whether any particular Territorial Army unit can be expected to reach a sufficient strength to form an effective unit of the new Reserve Army.
It might be thought that this was all the information we needed in order to decide on any necessary modification in the Territorial Army's structure, but that would not be so. For example, let us say that a given Territorial Army unit needs 500 men in order to constitute an efficient unit of the Reserve Army. Let us say that 100 volunteers are in sight and that 400 National Service men will be living in the area of the unit. At first sight, the problem seems to be solved, but this is to neglect the third of our requirements. Let us say that the Territorial unit in question is an infantry unit; but that, of the 400 National Service men who will return to live in its area, there may be 150 gunners, 100 R.A.S.C. men and only 150 infantry men. Unless we are willing to remuster the 150 gunners and the 100 R.A.S.C. men into the infantry, and thus fail to make use of their National Service training, we are still faced with our problem.
I am accordingly advised that we must face some readjustment of the Territorial Army structure, in order to get the best use of the trained manpower available from July next in the building of our Reserve Army. Before going on to give the House some account of this proposed readjustment, I ought to deal with the question which may be in the minds of some hon. Members. Why, they may ask, was not the Territorial Army, when it was reconstituted after the war, so organised as to take this problem in its stride? The answer is, I think, that the size and shape of the Reserve Army was then uncertain. The period of National Service

was undetermined and the period for which the ex-National Service man would remain in the Reserve Army was also uncertain. On the other hand, it was necessary to reconstitute a volunteer Territorial Army so that there should be some organised body to receive the National Service men passing into the Reserve.
I now come to what is proposed in order to make the best possible use of the National Service men as they pass out of active service. I am sure I do not have to tell the House that the experienced officers have only made these proposals for some modification in the structure of the Territorial Army with utmost reluctance and after a most careful examination of each individual case. Such officers would be the last men to under-estimate the importance of the long and valuable local traditions of the Territorial Army. They are acutely conscious of the value of these traditions, especially for a body like the Territorial Army, which has always been on a voluntary basis and which will retain an indispensable volunteer element. These officers have been loth to recommend a change in the functions or character of a unit which has had a long and distinguished history. They have been equally loth to amalgamate units which have their own traditions and loyalties, and, in fact, they have cut down to the very minimum these necessary changes.
Nevertheless, the opinion of these experienced officers, after prolonged study of the question, is that some changes in the structure of the Territorial Army are absolutely indispensable if the Territorial Army is to fulfil its vital new rôle of providing a framework, or backbone, for our Reserve Army. It is for this reason that we do not hesitate to appeal to the goodwill and loyalty of the Territorial Army and the Territorial Army and Air Force Associations. After all, the purpose of the Territorial Army has been to provide the country with the most effective military Force possible in any given circumstances. I am sure, therefore, that we have only to convince the Territorial Army leaders, the county associations, and all others who have given such loyal service to the Territorial Army that the changes are indispensable in the national interests, in order to evoke their whole-hearted co-operation.
Fortunately, the changes in the structure of the Territorial Army are not as far-reaching as might have been feared. The vast majority of Territorial Army units will continue to function in the rôles and in the places to which they are now accustomed. I cannot, of course, detail to the House this afternoon the individual changes which are proposed. Briefly, they involve a reduction in the number of major units of the Territorial Army—of lieutenant-colonels' commands—from 583 to 507. This reduction by 76 units still leaves the number of Territorial Army units, the House will observe, substantially above the pre-1938 figure, which was 350. Of the 76 units removed from the Territorial Army's Order of Battle, about one-half will be amalgamated with existing Territorial Army units, while about half will be transferred to the Supplementary Reserve. Full details of the individual changes proposed will, of course, be published and they are now available in the Library of the House.
In addition to these 76 major changes, there will be some 600 minor changes and moves. It is impossible to generalise on the nature of these minor moves or changes. Each problem is essentially a local one, and different solutions have therefore been sought, and, I hope, found, to fit each particular case. These changes are all under discussion between General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the Home Commands and the Territorial Army and Air Force Associations. Perhaps the best summary that can he made is that these changes will usually involve moving the Territorial Army Centre, or drill hall, to some new area nearer to the centre of gravity round which live the new National Service men and the potential new volunteers for that unit. It must not be thought that all these indispensable changes in the structure of the Territorial Army are unpleasant necessities. I will give one example of a good effect. It has been possible to group certain brigades together in Scotland to form a reconstituted 52nd Lowland Division. The absence of this Division from the Territorial Army has been much deplored in Scotland in the past.
This is only one side of the indispensable process of building a Reserve Army. It is not only proposed to adapt the structure of the Territorial Army so that it may best receive the quantity and the type of

man flowing into it from the National Service Scheme; it is also proposed progressively to adapt the type of National Service man flowing in. When a man is called up for National Service, we have to decide in what arm he shall serve. In future, we shall take into account the character of the T.A. units based on the town and district from which he comes, for he will return to these units probably at the end of his 18 months' service. Thus, if there is a gunner unit and an infantry unit in the man's town, we shall seek to make him an infantryman or a gunner during his period of service, rather than post him to the R.A.C. or R.A.S.C. Thus he will find his natural place in the Reserve Army in his own area when his 18 months' service are done.
Of course, there will be other factors to take into account. We cannot only think of the Territorial Army's requirements. If a National Service man on call-up has special technical skill or aptitude, or a strong personal preference this will have to be taken into account. There should still be, in the majority of cases, particularly for men who came from the larger cities, much freedom of choice; for the larger cities provide a wide choice. of Territorial units to which the men may return. Finally, we will still guarantee to boys who qualify for a particular arm by service with the Territorial Army or the Cadet Forces before their period of National Service, that they will he posted to the arm of their choice.
I must make it clear, however, that it will be a year or two before the full effect of these proposals for fitting the flow of National Service recruits into the Territorial Army structure can be fully felt. Until then a relatively high proportion of what is called "rebadging"—in other words, reposting—men from one Arm to another on transfer to the Territorial Army or Supplementary Reserve will be inevitable.
I turn to the question of the future character of the Reserve Army. The National Service men entering the Territorial Army will be joining units which have already been raised on a voluntary basis. The existing volunteers have the primary role of training the new corners. Yet many of the new entrants themselves will be men of high skill and powers of leadership. In fact, we are looking to these new National Service entrants to


be the Territorial Army volunteers and leaders of the future. Therefore, there can be no question of a Territorial Army divided sharply into two classes—volunteers and National Service men. After all, in due course the whole Territorial Army will be composed of officers and men who have served their period of National Service.
Let me here say a word about Territorial recruiting. As the House knows, we badly need more volunteers for the Territorial Army. Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to under-estimate what has been achieved in this direction. If we ignore the age group in the pre-war Territorial Army equivalent to the age groups which have been discharging National Service obligations since the war, we have very nearly as many volunteers in the Territorial Army now as we had between the two wars. This reflects great credit on all those who volunteered in the post-war period and who have worked so energetically in forming units and reconstituting the Territorial Army. What we need today are more Warrant Officers and senior N.C.Os. preferably with war experience. We need another 8,000 men of this sort and we are asking employers not merely to give such men an opportunity to join the Territorial Army, but to give them positive encouragement to do so.
I should now like to say something about the Supplementary Reserve. I have already said that some of the units will be removed from the Territorial Army Order of Battle and transferred to the Supplementary Reserve. One reason for this step is that in some cases National Service men will be returning to homes too far away from any Territorial Army Centre for them to take part in the life of the Territorial Army, and to take part in regular evening drills, etc. The Supplementary Reserve used to consist largely of technical units, such as railway operating and port operating companies and like companies in which in many cases, men were called upon to perform exactly similar tasks in war as they were performing in peace, and constant weekly training in new weapons or as members of a weapon team was not necessary. We now propose to expand the scope of the Supplementary Reserve to include a number of non-divisional

and line of communication units which have hitherto been raised within the Territorial Army.
In the Supplementary Reserve a man will normally perform his liability of 60 days' training in four annual camps of 15 days each, with his unit, whereas in the Territorial Army he will generally perform that liability in three annual camps of 15 days each, and the remaining 15 days' training will be taken at week-end camps or by attendance at drills; four drills being equivalent to one day. I should here mention that no 1949 National Service man leaving the Army from 1st July this year onwards will be required to attend camp this year. This enlargement of the Supplementary Reserve complements the modification in the structure of the Territorial Army of which I have informed the House. Together they should enable us to provide the number of units planned for the Reserve Army, including A.A. Command. On the whole troops in field force and A.A. Command formations will be drawn from the Territorial Army and the extra-formational backing on the whole from the Supplementary Reserve.
Let me attempt to sum up again the object of the proposed reorganisation of units of the Reserve Army. The reorganisation is intended to enable us to marry up our Territorial and Supplementary Reserve units which are characterised by their volunteer cadres and their strong territorial and traditional basis, with the trained manpower of National Service men as it begins to flow into the Army from July onwards. I know that those who have planned this reorganisation would be the first to say that it will involve many difficulties and cannot be expected to run smoothly from the outset in every case. Nevertheless, they are convinced, and they have convinced me, that it forms the only sound basis on which we can build the Reserve Army.
I have devoted the main part of my speech to these problems of organisation, the first the organisation of the Active Army, and the second, the organisation of the Reserve Army, for these issues face us immediately this year. I must not end my speech without saying a word about the present tasks and responsibilities of the Army. The Army today bears the responsibility of having entrusted to it 18 vital months in the lives of many of the


young men of this country. My predecessor in office made this matter of the welfare and morale of the National Service men his immediate personal concern. He lost no opportunity of achieving direct personal contact with these young men and he has told me, as he has told the House, of his efforts to see that their time, their energy and their enthusiasm are used to the very best advantage. I shall do my utmost to continue my predecessor's notable work in this sphere.
Nor would I like to end this speech without pointing out to the House the great efforts at economy made during the past year. In spite of the fact of the major new commitment in Hong Kong and the heavy continuous commitment in Malaya, there has been no Supplementary Estimate during the past year and the Estimates for the coming year are down by£5.7 million. In fact actual gross Army expenditure is down by£14.6 million for the appropriations in aid, mainly from the sale of stores, are now beginning to tail off. Such a result would have been quite impossible without the most rigid economy, especially as a substantial provision has been made under Vote 7 for re-equipment and research. It would be idle to conceal from the House that this last will be a continuing commitment in the coming years.
I repeat that I have thought it better to concentrate in this speech on one or two main issues. This has inevitably meant the exclusion of many important points which will no doubt arise in the course of the Debate. My hon. Friend who has been working on these problems for two and a hall years will reply to the Debate. No one can mistake the fact that the Army is still fully extended in discharging its numerous and heavy responsibilities. These responsibilities are of two kinds. The first and most immediate, the present overseas commitments; the second—less immediate, but no less indispensable, the task of preparing a force, in the form of both an Active Army and a Reserve Army, a force which can play a worthy part in ensuring Western Europe against attack.
Either task, without the other, could, perhaps, be performed without the need to call upon the appreciable part of the national effort and resources which, I am well aware, are represented by these esti-

mates. But in combination, these tasks cannot be undertaken at any less cost: in fact, taken together, they undoubtedly engage all the resources of the Army in men, material and money. Nevertheless, sustained as it will be by the support of Parliament, the Army is undertaking, and will discharge, its heavy, dual responsibilities.

4.20 p.m.

Mr. Oliver Lyttelton: The right hon. Gentleman has been in office for a bare three weeks. To have to introduce the Army Estimates after such a short tenure of office and such short experience of the subject must be something of an ordeal. He must have been making a speech which very largely depended upon the work of others and for which he has had no responsibility. I will try to bear that in mind. It is some encouragement to us on these benches to find the Secretary of State for War stressing and underlining the very arguments which we have been emphasising during the last four and a half years.
I should like to ask the Secretary of State for some more information on the subject of Malaya. No doubt he is aware of the widespread anxiety which has been caused in Malaya by the answer given by the Minister of State for the Colonies on the subject of military reinforcements. The right hon. Gentleman has not entirely removed that anxiety from my mind by what he said this afternoon. We want to obtain an assurance that if more troops are required they will be sent, and that the War Office, at least, will not regard the present forces which we have deployed in Malaya on these operations as necessarily the maximum. I attach some importance to that question, and I hope that whoever replies will make a particular reference to it.
The Memorandum issued on the Army Estimates is, in some respects, the most candid we have ever had from His Majesty's Government. I must quote again— they were quoted several times on Thursday—the words which it used, and which are frank to the point of brutality. In paragraph 7, page 4, the Memorandum states:
Moreover, the Army can never be fully efficient and the National Service men be properly trained and economically employed unless the Regular element is appreciably increased.


The right hon. Gentleman devoted the last part of the first part of his speech to this very subject. But upon that point he seemed to be pessimistic, almost defeatest, and this passage, which was so widely quoted, goes to the very heart of the matter which is before the House this afternoon. The most expensive and the least efficient way of organising military defence is by employing large numbers of short-service men. I think we all agree on that. The larger the number of long-service men the cheaper and more efficient will be the Army. This applies—and I think the Secretary of State was also on the same point which I want to reinforce—to all periods of service. The soldier who originally enlists for five years with the Colours and for seven years with the Reserve, or vice versa, and who re-enlists for a total period of 12 years is a great asset to any Army. But those who enlist after 12 years for a further 10 years, making 22 years in all, are not only an asset but are of incalculable value to an Army. It is from these soldiers that the bulk of highly trained and senior noncommissioned officers of the Army are drawn.
To employ short-service men is undoubtedly a very expensive way of filling the ranks. There are only a few months in which a short-service man can be described as a trained soldier. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) has said—and it was not disputed—the National Service man could put in only two or three months in Malaya as a fully trained man. The point I am making, that it is expensive and inefficient to have such a large proportion of short-service men in the Army, is generally acknowledged. The White Paper on Defence used the words:
All will agree that as many as possible of our peace-time defence responsibilities should be met by Regular Forces.
I am, frankly, disappointed by the rather hopeless attitude the Secretary of State adopted towards this problem. We have not seen the worst of it yet. Apart from the disquieting information that 40 per cent. of officers are on short-term engagements, there is also the fact that a little more than a year ago National Service men were serving for 22 months while most of those who are now coming out have served 20 months. From now

onwards we shall come back to the exact period of 18 months under the National Service Act. So this problem will be more acute.
But, far more serious than the present position—and I do not think the Secretary of State brought this out—is the trend of recruiting. If we look at the years 1947, 1948 and 1949 and take all three Services together, the figures are really startling. In 1947 the figure was 95,500; in 1948 it was 67,200; in 1949 it was 52,200. Recruitment in the last quarter of 1949 was at the annual rate of only 37,800. The figures for the Army alone are 40,500 in 1947, 33,900 in 1948 and 23,800 in 1949. The last quarter of 1949 shows recruiting for the Regular Army at a rate of only 17,000 men a year.
If I may put the subject in a pictorial way, and describe the Regular Army as "the thin red line" and the National Service Army as "the thick blue line," it is, unfortunately, true today that the thin red line is getting thinner. Consequently, the thick blue line will have to be made thicker if we are to keep any kind of efficient Army. This trend is the reverse of what is desirable in the cause of efficiency and economy. I think we all agree on that. In 1948 and 1949 we were led to entertain some hopes that increased recruitment and decreased commitments would help towards the solution of our problem. We hear this afternoon that there is no great decrease in the commitments which the Army have to fulfil. On the other hand, we have this very serious present position and much more serious tendency which the figures I have just quoted seem to show.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) warned the Government, in the clearest possible terms, about three years ago, of where we were going to get in this matter. Hon. Members opposite should read those words. My right hon. Friend described the Government as:
… planless in the grip of a situation which they had not foreseen. …
REPORT, 30th July, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 504.]
The predicament is quite clear.
I must now turn to suggestions for reversing the trend. I believe it is possible to do so, and to make the thin red


line, that is the Regular Army, thicker by taking action. This is not primarily a matter of money. We have now reached a point where I believe the increase in efficiency, by making the thin red line thicker, will be quite striking, and at quite negligible cost.
How is recruitment to the Regular Army to be increased? I hope hon. Members opposite will forgive me if I start upon matters upon which the Secretary of State was silent. We frequently hear, in industrial Debates, that men are willing to work and give their labour for the community because they derive satisfaction from serving their fellow men. How far these statements make a contribution to industrial relations or how far they are acceptable to employers or to the trades unions is another question. Nevertheless, this moral, spiritual and patriotic impulse is latent in people's hearts. I think that is beyond argument, but, unfortunately, it generally comes out only when great national danger is undergone and when perhaps survival is at stake.
If we are to fill the ranks of the Regular Army, the first step must be taken by public opinion. It must be shown that service in the Army is regarded by everyone as a noble calling, involving personal sacrifice, hard discipline and often death in the cause of the country. By various means public sympathy has been enlisted, and very rightly, for our Police Force. The same sympathy and understanding must be built up with respect to our Armed Forces. Whenever disparaging remarks are made about the military or the military profession—and they are not infrequent—damage is done to the public interest. There are many ways in which public opinion can be improved upon this point. One of them is by hon. Members making speeches themselves on the subject, but another one is by hon. Members keeping silent upon the subject.
Quite apart from these matters of public opinion, some of the panache must be restored, and military bands and uniforms have a part to play. This is one of the reasons why the selection of Service Ministers is so important. The idea is to try to find men who have had experience not only in war but, if possible, in battle—men who have been able to 'absorb, during their lives, some

part of the military philosophy which is necessary, and who understand, in action, the values of discipline and morale. It is most important to stress this. So much for the moral or impalpable side of the subject.
I turn to the material side, and first of all to pay and allowances. I think I am right in saying that the general argument which was advanced by the Government in 1945 was that at that time Service pay and allowances put the material lot of the married soldier roughly at the same level as that of the industrial population, taking into account the other concomitant advantages which the soldier gets with his pay. At that time industrial earnings were about 114s. a week. Since then, largely as a result of inflation, the average industrial earnings have gone up to about 140s. a week, whereas Service pay has remained the same, except for the increases which were announced on 24th November, 1948, and which had the effect of increasing the pay and marriage allowances by about 10s. 6d. a week.
If we accept the Government's own thesis that military and civilian pay were not widely different in 1945, on their own showing there is now a difference in favour of the civilian and to the disadvantage of the military of about 15s. 6d. a week. If these calculations are incorrect—and I do not think they are—I hope they will be corrected. These differences, very large though they are, will become still more marked by any examination of the rewards which senior non-commissioned officers or skilled tradesmen get in their military profession compared with the comparable rates earned in civilian industry.
I am very much disturbed by the very small numbers who reengage after the 12-year period which I have already mentioned. The total numbers of men involved are very small—perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 a year—but the payment of bounties to those who continue after 12 years would pay a very handsome dividend to the Army, not only in efficiency but also in economy. It is from this class that the senior noncommissioned officers are generally drawn. I hope that on this subject His Majesty's Government have studied the system of re-engagement bounties applied by the United States. I am not suggesting that their system is exactly applicable to our


problem, but it might be as well to take a leaf out of the book of those who have at least successfully solved their own problem.
I believe the United States system is something like this: Men engage for 3-year periods at a time, and if they reengage after any of those 3-year periods they get a small bounty. This seems to me to be a much more successful way of promoting the flow of long-service men into the Army than to give bounties, as happens in some cases, when men leave the Army, which is the British system. I think there are lessons to be learned. At any rate, the United States have now got, roughly, one million men in the Army and Air Force, and 400,000 in the Navy, all drawn by voluntary recruitment, I think, and, as far as I know, the National Service Act is in abeyance, at least temporarily. The Americans have also made a special point of regarding service in the Army and Navy as a life career. Many men in the United States serve for 30 years, and are permitted to serve beyond that time is the circumstances of the men permit.
Every hon. Member—and the Secretary of State has referred to this—is aware of the problem of married quarters, and will know what a great encouragement to Army recruiting would result from any contribution which the Government are able to make in this direction. I have something to say about the past record, and I am not surprised that the Secretary of State has been silent upon this. If the problem of housing is acute in the civilian field, it is still more acute in the Army. Instead of giving some preference to the Service housing problem to assist recruiting, the Government have put the Services at a heavy disadvantage compared with civilians.
The total number of married quarters constructed for all the Services between the end of the war and the end of 1949 was 3,000 whereas if Service married quarters had been built even at the civilian rate—that is to say, doing no more than putting the married soldier on an exact equality with the married civilian—then in the same period 15,000 would have been built. That is the number which would have been built if the rate of building of married quarters in the

Army had been comparable with the rate of civilian building in a not very glorious housing programme. In fact, 3,000 have been built. Is it surprising that the Government see the recruiting figures fall?

Mr. Bellenger: Are those permanent buildings?

Mr. Lyftelton: Yes. In this country there are only 3,000. The present programme shows some realisation of the mistakes of the past which the Government cannot possibly escape. As I have calculated, it will be at least five years before the back lag is overtaken. It is something which is now beginning to be tackled for the first time.

Mr. Rhys Davies: The right hon. Gentleman's statistics are very intriguing. He talks of married quarters in the Army. Surely they are built only for a certain time, whereas civilian housing is for a long time. But will right hon. Gentlemen bear that in mind?

Mr. Lyttetton: The married quarters are always occupied.

Mr. Davies: Not by the same people.

Mr. Lyttelton: I am talking about the housing of Service men. I do not know that the hon. Member's knowledge of this subject is particularly valuable. As men leave the Army other men take their places.
Finally, on this aspect of the subject, I believe that if we still adhere to the total period of service with the Colours of 22 years—it used to be 21 years when I was a soldier—and we do not attempt to increase that, as the Americans have done, we should at least give to those who complete their 22 years some positive guarantee of civilian employment at the end of their service. I believe the Secretary of State will get a lot of voluntary help in this matter if he asks for it from industry, because the numbers are not unmanageable. That is a piece of policy which I believe every hon. Member on this side of the House would support.
To sum up, if we are to solve this problem, the gravity of which we all agree, we must first of all make the call of soldiering, the profession of arms, more highly respected than it has been in our country, certainly during the last year or


two. If not, we shall not get the necessary recruiting nor will the standard of military discipline which is necessary be maintained.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell): We have done more in matters like pay than was done before the war.

Mr. Lyttelton: The right hon. Gentleman is now going back to the material rewards, if I may say so, whereas what I was talking about in this part of my speech was the respect—and I really know about this—paid to the uniform and those who wear it. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I am making no party point when I say that between the wars—after 1918 and certainly since the last war—the general move of public opinion has been rather against the military profession.

Mr. Shinwell: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman; normally I should have left the point to my right hon. Friend, but I think the right hon. Gentleman's remark reflects on the three Services—[HON. MEMBERS "No"]—or at any rate, so it appeared to me. Even if it applies to the Army, the application could be to the three Services. What the right hon. Gentleman suggests is that we on this side of the House have failed to pay the proper respect to the military. I can assure him that that is not so. Indeed, in pay, accommodation and the like we have paid more respect in the last two years than was shown in the years before the war, when pay was extremely low.

Mr. Lyttelton: The right hon. Gentleman seems very sensitive on this point. I never suggested for a moment that he has not—

An Hon. Member: He is very touchy.

Mr. Shinwell: Shut up; I am listening to the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Lyttelton: The right hon. Gentleman's contact with the Army as Secretary for War for a year or so and now, in his position as Minister of Defence, has made him unusually belligerent. It is really quite a relief to find somebody on those benches breathing fire and thunder.
I was talking about the move of public opinion against the military profession. I do not wish to attach it to any party, but just before the last war and since the last war it has been a popular thing rather

to look down upon the Services. I am not putting the blame on to the right hon. Gentleman. Of course, it would be quite wrong for him to express that opinion; he would do just the opposite. Nevertheless, it is a fact. In wishing to ridicule people, how often did he describe them as "Colonel Blimps"? That kind of attitude towards the military profession has not tended to make it popular. Hon. Members opposite should, on this occasion, search their hearts to see whether they have been guilty of any of these criticisms and, resolve, not to make them in the future.
Apart from this point, we must try to bring Army pay more into line with civilian conditions. Third, more attention must be paid to married quarters. Fourth, we must, I suggest, consider a sensible system of bounties for men who reengage after five or seven years or after 12 years, because that will perhaps pay the biggest dividend in efficiency, both military and financially. These changes will cost money which we cannot afford unless, at the same time, it is possible, by increasing the flow of men into the Regular Army, to reduce the intake of National Service men.
I was very surprised by a remark which the Secretary of State made and which seemed to convey to the House the impression that all the National Service men found their way into the Army. The fact is that about one man in two is selected for service with the Colours, and I think that is shown by the figures given by the Minister of Labour on 13th March. In this coming year the numbers due to register in the relevant age class, which is 1932, amount to 292,000 whereas the yield in National Service men is only 132,000. Does the Minister of Defence dispute those figures? If the idea of any selective National Service is repugnant to anybody in the House he should note that selective National Service is already taking place, but instead of taking place upon a universal system it is taking place by exemptions and other deferments which are much more questionable than an openly selective system.
Now I want to say a few words about the equipment of the Army. I do not want to deal with the subject of the Territorial Army because there is an Amendment down on the subject in the


name of my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney), and in the short time at my disposal I do not want to say very much about that. It was, however, rather astonishing to listen to the almost nursery description which the Secretary of State gave about how the structure of the Territorial Army requires alteration if only gunners come out from National Service in a place where there are only infantry units. The realisation which is now borne in upon him that the real solution of this administrative difficulty is to allocate the recruits into the various Services, so as not to create this problem when they have finished their National Service; the realisation that it is simply an administrative fact, is rather exhilarating, but it has taken him rather a long time to find it out. Does the Minister of Defence wish to interrupt again?

Mr. Shinwell: I thought that jejune suggestion was only worth laughing at.

Mr. Lyttelton: The point was sufficient to occupy half the speech made by the Secretary of State. He made the point. If it was jejune, it is a little odd that His Majesty's Government have taken four years to find it out.
As far as I can find from the Army Estimates, we are reducing the sums spent on equipment in spite of the exhaustion or approaching exhaustion of our war stores. That reduction, which is a very small one overall, is in face of what was said in 1948 and 1949. In 1949 the Explanatory Memorandum said, on page 9, paragraph 49:
The need for new production was brought prominently to notice in the summer of 1948, as a result of the change in the international situation, when to meet the situation"—
the language is not very felicitous—
additional expenditure was authorised on armaments, vehicles and stores to improve the position. As existing stocks deteriorate further expenditure on new equipment, vehicles, etc., will have to be sharply stepped up.
As far as I can find from the Army Estimates, a slight fall is estimated in 1950 by comparison with 1949, and that seems to be quite contrary to the expressed intention in the previous document. I hope we shall have some further information on this subject. The figures are on page 124 of the Army Estimates.
There is one particular matter upon which I should like some more information, and it is in regard to items under the heading, "Warlike Stores; Signals and Wireless Equipment." In 1948 the provision for that amount, if I am correctly informed, was£3 million. In 1949 it was£1,625,000. In 1950 it is to be£1,200,000. As signals and wireless equipment are such a vital factor in modern war I hope that whoever is to reply for the Government will give us some more information about this very sharp reduction in this particular department and, if possible, reassure me by giving reasons for it.
Now I turn to the question of vehicles. I suppose it is true to say that since 1945 we have had the policy of not providing the Army with new vehicles but of reconditioning the old. That, no doubt, has saved the country a lot of money, and, therefore, was a proper policy to pursue. However, I noticed that in the Report dated 14th December the Select Committee on Estimates appeared to think that that policy should now be reversed. The Committee appeared to suggest that, far from its saving money, too much money and work were being spent on the reconditioning of old vehicles which were not worth the trouble and the money, and that it would now be more economical to buy new ones. I should like some more information on that subject because the appropriation covers no less than£26,200,000. It is, therefore, an important matter.
In conclusion, we all seem to agree that the core of our problem is to increase the Regular Army in the ways that I have described, to make service in the Regular Army more attractive, and to fill its ranks by more recruits; and that all this will, admittedly, cost money. It is our belief on this side of the House—and many of us are in fairly intimate touch with Army affairs—that these changes would lead to very great economies in the Army, at negligible cost now and afterwards at positive financial saving. That is our belief. The change-over, we think, could be effected at practically no cost to the public purse now—if, of course, we accept what is happening de facto, that National Service becomes, pro rata, rather more selective as we try to build up the number of Regular recruits.
For those who think that armies are unnecessary—and I believe there are one or two hon. Members who do—I would say that the whole course of military history has proved that armies are necessary to defence and to victory. Modern wars will probably not differ very widely from past ones in that respect. In peacetime we have commitments different from those of almost any other nation. They are commitments which can be fulfilled proficiently only if we have trained soldiers on long-term engagements, who can be used in the four corners of the world, commitments which are necessary in the protection of the British flag and British citizens.

4.53 p.m.

Mr. Wyatt: I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton) has said very much today with which we would disagree, except that rather strange passage where he seemed to think that the natural revulsion that people have after a great war from things military, was in some strange way attributable to the machinations of the Labour Party.

Mr. Lyttelton: I did not say so.

Mr. Wyatt: I got the impression that the right hon. Gentleman thought that because some members of the Labour Party make speeches attacking military service, they have made the public dislike the Army. There is, however, one point on which I should like to take the right hon. Gentleman up, and that is the question of sending more troops to Malaya. That is a very strange idea, because it is not more troops that are needed in Malaya but a larger and more proficient police force. What is going on there is really in the nature of a police operation.

Mr. Lyttelton: I did not say we should necessarily send more troops. I asked whether, if the local authorities considered that more troops were required, they would be sent, or whether we were going to regard the present military force in Malaya, as the Minister of State for the Colonies said, as the complete maximum.

Mr. Wyatt: I should say we should regard it as the complete maximum, because if we are to do any good we must have men trained in police work. I did have the privilege of going out last year

with an Army unit looking for bandits, and I must say that I thought that, apart from looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack, it was about the most hopeless task one could possibly think of for soldiers, unless they were trained in police work. Unless they are, they have very little chance indeed of catching the right people, or even of knowing whom they are looking for at any given time. It is much more a matter of getting a larger police force in Malaya than it is of sending out more battalions of Guards, who,. however worthy their intentions may be, really cannot be very successful because of the very nature of the operation.
The right hon. Gentleman—very properly, I thought—drew attention to the fact that, of course, the central problem with regard to the Army today is that of recruiting Regular soldiers. It is obviously impossible to do without conscription at present, and I myself doubt whether it is desirable to eliminate conscription altogether. I do not believe, in fact, that four or six months' service in. the Army does anybody any harm at all, and as conscription is serviceable in producing partially trained reserves who can be called upon in time of war and who do not have to go through all the elementary processes of Army training all over again, I think it is probably very useful to have it. If all the men in the Army were Regular soldiers I believe that it would not effect a greater reduction than about 10 per cent. in the numbers required to carry out the present commitments of the Army. So one should not imagine that the raising of Regular soldiers to a sufficient number to eliminate the necessity of conscription would necessarily save a great deal either in manpower or in money.
I think there are two main bars to Regular recruiting. One is material, as the right hon. Member for Aldershot pointed out, and the other is psychological. It is, of course, quite true, on the material side, that whatever is said about equating the rates of pay of soldiers and civilians, they are not, in fact, equated at all. Even a six-star soldier—and one is supposed to be very proficient indeed to be a six-star soldier—gets only£155 per annum plus his keep, and that is not a great deal of money. Of course, it can be said his keep is worth another£3 a week, but the natural retort


of the soldier is, "Give me the£3 and let me decide how I will spend it." It is not of much value to work out that his breakfast is worth 1s. a day, say, and his lunch 1s. 6d., because the soldier would prefer to have the cash to manipulate himself.
I can see, as I think we all can, that it is not possible to have a great increase in pay in our present financial situation. It is, however, gratifying to see that we are going to save something like£10 million in soldiers' pay in the coming year. So it may be possible to do something with that saving. The principal suggestion I should like to make about raising the pay of Regular soldiers is, that the pay of conscripts, of National Service men, should be reduced, and that the pay of the Regular soldiers should be increased by virtue of the reduction made in the National Service men's pay.
National Service is undertaken as a national duty. Somebody who is called up by this means does not go into the Army because he deliberately chooses to go into the Army as a career. He is, in fact, performing a national service for the period for which he is required in the Army. On the other hand, the Regular soldier is undertaking the job as a profession, as a long-term career; and it is not fair that the Regular soldier should get only the same pay, certainly for the first 18 months of his service, as the conscript who is there to do National Service on an involuntary basis.
During the coming year the pay and marriage allowances of other ranks will amount to just over£50 million. National Service men at the moment in the Army amount to about a half of the total strength, so I think it would be safe to say that the National Service men's pay and marriage allowances, in so far as they have marriage allowances, would amount to£20 million out of the total of£50 million. If we were to take£10 million off the National Service men's total pay it would reduce their share to£10 million and we could increase the Regular soldiers' pay from£30 million to£40 million.
If, in addition, the Treasury were to agree to hand back to the Army, say, a half of the savings anticipated in pay this year, it would amount to about

£5,000,000, and we should be able to increase the pay of the Regular soldiers by 50 per cent. straight away. The 50 per cent. increase in pay, although it would not necessarily mean that Regular recruiting would go up to the heights which we would like, would, I think, be bound to have some effect on regular recruiting. It would mean that the rate of pay of the six-star man would go up to something like£225 a year—a great increase over£155 a year. It would mean, however, that the National Service man would have to go down to 3s. a day on first entry and up to, say, 5s. or 5s. 6d. a day after he has finished his first six months' period. So much for the material bar to Regular recruiting.
I think that it is equally important to get right the psychological side of Regular recruiting. What prevents the conscript from signing on for a Regular engagement? National Service ought to be a great advertising period for the Army to attract a conscript to take on a Regular engagement; but it is universally found that very few conscripts do in fact sign on for a Regular engagement. because by the time they have had 18 months' service they are fed up with it, and do not want to do any more. I think that it is reasonable to ask oneself why this should be so. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am afraid that it is not for pacific reasons, as some hon. Members sitting below me would like to imagine.
The first reason is perhaps that the conscript knows that he would not get an immediate increase of pay by signing on for a Regular engagement. He would continue on the old conscript pay, so there is no particular attraction on the pay side. Secondly, he is put off by a great deal of what goes on in the Army. The general atmosphere is not conducive to making people feel that they are being treated as human beings.
There are still far too many pettifogging regulations in existence in the Army of the kind which have been popular music-hall jokes for the last 50 years, and they are still quite real. I was horrified quite recently when I went to a unit near Salisbury to find that the ridiculous game of laying-out kit in an exact way on a bed, according to certain measurements laid down by the sergeant major, was still going on. Knives and forks had


to be pointed in a certain way and everything had to be adjusted to a pattern laid down in a most bone-headed manner by some company sergeant major. It is insulting to human dignity to be required to lay one's tooth-brush on a bed at a certain angle. It is too ridiculous to expect grown-up men to accept that sort of thing in 1950 with any equanimity.
There is a whole series of things like that. It would be interesting to know whether, for instance, the same system with which some of us were familiar when going on sick parade still operates in the Army. This was the system that when one felt ill one had to get up earlier than usual—about six o'clock in the morning—parade outside the barrack-room and stand in the cold for about three quarters of an hour until the sergeant-major or sergeant marched one drearily across the barrack square to the sick room. This arrangement was designed to prevent people reporting sick unnecessarily—I imagine to make them die in their beds. It is not conducive to an atmosphere in which people believe that they are being treated as adults.
Then there is the system of raising complaints. There can be nothing more undemocratic than the Army system of making a complaint. When a man is marched into a room with another man shouting in his ear about a foot behind him and he is then required to stand smartly to attention, every thought is driven out of his head, and on being asked what it is he has to say, he cannot possibly remember. Then there are all sorts of things like fatigues around the barracks, peeling potatoes, and cleaning out the lavatories. I believe that some attempts have been made to introduce potato peeling machines, and that is a very good advance. I believe also that there is some attempt to recruit civilian labour to do some of the more menial tasks in barracks, and I think that could be more widely advertised and more vigorously pursued in the matter of recruitment.
One of the complaints which many conscripts have—and which I think is quite reasonable—is that when they draw their pay at the end of the week—and this is a fair point which can be made against me for trying to reduce it—they

find all sorts of charges to pay, such as barrack-room damages. This is to guard against some mythical glorious "night out" when every window in the barrack-room is going to be smashed, and one has to insure against it over a long period by reductions from the soldiers' pay. It is time that type of deduction was eliminated.

Brigadier Head: I think that it is only fair that I should say that never in my experience has any one been charged barrack damages against a future event. What one is charged for are the things that it is proved one has broken oneself.

Mr. Wyatt: I myself have been charged against a future contingency. I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows that other people have also been charged in that way. Also one should not charge soldiers, for instance, with the cost of "blancoing" their belts. To make people blanco their belts at their peril and then to make them pay for the blanco is a refinement of torture which seems to be quite unnecessary.
Again, during his period of service the National Service man—I think these figures are pretty accurate—has, after he leaves his basic training unit, an average of three postings. Within about a year or 15 months a man serves in three separate units. That is really two times too many. It may be unavoidable to move him once or twice, but to move him three times is, I think, quite wrong. What happens is that the units concerned are in a constant state of flux; there is an atmosphere of instability, and, to put it no higher, the battalion football team is always having to be rearranged to the annoyance of those who support it. All this is very disconcerting and does not help to build up a good battalion spirit.
I am told that the average number of postings in the Middle East is nearly four times during a period of National Service. That means that a man is sent round about once every three months, each time just as he has got used to a dew unit, and he does not like it. There are a lot of rude words used about this type of activity in the Army. When a man comes to consider signing on permanently, he has all these things in the


back of his mind, and he does not propose to be mucked about like that in the future.
I think that another drawback to recruiting is the fact that we have not yet produced on a large scale a new uniform. At a unit I visited recently most of the men were wearing blouses which did not match their trousers; they were all different colours and different types of material, and were never issued so that the wearer had trousers and jacket of the same material; they were either of different materials or of different shades or of different textures. The result is that a man who is not an officer cannot take a pride in his uniform because it is not really like a uniform; it is not a thing of which anybody could be proud. Naturally, the National Service man feels that if that is the sort of uniform he is to have, he does not propose to be seen out in the town wearing it when he is with his girl; he would rather get back to civilian life. It is about time that we produced a proper Service dress, either of the sort we had before the war, or of a sort which can be worn far more often than anything that is produced today.
Those are only some of the things which could be done, on both the psychological and the material side, to improve Regular recruiting. Unless we do increase the number of Regular recruits coming in every year we shall never solve this problem at all, and every year for the next 20 years, when discussing these Estimates we shall hear that the Secretary of State for War still has not got enough recruits, that he still having to juggle with the number of men he calls up each year; and we shall still have suggestions for selective drafts, and other things of that kind, until we get Regular recruiting up to a level which will allow us to reduce the period of National Service to around six months.
Every attempt should be made to examine all these questions. It would be really worth while having a commission to go through the Army merely to examine what psychological irritants there are, quite apart from the question of material defects. If we can do that, we can create the right approach in the public mind, and particularly in the mind of the National Service man, so that he feels he will have a reasonable time in

the Service and will be treated like a human being. Then we shall be able to solve this problem of Regular recruiting.

5.12 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Alport: If I do not follow the arguments of the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) but confine myself, to the best of my ability, to the broad issues which seem to lie behind the Army Estimates, I am sure the House will attribute this to my inexperience, and will accord to me that indulgent hearing which new Members are accustomed to claim on such occasions as this.
I feel, if I am right in understanding the procedure, that the Army suffers a distinct disadvantage in having its Estimates debated before those of the Navy. One of the clearest lessons I learnt when serving at the War Office was that the best argument to advance when approaching the Treasury for approval for expenditure for some improvements in Service Departments, or for the introduction of some new item of equipment, was to prove that the Navy already possessed it. One could be certain that if, by some odd chance, the Treasury approved for the Army an innovation which was not already accepted practice by the Navy for many years past, their Lordships at the Admiralty soon enough found out and set about remedying this infringement of their prerogative by demanding and getting similar concessions for the Senior Service, whether that Service deserved it or not.
Therefore, in any examination of the finances of the Army the approach of a soldier is apt to be diffident, and even furtive, and any suggestion by him that the Army is getting more money than it needs, or that the money it is receiving is not being properly and economically used, tends to savour of desertion in the face of the enemy. Indeed, there have been many occasions on which I have heard the financial departments at the War Office referred to in terms beside which the epithets used for the Germans or the Japanese during the last war would almost appear as terms of endearment.
At the same time, study of the Army Estimates does bring to anyone's mind the question whether, for the very large sum of money which will be debated when the detail of the Estimate is before the House, the Army and the people of


this country are getting full value for money. I suggest that a point worth considering, even at this early stage, is a comparison between the number of men which were being estimated for in 1948–49 and their cost with those which are being regarded as essential during the forthcoming year.
In 1948–49, 415,700 men cost us£305 million; in 1950–51, 356,000 men are apparently to cost£299 million. This means that while the manpower, and therefore to some extent the effectiveness of the Army, has been reduced by 15 per cent., the cost has fallen, according to my mathematics, by only some 2 per cent. I cannot believe that this discrepancy can be explained away, either by rising prices or by the elaboration or maintenance of equipment. It seems to to provide pretty reasonable grounds for concluding that, to some extent, these very large sums of money, which bear very heavily on the taxpayer, are not being used as carefully and as economically as possible.
If I were basing this argument merely on the figures set up in the Estimates I would hesitate to advance it, but I represent in this House a garrison town which has military associations stretching away back into history. This year, Colchester celebrates the nineteen hundredth anniversary of its foundation. During the greater part of two milleniums there have been quartered in Colchester soldiers of many different ages and different armies: the Roman legionaries, the Danish Grand Army, the Conqueror's Normans, and Cromwell's New Model, end the soldiers who went to fight at Blenheim, Waterloo, Mons and Alamein. We in Colchester like soldiers, and we think we understand them. As a senior officer told me not long ago, in his experience there is no town where the atmosphere of friendliness and understanding between civilians and military is greater than in Colchester.
Therefore, in making any criticism, I do not do so with any sense of that feeling prevalent elsewhere, particularly in those years before the war, and not least—if I may say so—in what might be called Fabian circles, so well reflected by the lines:
It's Tommy this an' Tommy that, an'
'Chuck him out, the brute!'
But it's saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot.

Money spent on providing soldiers, serving and retired, with the decent conditions to which the hazards of their calling entitle them, is in no way grudged. Nor for that matter is money spent on ensuring efficiency of their equipment. But money wasted, and, what is even more important, human time and talents wasted, is something which must be grudged. My impression is that there is a feeling, among both civilians and soldiers, that under the present organisation and administration of the Army there is both waste of money and waste of manpower. I believe that this is reflected in the Estimates as they are presented to this House for the forthcoming financial year.
Let me give two examples to illustrate my argument. The first is a local one and the second is taken from a much wider background. I am informed that recently it was decided to end the normal civilian contract for the provision of bread for the garrison and to establish in Colchester an R.A.S.C. army bakery training unit. This latter is intended to provide bread for the garrison and at the same time to give facilities for training National Service men as Army bakers. The effect of this can be judged very simply by the fact that, whereas six civilian bakers were previously employed in this work, at present some 30 Army Service personnel and civilians are being used for that purpose.
According to my experience, field bakery units are not required in peacetime. I do not believe, in fact, from a military point of view, that there is any necessity for this change of organisation or for the maintenance of this particular type of unit. If the full bakery units are required on mobilisation, surely there will be no difficulty in obtaining them through the normal method of conscripting or obtaining as volunteers civilian bakers or civilians with bakery experience and welding them into units in the R.A.S.C. If the idea is to train National Service men for a trade after their release, surely it would be far better for them to be released three or six months earlier, so that they could be trained in their civilian trade in civilian environment and according to civilian methods, and at no cost to the taxpayer. If the idea is economy, then the Minister will find that the experiment, so far from producing


economy, ended in an additional drain on public funds.
From a purely training point of view, 18 months is far too short a time for a soldier in a technical corps to learn the basic training of his arm without wasting his time trying to master a trade which he could far better learn in civilian life. It seems to me to point to faulty administration, and it is also an example which, no doubt, can be emphasised by other examples of the same sort. It is also a waste of manpower which we can ill afford, according to the views expressed in this Debate by the Secretary of State for War.
Let me take my second illustration. I notice on Vote A in the Estimates there is an injunction to reduce the Colonial and Gurkha troops from 82,500 to 69,200. This appears to me inevitably to involve a further reduction of the contribution made by the East African Colonies to local and Imperial defence. We are told in the Statement on Defence for 1950 that the basic problem inherent in the future of the Colonial Forces is that
the cost, even of the forces required for internal security, is often beyond the means of the Colony.
This appears to me to typify the narrow approach which the Government have made since 1945 to the whole problem of raising Colonial Forces.
It would be perfectly possible to raise on a volunteer basis, for employment in the Indian Ocean area, certain units from East Africa. We must never contemplate using African troops in Europe—not from any prejudice of colour but for the simple reason that African troops from Central Africa would not be able to withstand the rigours of European winter. It would be possible, therefore, to enlist troops for this formation to take part, as part of the Imperial strategic reserve for the Indian Ocean area to the strength of a division at least, and the cost of the employment of a brigade of this division in Malaya would be substantially less than, say, that of the Brigade of Guards even from the transportation point of view alone—that is, merely having to move the reinforcements and the original formation from Mombasa to Singapore instead of having to bring them the whole of the way from this country.
From the military point of view it would, in my submission, be far more appropriate. In the first place, it would release European formations for service in Europe, and in the second place, East African troops have experience of, and aptitude for, jungle warfare. Thirdly, by maintaining—and this seems to me the most important point of all—a strong permanent East African force with operational and overseas experience, we would have an adequate basis for expansion in the event of a future war, a basis which we so sadly lacked in 1939.
I am well aware, having served for four years over there, that the African formations serving in Burma in the late war showed certain defects in training and organisation, but this certainly can be explained by the breakneck speed at which our expansion took place. Hon. Members will appreciate what I mean when I say that one battery armed with 3.7 howitzers in 1940 was expanded by 1944 to form a complete divisional artillery and its corps elements, an antiaircraft brigade, a heavy anti-aircraft regiment, coastal defence units for the East African Coast, and the training depots required to maintain these formations in active operations. The dilution was equivalent to pouring a bottle of whisky into the Thames, and then expecting a satisfying drink as a result.
The general conclusion of experienced officers was that the standard of performance, in spite of those disadvantages, of the East African troops in 1939–1945 was at least as good as that of the Indian Army in the first World War and that should another war occur, provided that there are sufficient Regular cadres available and sufficient operational experience can be obtained, East African formations could reach as high a standard of performance as that which enabled the Indian Army to make such a splendid contribution to the war effort between 1939 and 1945.
I therefore suggest to the Minister that these delays which have taken place should be subject to an investigation by him as a matter of urgency, and he should consider the creation of a permanent East African formation voluntarily enlisted for service in the Indian Ocean area, and that the cost of this should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. I am quite certain that such a formation would form a


valuable addition to the structure of imperial defence, and would, in the long run, provide for a saving on the expenditure by this country upon defence.
I do not want the House for one moment to think that my proposal is merely to replace expensive European units by cheap African ones, although there is no doubt the latter would be cheaper from the point of view of equipment and maintenance. I am convinced that such a proposal would be of great value to the Colonies concerned. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) speaking in a similar Debate last year said:
Indeed, I would say that experience in military service has proved the most effective method of education. The African who has served in the Forces is an admirable influence when he gets back to his village."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1949; Vol. 462, c. 1471.]
I would say without hesitation, from such experience as I have had, that the Army made a greater contribution to the improvement in education—and indeed to the improvement in health—of the Africans of East Africa in the five years of war than had been made in the normal course of events during a good number of years previously.
It was the custom of the Colonial Office to take senior warrant officers and N.C.O.s from the King's African Rifles and give them influential appointments in their tribal organisations. There was no doubt that their training in responsibility in the Service was of the greatest value to them in civilian life afterwards. I note that Mr. Alan Wood, whose name has been mentioned in this Debate already—here the Minister will be on very familiar ground—writing in the newspapers recently, said that one of the assets in respect of the groundnut scheme was the knowledge, the skill and the delight with which Africans from primitive tribes learned to handle heavy machinery.
It is sad to us and to those officers who had experience of African formations during the war, that the lessons which we learned very well indeed should have to be learned so shortly afterwards and at such very great cost. The African is capable of handling, and being trained to know, the most up-to-date weapons which are required for the normal field formations. There is no doubt that with continued operational experience he

would be a source of manpower in East Africa and a valuable addition to our defence resources.
I regret to have worried the House for so long on this subject, but I can assure hon. Members that this project, which has been so half-heartedly touched upon in the past, merits further consideration, not only to assist us in the difficult manpower problems we have to face but as part of the general development of Colonial Territories. The experience of providing not only for their political organisation but for their own defence seems to be part of the process towards eventual self-government.

5.34 p.m.

Mr. Parker: It is a very great pleasure to be able to compliment a new Member of this House upon his maiden speech. I do so this time not only by paying the customary courtesy to the hon. and gallant Member for Colchester (Lieut.-Colonel Alport) but by adding that it is a very real pleasure, because the House of Commons always appreciates contributions to its Debates which reveal special knowledge, and contain practical suggestions on the subject under discussion.
I want to deal with the particular problems of the conditions of boys' service in the Army. The problems relate also to the conditions of boys' service in the other Services, and any solution in connection with this service in the Army would be bound to affect boys' service in those other Services. However, this Debate is connected solely with the Army and I shall therefore concentrate my remarks.
There is a large number of boys under the age of 17½ in the Army. I would also classify as "boys" those of 17½ and over who are under the ordinary call-up age, of which there is a considerable number in the Forces. Their problem is somewhat different from that of the younger boys under the age of 17½, but some of the problems affect boys of all ages right up to the actual call-up age.
Most of the boys under 17½ are in special Army schools, where they are trained for different types of specialised services in the Army. So far as I can gather, most of that training is highly desirable and, on the whole, is very good. There is also a small number of boys scattered among the adult Services, as


band boys and so on. The most serious problem is that when boys join the Service, both when under 17½ and when upwards of 17½, they do so not only for the period of their boyhood but for a longer period, stretching well into their adult life as well. Normally they sign also for a further 8 years, plus four years' reserve, or for a full 12 years of service. It is very wrong that we should ask small boys to sign away not only what they are going to do with the rest of their boyhood but with the whole of the earlier period of their adult life.
Many constituents have come to me, not only parents, but young men who are themselves in the Service and who signed on as boys. They very much resent, now that they are adults, that they have to serve in the Army in a form of employment they dislike. They feel that they have been persuaded to sign on when they were young and not responsible for their actions, and when they did not really know what they wanted to do. There is very real resentment among these young men, who feel that the best years of their young adult life are being given to a job in which they are not interested when they would rather be learning some trade which they want to follow for the greater part of their lives.
Youngsters sign on for a number of different reasons. A very large number of them come from orphanages. They join up because they have no home life. Perhaps the headmaster may have made the suggestion to them when they were of an impressionable age. We cannot pretend that at that age they will know what they want to do in their adult lives. Many others come from unhappy or broken homes. There are cases in which youngsters have been brought up by relatives, the mother or father being dead. The youngster feels that he wants to be no longer dependent upon his relatives. He is anxious to move out from their home, and so he joins one of the Services.
A very large number of those who join up do so from a spirit of adventure, which is in itself a good thing. Boys aged 15, 16 or 17 often have rather fancy ideas about what adventures there are going to be in the Army. After a short time they get very disappointed because they find that the adventures are not what they expected. It is unfortunate that much

Army propaganda appeals to this spirit of adventure and that when recruits get into the 20's they feel rather differently about these things. They feel that they have been caught by propaganda which was of an unfair character.
What is the problem? There are at the present time 3,433 boys under 17½ years of age in the Army. That is perhaps quite a small number, but let us remember that when they get into the adult Army many of them are discontented because they feel that they have been got into it on false pretences, and they form elements of discontent. They tend to discourage adults from coming into the Army. I would therefore reinforce the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt). The problem therefore requires to be solved not merely because of the youngsters in the Army but because of its effect upon general recruiting. There is also the larger problem of the boys of 17½ upwards who join whilst still immature without really having made up their minds' in an adult way.
I should like to raise the whole question from the moral and political point of view. It seems to me that from the point of view of the rights of the individual and of treating adults as real citizens, we have not the right to recruit youngsters into the Forces and to get them to bind themselves for very long periods of adult life when they are not adults. That is very wrong. I particularly appeal to the Secretary of State who has written a good many books on political philosophy, to consider this matter. He himself has said that a Socialist society is one in which there should be full freedom for the adult individual. Here is a way in which he can carry out his ideas in his office. Something ought to be done to deal with the problem by this Government. This form of recruitment is very wrong in our present form of society.
I want to make some suggestions for dealing with the problem. First, it is reasonable that if a boy wants to enter an Army training school he should stay in the school and the Army for the full period of his boyhood. I do not think there is now any case for having any boys in the forces who are not going through army training schools or special youth units. If they want to sign on as youngsters, I suggest that they should not be asked to sign on for more than three


years after the period in which they reach 17½. They should enter for their boyhood period and three years from then; after they have been in the adult service for a year, if they want to sign on for the full period of service they should be permitted to do so. It is wrong that young boys and also those joining at 17½ should 'be expected to sign on for the whole period up to 30 years of age. It would however be right and reasonable if they entered at 17½ for a year and then after due consideration signed on for the full adult period.
I have had a very interesting letter from a man who has been connected with the training of boys in Army education schools. I wish to draw to the attention of the Under-Secretary some of the points he raises. He says:
I do not deny that 'boy service' may be a useful means of augmenting the flow of regulars into the army and I know the system produces some well-trained technicians who do well in the service. Also I have no complaint with the large army schools at which most of these boys are trained. But there are one or two points which to my mind need serious attention.
These boys sign on while they are only children. Often they can have little real say in the matter or are easily swayed by the family. Yet once in they cannot get out. It was my experience that many of them as they began to grow up loathed the idea of continuing in the army. Some developed obvious potentialities for other careers. Yet they are virtually slaves; the only ways of getting out, I believe, are by 'buying themselves out' (impossible on their tiny pay) or by behaving so badly or so stupidly that the army dispenses with their services….
The bulk of the boys are at proper army schools where they receive a very good training but a minority are stationed among various units, at regimental depots, where they are trained as bandsmen or 'drummer boys.' These lads live in close day to day proximity with adult troops. They are subjected to considerable moral risks, and the stunting effect on their general mental and moral development is serious.
These points are based on the experience of someone who has actually been engaged in training boys in the Army.
I ask the Secretary of State to consider if something can be done to overhaul the present conditions of recruitment of boys into the Army. Not only would elementary justice be done to a great many young men who at present feel that they have been got into the Army under false pretences, but this reform would assist recruitment for the Army as

a whole because general recruitment would be helped if these elements of discontent were removed. I therefore ask the Secretary of State to look at this problem, although I fully realise that it will have to be solved in the other Services as well.

5.45 p.m.

General Sir George Jeffreys: I should first like to join with the hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker) in congratulating my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Colchester (Lieut.-Colonel Alport) on his admirable maiden speech and on some of the very admirable and valuable points which he raised. I am quite sure that those of us who are interested in matters of defence and of the Army hope very much that he will in future frequently contribute to our discussions.
The amount we are asked to vote in these Estimates is some£299 million, which is less by approximately£5 million than the amount voted last year, but, as we were reminded by the Secretary of State, it is still a very large sum. Paragraph 18 of the White Paper states that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the money will be spent to the best possible advantage. I wish we could all be equally satisfied on that point. Last year some of us raised the point whether we were getting value for money, and I think that this year many of us will feel some doubts whether we are now likely to get value for our money.
I suppose that we are expected to take the Government's word for this, but we are given far too little information about the Army generally, its strength, distribution, organisation and readiness for war. We do not ask, and we do not expect, to be given all manner of confidential plans and particulars which might be useful to an enemy, but we ask to be given some of that elementary information such as I have mentioned and which we invariably got in pre-war years and which, if the Government have any doubts on the matter, they may be perfectly certain that the intelligence agents of foreign powers have in the very fullest particular. We ought to have very much more information.
There is not even a monthly Army List now. The monthly Army List at least gave us particulars of units, their stations and distribution, and I do not imagine


that it was an extraordinarily expensive production. I cannot think why we should not have it now. If I am correctly informed, the Navy once again has the Navy List, and I hope the Under-Secretary will tell us why there should not now be a monthly Army List. We should know quite a lot more about the Army if there were such a publication.
Once again we have a newly appointed Secretary of State for War, one who has never at any rate shown, openly or publicly, the very smallest interest in the Army of any kind. He cannot be expected to have any knowledge of the Army. He will only be able, as no doubt he did today, to speak from a brief, and he will be probably unable, as his predecessor was, to answer the simplest question about the Army without being coached in it by some staff officer.
What are the main tasks of our Army today? We are not told in the Army Estimates, but I suggest that the first and most important task is Western European defence, and Western European defence must, and does, include home defence; and second, as we are told in the White Paper, is the occupation of what is described as the vital strategic area of the Middle East and the maintenance of our positions in the Far East and in Africa.
As to Western European defence, paragraph 4 of the Statement on Defence says that an overall strategic concept has been drawn up and endorsed. A great many of us would like to know exactly what that means. Does it mean that a definite plan has been made specifying the contingents to be provided by the Powers respectively, and the tasks of those contingents? Such a plan is vitally and urgently necessary and, in my submission, it should be agreed upon and worked to. Further, our contribution to such a plan should be not merely one of equipment and stores, as we have been told is being made, but of fighting Forces.
In speaking of our contribution I would ask whether anything has been done as regards the standardisation of equipment between ourselves and our Western European Allies. I need scarcely say that if equipment is standardised, its supply, the supply of ammunition, and of supplies generally are greatly simplified. I am far from saying that it is an easy thing to do, but I hope the matter has

been considered and that some progress may have been made towards it. Since we are to act as one alliance, has anything been done with regard to assimilation of staff methods? Certainly between ourselves and the French they were very different in the past. Again I do not say it is easy but, if they could be assimilated, it would make for much easier co-operation between ourselves and our Allies, though I would not for a moment think of attempting to lay blame on anybody for not doing this.
I suggest that as regards our contribution of fighting Forces, we must set an example to our Allies and take the lead by providing a British contingent consisting not merely of so many thousand men—which is about all is voted in the Army Estimates—but of organised, trained, well-equipped units and formations, ready to take the field without undue delay. It is common knowledge that units at home at present, although nominally part of our active Army, actually consist of little more than cadres, cadres of instructors who are Regulars and a lot of recruits in all stages of training, from the extremely elementary up to the slightly less elementary, and that those units are in consequence quite unfit and unready for service.
It is, in fact, an utterly unsound system and it is urgently necessary that the system should be improved by the creation of training units. They can be called training units or training centres, but training units there must be which are not part of the active Army, as are the present so-called Arms Basic Training Units. These training units should be again created and no man should be posted to a Service unit until his recruit training has been completed with one of these training units.
I would give the example of the Guards Depot which is the most old-established training unit in this country and is universally acknowledged to be by far the most efficient training unit in this country and, probably, in the world. It is largely so because, wisely, it has been left free from interference and suggestions by various people with new ideas of their own at the War Office. It remains almost the only purely training unit. The efficiency of the Brigade of Guards is due largely to the training of that unit, and if something on those lines were formed for


the rest of the Army, the training and efficiency of the Army and its readiness for war would be greatly improved.
As is recognised in the Memorandum, the Army can never be fully efficient unless there is a strong Regular element in it. Regulars should not only form the bulk of the Service units but they are necessary also as instructors for National Service men and, incidentally, for Territorial units. Yet, as the Memorandum again states:
These figures reveal a serious situation and unless the downward trend can be arrested, the problem of maintaining an efficient Army will become increasingly difficult in 1951 and 1952.
I suggest that any measures in hand which are referred to in the Memorandum are inadequate. The measures detailed by the Secretary of State today are, in my humble opinion, not unsound but inadequate, and far more effective measures need to be taken, and taken quickly, if we are to have anything like the necessary numbers of Regulars in our Army. We cannot afford to wait until 1951 or 1952 and see whether the Army runs down to next door to nothing.
I was glad to hear from the Secretary of State that the situation with regard to married quarters is being dealt with. It is not before it is time. Other further measures I would suggest must include—in spite of what the Secretary of State said—improvement in the pay of Regulars, particularly of officers—especially senior officers—and non-commissioned officers. There must be abolition of the iniquitous system—because that is what it is—of taxing allowances by which quite a number of officers are worse off today, not only in the value of their money but in actual receipts, than they were before the readjustment of pay. Allowances are given for a special purpose, such as the provision of a house or lodging or some necessity of life. To pay the allowance, which may or may not be adequate for its purpose, and then to deduct Income Tax from it is utterly unfair and wrong. All these things, and many others, rankle with the Regular soldier, let there be no mistake about it.
Other measures which should be taken include a guarantee of employment by the Government for men when they finish their time. Further, good Army

service—emphasise the word "good" because I mean really good—should count towards the pensions of those who go to Government services such as the Police and the Post Office. Then there should be serious consideration of the use of bounties, referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton). This method has been used before in our Army when we have had a shortage of soldiers and it might be used again with great advantage. Further, I suggest that soldiers should be given a decent dress. Why should the soldier be practically the only man in the Kingdom who has not a best suit, and who has to live and work and sometimes to sleep in his Service dress?
Then there is the matter of retired pay and pensions, grievances over which form a very strong deterrent to young men from becoming Regulars. Let there be no mistake about it, young men do look ahead; and these two matters are a deterrent especially to those who may be sons of officers who have retired under the 1919 Warrant, which guaranteed a rise or fall in their rates according to the rise or fall in the cost of living. But when they hear that their fathers have been broken faith with, as they have been over this question, they are not encouraged to try their own luck in the Regular Army. All these and many other matters must be inquired into and action taken on them, not far ahead, but in the very near future.
Some of the matters which have been raised today—for instance, economies in Headquarters staffs and training and maintenance establishments—are referred to in the White Paper. Some of them were mentioned last year, perhaps not in identical words, by the then Secretary of State as being inquired into; but nothing has been done. Certain of the improvements I have suggested would undoubtedly be expensive, particularly the increase of pay for certain Regulars, but economies can be made—this suggestion also was made last year—in non-combatant and semi-combatant branches and services which do not contribute directly to the fighting strength and efficiency of the Army.
One example would be the bakery, which was mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Colchester. There are many other things on which


economies could be made, and I suggest it is not a question of whether a service is desirable—for many of them are desirable—hut of whether it is essential to the fighting value and efficiency of the Army. Economies might properly be made in a good many services which are not essential in this respect.
The Secretary of State spoke of problems of organisation, and dealt with the form of the organisation into units and the organisation and the training of recruits, but he said nothing of the higher organisation in formations for Western European defence or for Mid-Eastern and Far Eastern commitments and duties. He spoke of preparing a force for Western European defence, but he does not tell us what has been done in this direction. He is still talking of "inquiring" and "considering" the various matters, but we are not told that anything has been done since last year, when his predecessor was inquiring and considering what should be done in various directions.
Nothing whatever has been said about Empire co-operation. Everybody must realise how important is the co-operation not only of the great countries of the British Commonwealth but of the Colonial Empire also. Where should we have been without their assistance in the last war? An improvement could be made upon the arrangements then in force in that there could be definite agreement beforehand between the Governments as to what should be the measure of assistance those Governments would give to us and what we might legitimately and properly expect from them.
There is the further question, which was referred to again by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Colchester, that when considering our Eastern commitments we must remember that we have lost the great, well-organised and gallant Indian Army. What are we to have to take the place of that Army, which was of such great value to us in two great wars, in the Eastern theatre? It is quite possible that some assistance might be looked to from Pakistan but, as my hon. and gallant Friend has mentioned, there is the question of the role of West and East Africans.
Last year I asked this same question about the Indian Army and its substi-

tutes and suggested that we might look to Africans for assistance. It is stated in the White Paper on Defence that Colonial Budgets can only with difficulty meet the cost of their internal security. It would be a very good investments, however, for us to organise and to pay for the organisation, not of a lesser number, as is, apparently, now proposed, but of an increased number of African troops, to go some way towards making up for the loss of the Indian Army. That would be to the advantage not only of this country and of the Empire, but would be very greatly to the advantage of the West Africans themselves.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does the hon. and gallant Member propose using these African troops in operations in Europe?

Sir G. Jeffreys: No, certainly not. I definitely said that they were to take the place of the Indian Army in operations in the Middle East and Far East.
The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has treated us to some views about the atom and hydrogen bombs. I do not know whether I am doing him an injustice, but I think he has suggested that those two bombs are such very terrible weapons that it is not really worth while thinking about any other methods of defence. There is no question that the atom and hydrogen bombs are terrible weapons, but they are very much more terrible if they are entirely unresisted than if some action is taken with a view to minimising their possible effect.
The late Mr. Baldwin spoke some years ago of our frontier being on the Rhine. It may have to be even more distant now. One of the measures we most emphatically ought to take is to keep the starting or launching points of aeroplanes and rockets at as great a distance from our shores as possible. It would be a very serious matter indeed for us if they were to be on the shores of the channel. Not only do we want to keep those starting points at a great distance; we want to keep the starting points for our own aeroplanes and, perhaps, guided missiles as far forward as we conveniently can. I do not propose to say anything about the Territorial Army, for the same reason as that put forward by my right hon.


Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton), because it forms the subject of an Amendment which is to be moved at a later stage of the Debate.
I hope that the matters of higher organisation and of organisation into formations and by units, will be seriously considered by the War Office. They have given no sign whatever at present of considering this matter. I wonder very much how many divisions or equivalent formations we could put into the field. Should I be very wrong in saying that the number is, possibly, one? It is not very much more than that, and if we take no part, either by our example or in taking the lead, in Western European defence, the other nations who are nominally with us in that defence will not take very much part in it either. It is of the utmost importance that we should have a plan, that we should work to that plan and that our troops are organised so that we can take an effective part in that plan, not only in the air and by sea, but also on the land.

6.10 p.m.

Mr. Paget: I have been attending these Debates for some five years. The argument always seems to go in much the same circle. If I may so put it, we have certain commitments and, of course, those commitments cannot be reduced; they are commitments that require 350,000 or 400,000 men; only about half, or less than half, that number can be found by Regulars and that proportion of short-service men and Regulars means an inefficient Army. Of course we would like to have more Regulars, but we know we are not going to get them; therefore, we are going on having an inefficient Army and so we are not going to be able to fulfil the one commitment that really counts, that is, to provide the divisions that are necessary if Western Europe is to be defended.
I would like to try to find some way out of this. We have talked about how we can get more professional Regular soldiers. I hope we shall try to. We shall not get a large increase. If we avoid the anticipated reduction, we shall be doing quite well. It seems, therefore, that we have to think in terms of reducing our commitments. If we do not reduce those commitments, we must fail on the one vital commitment, which is the safety of Europe.
What are the Colonial commitments, and how can they be got away from? It seems to me that the hon. and gallant Member who made such an admirable maiden speech, the hon. and gallant Member for Colchester (Lieut.-Colonel Alport), provided a solution and I am very thankful to find another enthusiast for raising a Colonial Army. Whatever may be said, our Colonial commitments are not anything like what they were before the war. They have not been increased but have immensely decreased. True, we have trouble in Malaya; true, we have an additional commitment in Hong Kong, but what have we lost? First, Palestine, which was a very heavy commitment indeed. I know that India had value as a great reserve, and so on; every commitment has value; otherwise, one would not be committed to it. But India was something which involved troops and no longer involves troops. The Egyptian commitment, too, has gone, and, of course, far and away the most important commitment of all was Italy. While we had Italy in Africa we had to have in Africa an Army capable of meeting another European army. That has gone. Nowhere in our Colonial Empire or in the East do we now have to contemplate meeting another European army. The sort of menace we had to face before the war has gone. We have a problem in the Colonial Empire which can be met by raising troops which are suitable for that job, that is to say, Colonial troops.
At present, we have the Guards Brigade engaged in hunting bandits in Malaya. I do not say they do not hunt bandits very well, and that they are not doing very gallant service; I have no doubt they are. Equally, I have no doubt that a Rolls Royce would work admirably as a delivery van, but it is the wrong sort of machine to use for that purpose. For this sort of semi-police occupation we ought not to commit the elite of our Forces. It is said that the Colonial budgets will scarcely pay for the existing Colonial Armies. Why should they? /f we—this Parliament, this Budget—are to be relieved of this commitment, which we are finding it progressively more difficult to maintain in terms of manpower. why should we not pay for a very much cheaper method of meeting that commitment, that is, provide a subsidy to the cost of the Colonial troops? It is admirably


put by the hon. and gallant Member for Colchester. I hope I shall find someone with the same views as I have on another matter. We cannot get the recruits here in England for a Regular Army. In Europe there are men of first-class fighting material who would be only too anxious to volunteer if they were given the chance. Why not give them the chance?

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Does this mean Western Germany?

Mr. Paget: This means what the French organised when they had the same sort of manpower difficulties as we are facing today, and which gave them a first-class service as the Foreign Legion.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Ex-Nazis?

Mr. Paget: Ex-Nazis if my hon. Friend likes; I do not mind in the least. When one has a totalitarian Power the ordinary man in the street has, perforce, to follow the politics imposed by that Power and it is a lot of nonsense to talk about ex-Nazis, as it is to talk about ex-Communists somewhere else.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Will my hon. and learned Friend tell me what the last war was about?

Mr. Paget: On another occasion, perhaps, but not now. Since these Colonial commitments are condemning us to an inefficient Army for the protection of our first commitment in Europe, for heaven's sake let us get recruits where we can find them, in Germany if you like, in Central Europe. I do not mind if they are people who were once Communists or Nazis, or anything else. I believe they are good material which can be brought together under British officers to form admirable units, and I would like to see a number of brigades raised and maintained in the Middle East, as the French did. It seems a sensible thing to do and a thing I would like to see done.

Dr. Morgan: I am rather intrigued by my hon. and learned Friend's argument, and would like to know a little more about it. Do I understand him to advocate the formation of a Colonial Army, from among people who have no vote, who have no property and are living in destitution, as in the West Indies?
What does he want them to join the Army to fight for?

Mr. Paget: I think the answer will be that if they do not want to join the Army they will not, but we know perfectly well that wherever we form an Army in Africa, which is the place under consideration, we have queues of recruits. It is something which the native population are most anxious to join and there is never the slightest difficulty in getting them. I was not talking of raising a Foreign Legion in the West Indies, but I was saying that as everyone agreed we cannot get the recruits here in Britain why not accept the good fighting material which is most anxious to volunteer in Central Europe? Form them into units in the Middle East under our own officers, and there you have some first-class fighting material which will relieve us of these commitments and allow us to have a Regular Army back here in England

Sir G. Jeffreys: The hon. and learned Member would not suggest, I imagine, using these foreign legionaries as professional instructors of our National Service men in this country? That is one of the great reasons why we want the Regular troops.

Mr. Paget: I never suggested that. They would not come to this country at all. They would be mobile units which could be switched where required from whatever place we decided to make our base in the Middle East, in just the same way as the French handled the same problem. Their presence would enable us to get rid of the commitments which cause us. by over-dilution of National Service men, to have an inefficient Army here.
If we got rid of our Colonial commitments by transferring thereto a foreign legion and to an expanded coloured Army doing, broadly, a gendarmerie job, I believe the present force of 180,000 Regular troops to be quite sufficient for our purpose in this country. We need, broadly speaking, six to eight first-class mechanised and armoured divisions to meet the danger in Europe, and these could be organised out of that number of men. Let us consider for one moment what is the military problem we are up against in Europe. The Russians have, in their zone of Germany, a force estimated at 25 to 30 fully mobilised divisions. Of those, about 12 are probably armoured.
There are various degrees of armour and it is not easy to compare divisions precisely, but that is the order of the force that we have to meet. We, the Americans and our other Allies in the Atlantic Pact, have to provide the sort of force which can hold up that immediately ready Russian force for at least sufficient time for the French, Belgians and Dutch to mobilise. That requires highly skilled professional troops.
En the initial stages of a war a conscript Army forms practically no protection. I believe that this idea of the levy en masse, which is the real basis of the idea of conscription, is obsolete. Look what happened in 1940. The great German victories were won by about 40,000 troops. In the battles of France only about 40,000 Germans actually fought; the others had a walking-on part. In Holland we saw that a force with a mobilisation strength of about 400,000 was forced to surrender inside a week by a force of under 20,000. That is the measure of the superiority, in the early mobile stages of a war, of highly trained and equipped professional soldiers over the levy armies. It is therefore completely essential that such a highly trained, highly armoured, highly equipped force should be in existence, and to it we must make our contribution.
The second task of holding lines will depend upon the French, the Belgians and the Dutch having time to mobilise. I do not think that there is much likelihood of our being able to use reserves if we do not hold the Russians in the initial phase, because there will be nothing to defend. In any event, the great pool of reserves for the Atlantic Pact is American. In the same way that we used to be the reserve of Europe so America is now the reserve of the Atlantic. We have to hold the ground for the American troops to be able to come. What, then, are our jobs? We require, first, a Colonial Army, stiffened with a mobile foreign legion to cover our Colonial commitments. Second, we require our professional Army to be exclusively committed to Europe, because we cannot fulfil that primary commitment with an Army which is in Hong Kong or French Indo-China. It must be committed here and go nowhere outside Europe.
Third, some garrison forces are required to cover our own country and to

prevent weak airborne landings or anything of that kind spreading too much. I believe that to be the function of conscription. I would have a six months period of conscription in order to form garrison battalions. I would form them and train them locally where the people in them live. I would keep the formations in which they were trained as Territorial formations with a garrison function for the next five or seven years, or whatever period is selected. So far as training is concerned, I should make them a commitment not of the Regular Army but of retired officers and N.C.O.s. They would be fully adequate to do the job which is necessary to create garrison troops, which is what would be required. Out of those garrison units one would train and create divisions when a war was going on but they would all have to be re-trained all over again. That will happen in any event when our present or future Territorial Army is mobilised.
I suggest that these are the general concepts by which we can get out of the hopeless task of committing our Army to commitments which involve a dilution that imposes perpetual inefficiency, which makes our Army incapable of fulfilling its primary commitment. When one attempts to talk in practical terms about this type of problem one tends to he misunderstood, and for that reason I state that we want in Europe not another war but peace. Our every experience of the Russian, however, indicates that the most likely way of getting peace is to make it clear to the Russian that he will not get away with anything if he goes to war. Our hopes of peace are proportionate to our capacity to resist, and I believe that the weakness, the power vacuum, which is stretching from the Elbe to the Atlantic, is a threat to world peace. It is for that reason, above all others, that I desire to see a really efficient Army capable of meeting the Russians on level terms

6.30 p.m.

Mr. McKibbin: I crave the indulgence of the House, as this is the first time I have had the honour of speaking here. I am particularly interested in the question of voluntary recruiting for the Territorial Army in Northern Ireland. We have not conscription, but that is not our fault, because when the 1939 war broke out we asked for conscription, as we wished to


take our full part in the war. For reasons far too controversial for me to go into here, we were refused. So we cannot depend on any intake of National Service men, and all our people in both the T.A. and the other units must be volunteers.
1 have the honour to command a battalion of the Army Cadet Corps, the object of which is to provide pre-service training for boys between 14 and 18 prior to going into the Services. But there is no compulsion whatever for them to join the Forces when their training is finished. Bearing in mind the fact that the population of Northern Ireland is only 1,400,000, I am very proud indeed to say that we have over 50 units of the T.A. in Northern Ireland, plus seven battalions of the Army Cadet Corps, all of whom are volunteers. In addition, we have to find recruits for our own three Regular battalions, "The Stickies," "The Faughs," and "The Skins." The hon. and gallant Member for Colchester (Lieut.-Colonel Alport) is probably the only person in the House who knows who "The Stickies" are, because they are stationed in Colchester.
I am not suggesting that all these T.A. units are up to strength. They certainly are not, and I have always been searching for reasons why we cannot get more volunteers. During the war I gave a lift to an English corporal who was serving with his regiment in Northern Ireland. He was full of grievances. He was married—that was not the reason he had grievances, I do not mean that—but he was married, with two children. He had been conscripted and was serving on ordinary Army rates of pay. His younger brother, who was not married and who was working in a munitions works, was getting between£17 and£20 per week. That was one of his principal grievances, that his younger brother would not give him anything out of the£20 a week which he was earning. I give that only as an example of the kind of unfairness which I believe is one of the principal reasons why we do not get more volunteers, either for the T.A. or the Regular Services.
I pointed this out to a high ranking officer at a T.A. meeting and he said that we did not want the sort of people who joined the T.A. for money. This officer was a very old man. He was a bachelor

he had fought in the Boer War and his ideas had become, I presume, somewhat atrophied I did not fight in the Boer War, but I did to a certain extent in the 1914–18 war, There was a certain amount of sport then to appeal to the adventurous. But that appeal would not be of much use in future wars, where some man, or even a girl, can sit on the other side of the world and press a button to start some missile on its way which will blow us all into oblivion. There is not much sport about that to appeal to anybody.
The ideal way, of course, to get over the difficulty if war broke out would be to conscript everyone and let them work at a soldier's rate of pay whether they are in the Army or in a reserved occupation. But I realise that that would never work here. I would not want it to, because, thank Heaven we still have some freedom in this country; in fact we have more freedom than any other country in the world—no matter which Government is in power. The suggestion I would make is that on mobilisation, those in the Regular Services and the T.A. should have their pay stepped up to the same basis as those in reserved occupations. If a guarantee were given to this effect and also if it were guaranteed they would get their jobs back, I believe there would be no shortage of volunteers at all. The gratuity which an ex-Service man gets is a mere pittance compared with what a worker in a reserved occupation can save.
I brought up this suggestion at a free-for-all talk in a barracks in Belfast, organised by the B.B.C. There were all sorts of people present; troops, members of the public, trade union officials, everybody—and they could say what they liked on the question of why there was a shortage of volunteers for the T.A. My suggestion was received by the troops with great enthusiasm, but it was cut out of the broadcast, like a lot of other sensible suggestions made by the troops themselves.
There was present a trade union official who was an ex-Service man and a great friend of mine. I suggested that he should reply to the question. He said that the B.B.C. had stated that one could only use the microphone once and he had already spoken. He then sat down, and so I never got an answer. It was a very


clever way for him to get out of it. The point I make is that it would only cost
big money if there was a war. It would not cost any more if there was no war. On whatever else we must economise, we cannot afford to economise on the Fighting Forces. It is no use building up a Welfare State if in the process we sacrifice the means of protecting it.
The final suggestion I would make is that the T.A. pay should be tax free. There should be no Income Tax on it, even if the pay is less. There is one example I have in mind. I was given£22 to go to camp. I thought that this was excessive; I did not ask for it, and I did not want it. However, I took it, and used it for the purpose of hiring buses to send the cadets to the nearest sea-side town after they had finished for the evening. It was a useful thing, and got them to come to camp. The next year I did the same thing. Then the Income Tax man came along and I had to fill in a form. The result was that between Income Tax and Super Tax I was left with£12 out of the£44 that I had already parted with for the buses.
These petty economies do not help recruiting. The idea of giving a thing with one hand and taking it away with the other is absolutely wrong. It always seems to me perfectly scandalous that a private soldier should be given a pension after 22 years' service and when he comes out of the Army, and gets into some other business that brings him up to the Income Tax level, that most of it is taken away again. If a man who has given 22 years' service, a great part of his life, is to be given something, it should be given freely with both hands. There should be no Income Tax levied on pensions.
I wish to thank hon. Members on both sides of the House for having listened to me so patiently.

6.39 p.m.

Mr. Rhys Davies: I am sure I speak on behalf of hon. Members of all parties when I say that we are delighted with the maiden speech delivered by the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McKibbin). He brings to this House a feature of our Debates which is very welcome, that is, a grain of humour, and we shall be glad to hear him again and again.
I have heard many Debates in this House on this subject; I have tried to follow the trend of our discussions from last Thursday when we dealt with Defence, because the Debate today has ranged itself round the very same subject. I must confess that I have listened to some speeches today which I never anticipated hearing from hon. Members on this side of the House. I shall, however, come to them later on.
The strange fact to me about the vocabulary of the military class in every country is that they are always talking of defence. It is clear, I think, that all the great powers are preparing for war in the hope that it will not occur. I suppose if I were in Moscow or Washington tonight they would also be talking of defence. Why do they misuse the English language in this way when in fact what they are doing is preparing for another war? As I said, none of them desire a war; but they forget one important point, namely that whilst Governments provide money for equipment and instruments for fighting purposes there will always be a group of military-minded gentlemen in every country who will pull the trigger and see that those instruments are employed. They will find some excuse to start a war. If I had my way I should not deal with the problem in this fashion. I would say to the military class in my country, "There is so much money for you to spend; do your best with that sum; it is all you will get." Until Governments and Parliaments come to that view, we will never stop the appetite of the military machine. It always demands more.
I come now to some of the remarks made in this Debate. The hon. and gallant Member for Petersfield (Sir G. Jeffreys) talked about the Atlantic Pact and Western Defence. As one who knows nothing at all about military affairs—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear.") Why should I know? I have a very sound policy about wars, and it is that those responsible for the quarrels should fight them out themselves instead of calling upon other fellows to do their foul work for them. As I said, the hon. and gallant Member for Petersfield talked about Western Union and the Atlantic Pact. On that score I would ask the Minister how it comes about that the more the nations come together to the defence or Western Europe, the weaker we seem to


become, and the greater the cost of armaments.
That is a strange and anomalous state of affairs. I should have imagined that having got France and the Scandinavian countries and the might of the United States of America together to defend Western Europe, the cost of armaments in my country would have been reduced proportionately. That, however, is not the case. The more the nations come together to defend Western Europe, the greater the increase in armaments. I am told that this is not the end, and that the£799 million we are now spending will be as nothing in a year or more.
I should like the Minister to answer another question. How comes it about that the greater the support we get from foreign powers to meet our commitments the greater is the number of soldiers we require to carry out those commitments? I do not understand the contradiction. I thought that the right hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton) was a little critical of military conscription.

Mr. George Thomas: He voted for it.

Mr. Rhys Davies: We have a strange state of affairs here today. We have Conservative Members opposite criticising military conscription because it does not work—

Mr. Lyttelton: Mr. Lyttelton indicated dissent.

Mr. Rhys Davies: And we have Labour Members on this side of the House supporting military conscription. It is a new form of Socialism to me to have a Member of the Labour Party supporting military conscription.

Mr. Paget: The old Social Democratic Federation was always in favour of a citizen army.

Mr. Rhys Davies: But the Social Democratic Federation never made headway in this country. I would venture to tell the hon. Gentleman, because I was in the Labour Party before he was born, that if those of us who stood on public platforms 30 or 40 years ago had delivered speeches on the lines of those uttered by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) today, there would have been no Labour Party and no Labour Government either. The right hon. Gentleman opposite complained that

there was no public opinion in favour of the Fighting Services. He suggested that we should employ bands and wave banners—that we should sound the trumpets and the kettledrums and blow the clarion call in the streets so that people could be roused to join the Army and fight.
The fact is that the people of this country have suffered two wars and they have had enough of it. No amount of radio propaganda or bands and banners will arouse them. They do not want another war. They are not quite sure which is the next enemy they will be asked to fight. One hon. and gallant Member mentioned Mr. Baldwin—I think I was here at the time—as having said that our frontier was on the Rhine. According to some speeches here today, our frontier has now been pushed from the Rhine as far as the Danube. In the end, I suppose it will reach the banks of the Volga. I should like to ask the Government how can they expect to get more recruits for the Regular Army when conscription takes a large number of the very same young men who might otherwise join as volunteers? They cannot have it both ways. The last war ended nearly five years ago, and the comparison made now of our fighting strength is not between that of 1950 and 1938 but between 1950 and the war period.
I heard on the radio yesterday that most amazing story in the history of the British people. We were told that we are to enrol women into the fighting services and to call one of them a brigadier-general. I should like to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether there is anything to prevent one of the new women soldiers becoming a field-marshal?

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Michael Stewart): At present there is a limitation governed by the terms of the announcement which my hon. Friend has quoted but who am I to set limits to the future?

Mr. Rhys Davies: That is, of course, no answer to my question. If Stalin reads the speeches of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and my hon. Friend the Member for Aston, I am sure that he will collapse in the Kremlin. I would ask my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton where he gets his information when he talks of 15 divisions of


Russian troops on the Eastern side of Germany. There was an article in yesterday's "Observer" by some gentleman telling us all about the strength of the forces of Russia. I thought that nobody could get hold of the secrets of Russia. Where do these gentlemen get their information? I have found out long ago about this military business that there are people in every country—and there are such people in my own country—who play upon the fear of the masses and find an enemy at every turn. Who was our great Ally five years ago? Why, Russia. What a grand fellow Stalin was then, and what splendid soldiers the Red Army possessed. Yet now, the hon. Member for Northampton is expecting a war with that Army.

Mr. Paget: I really must protest about that. I made it clear that I thought that the way not to have a war with Joe Stalin was by being in a position to resist him. I thought that the Baltic States rather demonstrated that. They did not want a war with Stalin, either, but they chose the wrong method.

Mr. Rhys Davies: If the hon. Gentleman can collect the foreign legion from the coloured races of Africa mentioned in his speech and march them right to the banks of the Volga, I am sure that the Red Army would collapse like nine-pins.
A large number of people of this country are very sad about our commitments, because everything that is said by the Government Front Bench in support of military expenditure is to the effect that we must carry out those commitments. I had been in this House for 20 years before I knew that the British Government from time to time was maintaining a garrison, I think, of 30,000 British troops, on the banks of the Nile. The British public has never been informed where our troops are stationed all over the world.
I am opposed to all this expenditure for one simple reason. Some people have come to the conclusion, and I respect their views, that the only way to prevent war is to prepare for one. I have travelled over this country and many places abroad, and I have met all types of people. I once met Gandhi, who showed mankind a better way to avoid war than the generals. I say again, that once a Government produces the

instruments of war, somebody will use them. Hon. Members know as well as I do the present economic conditions of our country with the cry for houses coming from all over the land, and then we talk of building barracks and still more barracks. It simply means that the more barracks we erect the fewer houses we build. Finally, hon. Gentlemen know my views. I speak about war and peace wherever and whenever I can, and I am very proud to stand here tonight, having been elected nine times by the people of Westhoughton because I advocate those eternal principles laid down in the Sermon on the Mount.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (RECRUITMENT)

6.54 p.m.

Mr. John Tilney: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House considers that every effort must be made to encourage a larger number of volunteers to join units of the Territorial Army before the National Service men are posted to the Territorial Army; and with a view to getting recruits therefore calls upon the Government to improve its publicity and the conditions of service and amenities in the Territorial Army and to ensure that up-to-date equipment is allotted to each unit with proper arrangements for storage and maintenance.
In moving this Amendment, I should like to express to the House my appreciation of this, the first, opportunity which I have had of addressing the House, and of having been chosen, by the luck of the Ballot, to speak on a subject about which I feel very deeply and which also gives me the chance of paying tribute to the great work of our Auxiliary Forces. What are the rôles of the Territorial Army? They are three: first, to provide anti-aircraft and coast defences here and by way of reinforcements overseas; second, together with the active Army anywhere, to provide a field force; and, third, to support our Civil Defence organisations against air attack. On the Territorial Army is based our whole mobilisation scheme.
How are we to attain these objectives? I suggest by a properly balanced mixture of volunteer and National Service personnel—and there must be no division between these two, as the Secretary of State for War mentioned in his speech. Their tasks are widespread and complex,


but one element without the other would fail in their joint objective. National Service men, during this summer, will proceed in an even flow into the Territorial Army. Some hon. Members may think that with this steady influx of fresh blood the situation is quite satisfactory, but the National Service man only has to serve 60 days' training in four years, and three-quarters of that time, it is hoped, he will spend in training in three annual camps of 15 days each. Only 15 days more are left to be spread over four years, and it is impossible to keep a unit alive and militarily active by efforts which, however good, are the equivalent of less than one 30-hour working week a year. The continuity of direction and training, the provision of officers, both with and without commissions, must surely fall on the volunteers.
Without its pride in achievement, the Territorial unit will be sorry stuff. It was that esprit de corps which made many of the Territorial Army Regiments, at the outbreak of the last war, exceedingly loth to give up, as ordered, the "T"s we were proud to wear on our shoulders. Without these efforts, the sacrifice of young men's time and freedom in National Service will be in vain. Our mobilisation scheme may fail, and our commitments, which may horrify the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies), but which are commitments of honour and common sense, will not be able to be met, either here, in the Empire or in Western Europe.
It has been the voluntary spirit of service for the public good which has already produced reasonable working cadres. If the volunteers had not provided the leadership for these cadres, it would have had to have been found from the already depleted Regular Army, whereas, up to now, these cadres, capable of strong expansion in a time of greater emergency, have not been costly. It is defence very much on the cheap. Out of Army Estimates of£341 million gross, the Territorial Army, excluding the Cadet Force, is costing less than£10 million.
But there are signals of danger. It was originally planned that there should be 150,000 volunteers, and it is hoped, under these Estimates, to maintain 142,000 this year. What are the figures? On 1st January this year there were no more

than 82,500 volunteers. Compare this figure with 161,000 on 1st January, 1938, before Munich, before the doubling of the Territorial Army; it is now spread over virtually twice as many units as before the war, with all that that means in increased overheads and unnecessary expense of operation when working at less than full capacity. I am certain that the Territorial associations and the volunteers will respond splendidly to the appeal made earlier this afternoon by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War when he gave notice of the various changes that are to be made in the order of battle of the Territorial Army.
What is the cause of the lack of volunteers? I think we must all agree that owing to Hitler's war we have virtually lost what amounts to a 10-year age group. The lad who was 18 in 1939 had probably not joined a Territorial unit. But by the time he came to be demobilised he was 25 or 26 years of age, had possibly married and had to face a new, strange civilian world and find a niche in it, with all the problems which an entirely new life entails. The Territorial Army, when reformed, did not draw on his age group; it drew on a much older one, and that age group is still older today. In 1947, there were many first-class N.C.O.'s and men who signed on, not for four years, but for three, and their period of engagement is almost finished Therefore, we have a good, but ageing cadre, and possibly a declining one as well.
To give the continuity of direction and training which the long-service Regular provides for the active Army, and which the volunteer must provide for the Territorial Army, the country should surely make its appeal to the best type of wartime officer, N.C.O. and man. It will not do this by offering jaunts to the seaside or lolling in comfort, though, naturally and rightly, the volunteer will require those technical amenities which he must have to do his job properly. There is a feeling in the country that all has not been well with the publicity of the Territorial Army; there is a feeling that those at the War Office have not known how or to whom to make their appeal; there is the feeling that the Territorial Army will accept anyone. Surely, in a cadre such as this, formed to inspire, direct and


train, quality is so much more important than quantity.
I am glad to say that in my home city of Liverpool there appears very frequently, in the "Liverpool Echo," the following advertisement, inserted by the local Territorial Association:
Lancashire wants men with character and grit. Quality not quantity. Men of Lancashire, the Territorial Army now requires a limited number of N.C.O.'s of good quality and active service experience in each unit. The object has never been to recruit numbers to reach full establishment, but to complete the instructional teams to train the National Service men. Those with the requisite qualifications apply to the nearest drill hall for information. No bedside lamps.
The best recruiting agent is the man who believes that he belongs to a good unit. He gets his relations and his friends to join, and they are proud to belong to a unit that has won distinction. My old regiment, in Liverpool, in 1939, when the Territorial Army was doubled, raised its complement from 390 to 1,400 in three weeks, before we were able properly to start our publicity campaign and very nearly entirely through the recruiting done by the existing volunteers.
But if the volunteer—and by the word "volunteer" one naturally means the potential National Service volunteer as well, because, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, in due course all volunteers will have undergone a period of National Service—is to be a good recruiting agent, he must be sure that he will receive fair treatment. At present, he is worried about several things. First, he knows that certain of his friends and acquaintances who joined up in the late 30's were disabled during the last war, and do not consider that they have received proper pensions. Second, he must be certain that the volunteer will get at least as good treatment as the National Service man. Third, his wife—the Territorial Army owes much to the wives of volunteers—wants to be certain that their joint annual holiday will not be spent at his camp. Fourth, he wants to be certain that, at any rate for his service in camp, he will not be out of pocket.
This is not the right time or place to discuss war pensions, but would the Secretary of State for War say if it is true that the National Service man may be paid for the time he spends going from

his home to his Territorial Army centre, for the time he spends there and goes back and shuts the door of his home, whereas the volunteer will be paid only for the time that he is at the actual Territorial Army centre? The system of grading for merit appointments, known as the star system, is a very complex one. I understand it is being reviewed. But I hope the right hon. Gentleman will assure the House that this vital factor of incentive will remain under the control of the commanding officer, whatever the difficulties may be of change of arm or transfer from the National Service to the Territorial Army.
Would the right hon. Gentleman also say what penalty will be imposed—and in what courts it will be applied—on what we all hope will be that very small number of National Service men who may not be willing to serve their country according to the law? Will he make certain that that penalty is uniformly just throughout the country yet severe enough to prevent any rift, which he has referred to, arising between National Service men and volunteers? Is it not time that the nationalised industries had some uniform policy over leave and payment while men are in camp? How. otherwise, can the privately owned industries know what is expected of them if the nationalised industries have no coherent policy for the T.A. as a whole?
Substantial advances have been made in the Territorial Army since 1939. The command structure has been improved and training emoluments have been increased. Help from the Regular Forces has improved training. Moreover, that training has provided that vital link, which was lacking before the war, in liaison between Regular and Territorial Forces. Four years' T.A. service on the part of the National Service man will bring an infusion of well-trained fresh blood, and the Territorial Army will no longer only reach its full complement when the country is thoroughly frightened.
These are great advances, but there are still some basic weaknesses. In 1939, few Territorial units had any knowledge of administration and those officers, N.C.O.'s and men who learned administration by bitter experience during the war are now older and fewer. For technical and semi-technical units that have large amounts of transport and stores it


is surely necessary to decentralise equipment down to sub-units. That equipment should not be locked up in the regimental stores and located at a week-end training centre. There should be adequate accommodation down to sub-units, and a sufficiency of people to look after the equipment.
It is equally important to remember, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Petersfield (Sir G. Jeffreys) implied in his speech, that the job of an Army is to fight or to train to fight, and time in issuing and handing over equipment is time taken away from training in that equipment. Time is a vital factor in the Territorial Army and it so happens that generally the most efficient officers, on whose knowledge the standard of the unit depends, are those most pressed in civilian affairs. They must be given reasonable help so that, responsible for the broad policy and training, they are able to decentralise details either to Regular permanent staff or to specially rewarded Territorial personnel.
Yet, with no such help, one unit on Merseyside has been given a week-end training centre 40 miles away, with all that that means in wasted effort and time and extra cost. In 1939, a battery quartermaster-sergeant in the Territorial Army received special pay. None such is forthcoming now. To bring about this necessary decentralisation is it not possible to provide the necessary storage accommodation and also to provide either more permanent staff, or help or some extra pay—it need not amount to very much—for purely Territorial administrative personnel? By so doing, a commanding officer will ensure that someone who is responsible for those stores and equipment, on a sub-unit rather than at unit level, is always available at all operative times.
As the right hon. Gentleman may know, the difficulty is that owing to the exigencies of industry one can never be certain in the Territorial Army whether Territorial personnel can turn up for parades in an evening or not. Therefore, it is immensely important to have someone who will always be present with responsibility for issuing sub-unit stores. It will not cost very much. In any event, the Territorial Army is defence very

much on the cheap. It would be money very well spent.
There appears to be too much rigidity in planning, and too much centralisation. For instance, it has been laid down that all gunners should train at their week-end training centre. If the unit on Merseyside had to do that 40 miles away, I am afraid that not much training would be done. Apparently, the same area in square feet is allowed for headquarters, known as T.A. Centre, whether a good training area is near or whether those headquarters are in the middle of a city surrounded by a mass of streets. The announcement today by the right hon. Gentleman that Territorial Army Centres may be moved to where the volunteers are most likely to be is no doubt a step in the right direction. But I hope he will also bear in mind the need for flexibility in accommodation, depending upon the area to which he moves that accommodation. This lack of flexibility is due to lack of liaison and a misunderstanding of how the Territorial Army works.
In 1947, when the Territorial Army was reformed in Western Command, we were consulted and were given great help by senior commanders of the Regular Army, but it was too late. The framework, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, had already been decided on without consulting those who really knew how the Territorial Army worked, both in peace and in war. Such lack of consultation must be overcome, and I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that the machinery of liaison from the Territorial Associations up to the Director of the Territorial Army could be broadened by quarterly meetings at command and district levels by Regulars and Territorials of all arms. These meetings should discuss policy, and their recommendations should receive immediate attention and action. That is the right way to give us proper value for our money. Incidentally, it is to be hoped that there will be no further change for some time in the great and important office of the Director of the Territorial Army.
The Regular soldier is now working with the Territorial in peace-time as he did in war. Together, despite difficulties, disappointments and downright discouragements—some unavoidable and some man-made—they have already achieved great, though unspectacular, things. To


them the country owes a heavy debt. With greater mutual aid, understanding and help from His Majesty's Government they can, with the National Service man, build up an Auxiliary Force which will yet be the envy and the admiration of the world.

7.22 p.m.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I beg to second the Amendment.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney), I must crave the indulgence of the House. I break in upon its deliberations at so early a stage only because, like my hon. Friend, I have had experience of this particular subject as a member of the Territorial Army. I should like to assure the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that my comments are meant essentially in a helpful manner and not in any critical form. I take courage in making them since he has been at the War Office only as long as I have been in this House.
Reference is made in the Amendment, and has been made by my hon. Friend, to publicity. I should like to deal with this matter because I think that in this respect we have had a lamentable failure. It is the more lamentable because there is evidence that the War Office, under the direction of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor, carried out a survey of the problems involved in Territorial Army recruiting. It was quite clear from that survey where the main lines of recruitment must be and where the main obstacles existed. Yet there is no evidence in all the publicity that any attention has been paid to those conclusions. The first Territorial Army poster that I recall was of a young man putting on his gaiters, a laborious and tiresome procedure at the best of times. The second poster illustrated two persons whom, one assumed, the Territorial Army would be glad to have in its ranks. I can only describe them, as my unit did, as the burglar and the spiv.
It must be made quite plain that publicity is not just a question of putting up posters, even if they are good posters. Publicity is a question of making the right appeal in the right place. The right place, as the right hon. Gentleman has made clear, is to the veterans who fought in the last war. I submit that no real appeal has been made to them.
In our publicity we must try to convince them that it is better to place their services at the disposal of the Territorial Army than to regale their friends in public houses with stories of what they did in El Alamein and on the beaches of Normandy. Quite clearly, there is resistance on their part—and a very reasonable resistance—because many of them have served six years in the Forces and they think that that is quite enough. Their reaction to all the appeals is, in fact, "Nuts," and whereas that might have been a satisfactory answer to the right hon. Gentleman in his previous office, it is hardly satisfactory now.
Secondly, there is a very formidable obstacle in their wives. They say, "You have been away for six years and you are now going to stay at home." Although there may be some men who are very pleased to find a good excuse for being away at least one night a week, there are not enough. We have got to make a real endeavour to bring the wives of the veterans of the last war on to our side. That can be done by telling them that it is better to let these men go for a short time now than to run the risk of losing them again in another catastrophe. I also believe—we have found it so in our unit—that a great deal can be done on the premises to encourage the support of the wives of the men who serve in the unit.
There is another source of recruitment to which a certain amount of reference has been made, and it was the source of recruitment of the Territorial Army before the war. I refer to those in the younger age group who are about to go up for National Service. I know that this has been discussed before in the House, but I believe that far more could be done to encourage young men to enlist in specific Territorial units before they go forward for their National Service, so that they can get ahead of the game and, as it were, peg out their claim before they go up for what must be for many of them a very real ordeal.
There is another source of recruitment which I would commend to the right hon. Gentleman, particularly because of the experience we had in 1939. I refer to the staffs. There are today many men who served in high places on the staffs and who are unable to play their part in the Territorial Army for reasons of time.
Means should be found to give them staff training at the present time so that they could be called upon quickly to perform those duties in a grave emergency. If they are not called forward we shall have exactly the same state of affairs as last time. There will be a general call to the Service units for staff officers, and those of us with any experience know what that means. The commanding officer looks round to see who is least indispensable, and that person goes on the staff. The unit subsequently suffers. I am making no personal reference to those hon. Members who may have been in high positions on the staff.
The next point I wish to make concerns the question of incentive. ft has already been touched upon by my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree. I hope I shall not be regarded as being controversial if I say that we must provide in the Territorial Army far greater incentive than we do at present. I am not suggesting, and no Territorial would suggest, that we should introduce the profit motive. There has never been any question of anyone making anything out of the T.A. and escaping a court-martial. Nevertheless, the principle which has already been laid down must be adhered to—that no man should lose through joining the T.A.
I am glad that reference has already been made to the question of the nationalised industries and their failure, so far, to give a lead in the matter of holidays, and I am glad the Secretary of State for War gave us an assurance that employers would be encouraged to encourage their employees to join the Territorial Army. I hope that encouragement will be real and forceful. That is all very well, but I detected in the right hon. Gentleman's speech a certain complacency and satisfaction which perhaps—and I hope this will not be regarded as impertinent—he will not feel when he has been in his office a little longer.
I am not at all satisfied with the situation which persists in the Territorial Army, nor are my colleagues. One of the reasons is that there is a growing feeling that the Territorial Army is becoming the Cinderella of the Service. It is no good claiming that that is not the case when one sees the situation which exists with regard to training conditions and equipment. In the present Territorial Army

we have a completely different situation from any which has existed before. We have war-tried men who know the potentialities and restrictions of equipment. It is no compliment to them—indeed, it is the height of unwisdom—to hand out to them obsolete equipment. It is very dangerous to do so because when the National Service man arrives, assuming that he has been trained on modern equipment, he will know more about the equipment than does the Territorial who is supposed to instruct him. There is no worse situation for any instructor, officer or N.C.O. than to find that he knows less than the man below him.
Although I realise that there is a considerable problem here, I regret very much that we no longer have Regular adjutants in Territorial units. I believe some units, a small minority, have them, but the majority do not have Regular adjutants. The existence of a Regular adjutant was a most invaluable link with the Regular Army and I think the Minister would be well advised to restore the appointment at the earliest possible moment. Further, and, again, I am aware of the problems of the Regular Army, we are not getting the right standard of instructor in the Territorial Army. Indeed, we are having to instruct the instructors who are sent to us. I can understand that manpower dictates it, but it is something which does not conduce to efficiency in the Territorial Army.
I do not want to be parochial, but I must say I am very concerned with antiaircraft. Today, anti-aircraft is by no means in the high standard of training it should be in, and in view of the fact that the Secretary of State has already said that anti-aircraft work will be a high Territorial commitment, I regard this situation as very serious. There is one great problem which we, in anti-aircraft, have always had to face and that is the provision of air co-operation for our shooting. If men are to go to camp for 14 days, which is the longer period required of the A.A., to achieve their proficiency on the guns, they must be assured that, weather conditions permitting, they will be able to shoot. Today, the availability of aircraft is such that they cannot be given that assurance. It is very difficult when commanding officers are expected to take their men to camp under such restrictions.
One further point remains on the question of incentives, and that is the prestige of the Territorial Army in public functions. Reference has been made to the "T" which Territorial units wore before the war. We have heard that there is a consensus of opinion in the Territorial Army against the wearing of the "T," but I honestly believe that a wise Government would overrule the view that the "T" should not be worn. I would press very strongly for the restoration of the "T" for Territorial Army units. It has been a matter of considerable pride and has been greatly valued by very many people. I do not wish to cry over spilt milk, although it was spilt from a high level, but in connection with anti-aircraft I believe that the denial of the 1939–45 Star has had a grave effect on recruitment. There is a growing feeling that A.A. is nothing more or less than Civil Defence in battle. That is not decrying the role of Civil Defence, but, on the other hand, it is no incentive for a man to join antiaircraft units.
I have noticed the absence of the Territorial Army from many great public functions. I think the T.A. should always be represented at such functions, because that is the role of the citizen army. I think more glamour should be given to the men of the Territorial Army and that the sooner the No. 1 dress is issued to the Territorials the better. I believe that what has to be done is something far more radical than has been envisaged in this Debate so far. A new spirit is required in the attitude of the Government to the Territorial Army. At the time the Territorial Army was reconstituted we heard from various authorities that a new Army was coming into being which would have three equal partners—the Regular, the Territorial and the National Service man. That is a very fine conception which I, for one, believe could be made to work, but I was very surprised today to hear from the Minister that the future plan upon which we are working envisaged the indefinite continuation of National Service.
I should like to feel that the stepping up of our voluntary force would be so successful that eventually we could dispense with conscription, because conscription is not an aspect of our Service which is in keeping with the traditions of this country nor is it economically sound. I

realise that at present such a step would be impossible, but it would appear from the plans put forward this afternoon that it is the intention to base all our future organisation upon it, and that I regret extremely.
The Regular Army must have a new approach to the Territorial. I fear that Regulars today do not appreciate the problem of the Territorial to its full extent and that there is a tendency to patronise the Territorial in the presence of National Service men. If our future Army is to be effective, then all three parts must be fully co-ordinated. I urge the Minister to do everything he can to build the prestige, efficiency and traditions of the Territorial Army, because they are in keeping with the finest traditions of this country.

7.39 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: It falls to my lot to congratulate two hon. Gentlemen, the hon. Member for Waver-tree (Mr. Tilney) and the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Harvey) on very earnest and well-informed maiden speeches, and I can do so with some degree of objectivity because, from the point of view of principle, I do not agree with a word of what they said. The purport of the Amendment is to call attention to the need for further recruiting for the Territorial Army, and to create a greater feeling of enthusiasm in the country for the re-organisation of our military Forces, which has been outlined by the hon. Gentlemen.
On this occasion last year we had a speech from the present Minister of Defence in which he dealt with similar matters, and at that time he outlined his scheme for a great campaign for recruiting for the Army, and held out hopes which I do not think even the most optimistic of his followers would say had been achieved. I do not think it was the fault of the Minister of Defence who was then Secretary of State for War, because I believe he put all his energy and enthusiasm and ability into the campaign. However, at the end of it there has been a comparative failure. He was assisted by a great broadcast campaign in which the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and other prominent public figures took part. It was anticipated that, as a result of that campaign, there would be an increase in the strength of the Territorial Army. If that anticipation had been


realised the two hon. Gentlemen would not have had to make those speeches here tonight.
The Secretary of State for War has now been promoted to Minister of Defence, not because, presumably, of any increase in the number of recruits he was able to bring into the Forces; and we have now a new Secretary of State for War who will presumably have to begin where the late Secretary of State for War left off. Is there any reason to believe that the new recruiting to be carried on by the new Secretary of State for War is likely to be any more successful than the great campaign which was conducted last year? I pressed without any success for some figures of that campaign. I tried to get from the Secretary of State for War some figures which would show what effect those broadcast appeals by prominent public men had had upon the public.
It was thought, for example, when the Leader of the Opposition went to the microphone that that event would be immediately followed by an increase in the number of recruits; and I am quite sure that in making a patriotic appeal the Leader of the Opposition is really superior to anybody who goes to the microphone in this country. Even he, however, was not successful; and I cannot conceive that a new appeal by the Leader of the Opposition this year would be likely to have any greater effect than the one he made last year. It was recalled in the Debate on Thursday that the Leader of the Opposition during the General Election had to deny a rumour that he was dead. There are worse things than death, and one of them is to be obsolete. I do not believe that the Leader of the Opposition, if he made an appeal in this proposed recruiting campaign, would be regarded as facing the facts of the position today.
I do suggest that, as a result of the evidence we have now gathered, we have to come to the conclusion that the last recruiting campaign was not a success, and that if a recruiting campaign is to be more successful in the future a different kind of appeal will have to be made. Think of the difficulties of the Secretary of State for War. Imagine his going on a joint recruiting campaign on the same platform as the Leader of the Opposition. Imagine the Leader of

the Opposition coming along and saying, "Yes, we need to strengthen our Territorial Forces—we need to increase our armed strength—because we need to fight Communism."
Surely the Secretary of State for War is hardly the person to go on a recruiting campaign in. Scotland, for example, where we are familiar with his theoretical writings which are interesting contributions to our Socialist thought. Surely it would be the crowning irony and the crowning climax if the present Secretary of State for War were to appear on platforms in Scotland to ask the working classes to join up and be prepared with military training to take part in a war against Communism.
Of course, there will be awkward questions. I want to suggest some of the questions that are likely to be asked. One of the first questions in Scotland is likely to be "How is all this military organisation going to affect the greatest problem that besets us all, the housing campaign and the housing problem?" The hon. Member for Harrow, East, used the word "incentive." What incentive is there in Scotland for anybody who is asked to join the Army at the present time? Naturally, prospective recruits will want to know what reward they are to get if they give part of their lives to the Armed Forces. I know from bitter experience the sort of problem with which people who have served their whole lives in the Armed Forces are being confronted when they come back to civil life after they have done their service for their country.
I suggest it is not a good advertisement for any Territorial campaign, for any recruiting campaign, that at the same time as recruiting appeals are being made from the platforms, outside the barracks there are people who have been thrown out of married quarters because they are unable to get homes after having given up 30 years of their lives to the people of this country. If the Secretary of State for War came to my constituency, and I took the chair for him, I know some of the questions he would be likely to be asked. I can imagine the question, for example, that would be asked by an ex-soldier who has just come out of the Army after serving six years, and who has to live in one room. What sort of incentive is there for a soldier in fighting for a home that he has not got?
I want to ask the Secretary of State for War some questions about how this affects the housing problem. He said that married quarters for the Armed Forces would be available by 1955. If he is holding out a prospect of homes for soldiers by 1955, he is holding out a prospect far more optimistic than that he is holding out to any other section of the community. I want to know how these houses for the Armed Forces are to be built, and what the Secretary of State thinks about some of the figures that have been given to me today by the Minister of Works. I asked the Minister of Works how many building workers were employed on 1st January on building work for the Armed Forces. In reply, I am told that at the end of December it was estimated that there were 30,750 building and civil engineering workers employed on work for the Service Departments.
I see Mr. Speaker beginning to wonder what relevance this has to the Amendment, but I have learned from listening to the speeches of hon. and gallant Gentlemen the strategy of indirect approach. I want to point out to the Secretary of State for War that when he comes to make a great recruiting appeal on the platforms of the West of Scotland, he will be asked why there are more building workers working for the Services than there are engaged in building houses for the people of Scotland. Until we get that question answered, and until we can tell the prospective Regular, "You go and fight for your country," and tell him with security that there will be a home for him afterwards, he is not going to be enticed into the Armed Forces.
The hon. Member for Harrow. East, hoped that the Territorials would not be asked to carry out their exercises with obsolete materials, so I presume that one of the incentives for getting a stronger Territorial Force is to have the Territorials carrying out their exercises with modern military equipment. I think that the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) will agree that if these exercises are not carried out with proper modern equipment there is no justification for them. So if we are to have our Territorials exercising with tanks, what is the economic implication? I ask the Secretary of State for War if the Territorial Forces which he is to organise are to be equipped with modern

tanks. It is no use having a Territorial Army exercising with tanks of 1940 vintage. They have to be modern tanks, and so all our Territorial Forces throughout the country are presumably, if they are to be effective at all, to be equipped with the latest kind of tank.
What does that mean? I will quote reliable figures from an article by Captain Liddell Hart on the cost of equipping our Armed Forces with these new tanks. He says that before the war it used to be reckoned that a tank cost about£1,000 for each ton of its weight. Costs were estimated during the war by mass production, and they rose as the tanks got bigger. The German "Tiger" of 1943 set a new level, and the tanks which all the chief Armies now use weigh 50 to 60 tons. Even at£500 per ton, the cost would be about£30,000 a piece. If we are to equip all the Territorial divisions throughout the country with tanks at£30,000 a piece, we shall have to spend a very huge sum on this new kind of military equipment. I want to know how this can possibly be done within our limits of expenditure of£780 million. That is the present dilemma.
If we are to equip our Territorial Forces or our Regular Forces with the enormously expensive implements of modern war, we can only do it by greatly increased national expenditure, which will ultimately drive this country into bankruptcy. If we go further into the problem, we see the dilemma with which we are faced: that modern war has become such an expensive thing—military equipment, new tanks, radar and everything else connected with modern war are so stupendously expensive—that if we are to arm in a whole hog way, we shall inevitably be driven to national bankruptcy.
I suggest that in these matters we are the realists, and the people who talk airily about£780 million being the ceiling of military expenditure are talking moonshine; that if we are to arm the British nation in this way, we shall get a huge increase in our national expenditure—an increase which must inevitably strike at the root of our social economy. Here I agree with the point of view expressed by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), that the choice of the Labour movement of this country has to be between Socialism and the cost of


defence. That is why I deeply regret that in this Estimate tonight we are being asked to sanction£304 million.
Last year we spent£15 per head of the population on defence. This will be up this year. The calculation which I base upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer's calculation of last year works out that a man with a wife and three children, who may not have a home to defend because in Scotland we have a huge section of the population crowded into one-room and two-room tenements—has to find out of his weekly wage the sum of£1 8s. for so-called defence. That compares with approximately 2s. a week spent on housing, and the people of Scotland know that they are not going to have houses if we proceed with the economic preparations for war. We say that they are quite right, and those of us who believe that housing should be top priority put this point of view: If we are to have houses and homes for the people now, we cannot afford to squander hundreds of millions of pounds on arms, much of which will be obsolete.
I do not suppose that we shall have Territorial divisions playing about with atomic bombs, but the realism of warfare today is that we cannot ignore atomic bombs; they are here; and to play about in the old-fashioned way, organising manoeuvres and rehearsals of the last war, at a time when this imponderable factor has entered into modern warfare means that we are just playing with the whole concern. So we challenge this new expenditure on obsolete military armaments. At the beginning of this century the founder of the Labour Party was asked by the "Daily Express" what was the greatest danger confronting humanity during the next 50 years.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew): I would point out there were no Territorials at the beginning of this century.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: No, Sir, but the Territorials came as a result of ignoring the warning of the founder of the Labour Party. His reply was "Militarism," and he was quite right. Today, the enemy of all social progress in this country is equally militarism, and as long as the Labour Government are content to carry on where the Leader of the Opposition

left off, and talk in terms of the old obsolete military terminology while trying to get Socialism at the same time, they are on the road to failure. Social services, housing, education, and all the things that Socialists try for cannot be obtained if we enter an armaments race. I say, just as did the hon. Member for Coventry, East, that we cannot have Socialism and Defence; and if we are faced with making the choice, we stand for Socialism.

8.2 p.m.

Mr. Angus Maude: Once or twice in the last few weeks I have thought that one of the things which must make right hon. and hon. Members opposite regret still more the result of the election has been the continual flow of speakers from this side of the House craving the indulgence of the House while they make their maiden speeches. If I join this list this evening—and I do most humbly ask for the indulgence of the House during this ordeal—it is because the Amendment, which I wish to support, is one which I believe to be extremely important.
My hon. Friends the Members for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) and Harrow, East (Mr. Harvey), have put the case for increased recruitment and equipment with complete clarity, and I cannot say that I think their case has been in the least shaken by the comic turn of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), which I personally greatly enjoyed, because it seemed to me that he was not addressing his observations to the Amendment; his objection is to the entire defence programme of His Majesty's Government. His speech could have been as well made against the Navy Estimates, the Air Estimates or the whole of the Army Estimates. Indeed, I should have thought that the right address for his speech was that of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, because, given the foreign policy of the Government—with which we on this side are broadly in agreement—the defence commitments flow from that foreign policy as night follows day. If we are to honour our commitments overseas we must, without any question I should have thought, honour the defence commitments which flow from that foreign policy. I cannot see that opposition to an Amendment designed to call attention


to the need for increased Territorial Army equipment is the platform on which the hon. Member for South Ayrshire should be speaking. His platform should rather be that of foreign policy.
We are all agreed that in the way of Territorial Army recruiting there are certain obvious difficulties, about which we can do very little. There is the aftermath of war, and National Service which takes away many potential recruits to the Territorial Army. There is also the fact that in the last few years there has been a tendency towards earlier marriage. There is a rise in the birth-rate, which means that a very large number of potential recruits are youngish married men with young families, and are not particularly anxious to give up their week-ends to the Territorial Army when they might be playing with their children.
We who have tried to recruit men have found that today there are more young married men with young children than there used to be, so that they are far more difficult to recruit into the Territorial Army. There is also what I would call the general increase in the complication of living nowadays, which means that owing to the cost of living and the difficulty of getting things done the average man is tempted to spend his weekends either decorating his house or working in his garden to cut down the greengrocer's bills. All these may seem small things, but they are obstacles which we must somehow overcome.
What are we to do about this? It seems quite clear that broadening our field of recruitment can give us only quite limited results. We could perhaps do something if we were able to relax the rule that we cannot recruit men within 12 months of their liability for National Service. Territorial Army units would welcome the opportunity to recruit deferred apprentices before they undertook their National Service obligations, which would give the units a chance of getting the same men back after their period of National Service. We sometimes wonder whether we are "selling" the Territorial Army to the National Service men while they are doing their National Service. Are we doing everything possible to get those men back into the Territorial Army as volunteers? The Territorial Army can only be "sold" to

these men by Territorials, not by Regular officers, and not by civilians. It is while these men are doing their National Service that we must tackle them.
Generally speaking, though, we cannot do much in the way of broadening the field of recruitment. It is clear that we must increase the response in the field which is already being tackled. How are we to do this? Since this is not, despite what the hon. Member for South Ayrshire has said, a party matter, I shall take leave to disagree with one or two of the things said by the mover and seconder of the Amendment. I do not believe that we shall get more recruits to the Territorial Army by any likely change in pay and bounties. Nor do I believe that we shall get more recruits by any of the obvious material incentives. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree, who said he thought the new blue uniform would help. I think the issue of the No. I dress, which we do not hope for but which we should like to be given some encouraging news of—although I know the difficulties—would make a very great difference to the appeal to the civilian. and particularly to the young civilian who might join the Territorial Army.
I am convinced that the problem goes beyond the detailed appeal through incentives to the individual. The problem the Government have to solve is that of the public's view of the Territorial Army. I do not think many people really know what life in the Territorial Army is like: I do not think either that many Regular soldiers know what it is like. They find it difficult to understand that peculiar comradeship, and that peculiarly democratic atmosphere which a good Territorial Army unit can produce. I know that experiences of having Regular officers attached to Territorial Army units vary very much between arms of the Service.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Harvey) who comes from "Ack-Ack"—which is a world in itself as far as the Territorial Army is concerned—spoke with some pain of the lack of Regular Army adjutants. He had other experiences which are quite different from mine. I come from a field force unit in the London area. We have always had Regular adjutants, and they have been selected and trained with the


utmost skill. They have been extraordinarily good and, while we may be peculiar and lucky in that way, we have certainly benefited.
It is the public whose attitude has to be changed, not the attitude of the Regular Army. However, the public attitude certainly cannot be changed without a clear and strong lead from the Government, because it is the esteem in which the Territorial Army is held by the public that will determine the response to its recruiting drive. We are sometimes surprised to find how complete is the public ignorance of the need for a Territorial Army, and until that need is recognised we have no hope of fulfilling our recruiting aims. Therefore, while I agree that the publicity campaign has to be carefully framed and is all-important, what we want is a public campaign aimed at building up the esteem in which the Territorial Army is held, not one aimed solely at the person whom we are seeking to persuade into the Territorial Army.
The Government should know something about this because they have used somewhat the same kind of campaign for recruiting coalminers. A large-scale publicity campaign was launched to raise the public esteem in which the coalminer was held. It is not for me to say how successful that has been, but I am sure it was the right approach. An effort was made to tell the public that the coalminer was a man on whom the prosperity and the comfort of the nation depended, that the coalminer now was a man who needed the technical skill of an engineer, the courage of a soldier, and a number of other qualities which perhaps the public had not previously been ready to ascribe to him. That was an essential part of the recruiting campaign. Something of the same kind must be applied to the recruiting campaign for the Territorial Army, because unless the lead from the Government is absolutely clear and unmistakable the public will not react.
During 1947 and 1948 we in the Territorial Army felt a little dubious about the absolute and unequivocal support which the Government were giving us in our recruiting efforts. We could see the difficulties with which they were faced quite clearly: they did not want to take too many men away at holiday time

from production in order to send them to camps; they did not want to take them off industrial overtime at weekends to send them to Territorial Army training periods. But we cannot compromise on matters like that with any hope of getting anything done. We must come out and say, "We shall have to take the risk of losing production; we shall have to lose something if we are to gain anything."
If we are to get recruits we must say, "The Territorial Army and its recruitment are absolutely vital and essential to our defence. If we do not recruit those people we are sunk"—as we shall be—" and everything must be subordinate to it." We have seen that even the slightest international scare produces a slight increase in recruiting. During the Berlin blockade we saw the effects in our recruiting figures because the Government were devoting a certain amount of time and effort to impressing the seriousness of the defence position upon the public. Slightly, but quite perceptibly, the public began to react.
I will conclude by putting forward a few suggestions as to the kind of things which the Government, and particularly the War Office, might do to foster public esteem for the Territorial Army. They are not all things under the direct control of the Secretary of State for War, but I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would be able to obtain the co-operation of the people concerned to get these things done. First, I would urge the right hon. Gentleman to appreciate the need for perpetual and continuous publicity. In the past the War Office has been rather oversensitive about its publicity. People come along and say, "That poster is no good; scrap it," so they scrap it. The effect of a poster takes a long time to build up, and the publicity department of the right hon. Gentleman should have the credit of their convictions and plug away at a good poster when they have it. If necessary, let people all over the country get used to a single standard poster. I do not want it to become part of the furniture of the hoardings exactly, but a cumulative effect is worth any number of separate little patchy posters which are continually changed.
Another suggestion for continuity is that instead of periodical jamborees run by boroughs and county councils, we should have a regular annual defence day


or defence week which everybody knows is coming and in which the Territorial Army units of the country can all share at the same time. If that became an annual feature, I think people would look forward to it. They would begin to say, "I would not mind being in that sort of thing myself next year," and it would begin to have some effect.
Another small but important thing is to encourage local newspapers to run every week a Territorial Army news column containing all the local Territorial Army news. I do not know whether all the newspapers would be prepared to cooperate. Personally, I think they would, but such local interest and local continuity sows the seed of interest in the would-be recruit, and gets him gradually used to the idea of regarding the local Territorial Army unit as something which concerns him personally.
Then there is the approach to industry, without which we shall not get anywhere at all. Before the war a number of firms became, so to speak, godparents or foster parents to a Territorial Army unit and some good results were achieved. In some cases there were companies manned almost entirely by the employees of a single firm. There are, of course, certain disadvantages in that. If the firm simply transfers an unsatisfactory pattern of industrial relations within itself to a Territorial Army unit the results are deplorable. That, however, is avoidable. It is most undesirable that the managing director should be the commanding officer, that the senior N.C.O's. should be the foremen, and that the departmental heads should be the company commanders; but if that can be avoided—and it can, usually by having a commanding officer from outside the firm and infusing a proportion of outside warrant officers and officers—the results can be very satisfactory indeed.
Where that is not possible, if county associations can make a direct approach to local firms and give them a quota for the year at which to aim the results would be much more satisfactory than the present piece-meal approaches which have been made. I am quite sure that if a unit or a county association said to a large firm, "We want 50 recruits from your firm next year and, possibly, another 50 the year after," and the firm accepted

and tackled that proposition through its works council and joint consultation machinery we might get something done. I say deliberately "through its joint consultation machinery," because unless this is done with the approval of the trade unions, we shall get nowhere. The influence of the trade unions and of local trades councils in this matter is very important.
I know that in some cases, where local union branches or trades councils are dominated or controlled by the sort of people who spend their time passing resolutions denouncing the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary as an imperialist war-monger, this presents some difficulties. But, fortunately, these cases are by no means typical. This matter is comparatively non-party. On both sides of the House we are generally agreed on the absolute necessity of recruiting for the Government are committed to it, and I cannot feel that trade union leaders on the whole can possibly oppose it.
But I do not think we have the support from trade union leaders that we might expect. It is difficult for them, I know, but the best support they can give is to encourage people, not in the top rank of the trades unions, but those who are highly influential locally among the younger people, who are influential in the firms in the area, to join the Territorial Army themselves and to let it be known widely that they have done so because they believe it is something essential which they must do for their country. The effect within industry would be out of proportion to the effect of one single recruit joining the Territorial Army. If we can get the trade union interest to show itself in the concrete form of providing recruits from the influential members of the unions, then the rank and file in industry will be very much more willing to follow.
When we have taken all these measures to increase the esteem in which the Territorial Army is felt, then is the time to go ahead with the approach which will pull in recruits; the seeds have first to be sown, however, and the atmosphere has to be created. The County of London Association have this winter introduced an extraordinarily good scheme for recruitment, but the background is not yet complete. I ask the right hon. Gentleman for an assurance that this vital task of tackling


the background and of building up the right atmosphere will be pushed forward with all the energy of which his Department are capable. We shall then begin to see some results in this all important matter.

8.25 p.m.

Mr. Redmayne: Since it would appear that a very large number of maidens are interested in the Territorial Army, the House might well look forward with some dread to the number who will show an equal interest in the Navy Estimates tomorrow. As a maiden speaker myself I may, perhaps, be forgiven for riding a personal hobby-horse within certain bounds, bounds which will be closer than those of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies). The majority of people in Rushcliffe, the constituency in Nottinghamshire which I have the honour to represent, although sufficiently interested in military matters, have other more pressing problems. They may be pleased, however, that I make my maiden venture on a subject in which it is perfectly possible to be constructive without being unduly controversial and so myself be earlier admitted to the honourable ranks of the controversialists on subjects in which the people of Rushcliffe are particularly interested.
No man who has for many years been a Territorial soldier and who is now member of a Territorial Association can listen to the Debate and remain silent. I have heard with great interest the proposal for dealing with the National Service intake to the Territorial Army. These problems are not new. They have been with us ever since the time of the first conception of the Territorial Army in its modern form, and I am only sorry to learn that the solution offered this evening by the Secretary of State for War is expected to take two years before it is smoothly working. The damage that can be caused by faulty methods in those two years may cause irreparable harm for many more years than two.
The success of the T.A. in its new form will depend on the advertisement that is given to it by the first National Service entrants, whose disgruntlement [could be very damaging for a very long period in the eyes of those who follow them. It is said, and rightly so, that National Service men must be posted to

the unit of their arm of the service and that that unit must have its full complement of volunteers to form the framework for the National Service men. Various remedies for these two proposals have been suggested. These remedies will be completely ineffective unless we can look forward to a complete change of outlook on the whole problem.
At the risk of exceeding my maiden's licence, I must say that in my opinion—which is the opinion of many serving Territorial officers as well—in the whole plan and structure of the Territorial Army there has not been that whole-hearted drive and support from the Government which alone can command success. I will cite two examples from the very early days just after the war. In those early days a Territorial officer was expected to obtain recruits and clothe them in part-worn battledress, a reasonable measure of economy, but what a reception for that best type of battle-trained soldier he was supposed to be recruiting—a man whose whole value and skill in battle had been based on just that type of self-respect that in peace and in war is typified by being a bit smarter in mind and in body than the next man, or the next unit, or indeed one's enemy.
In those early days a newly appointed commander of a Territorial brigade—himself a most distinguished soldier, and the brigade with a great war record which entitled them to wear on their vehicles the New Zealand fern as their badge—on his first visit to his commanding officers was expected to put up his flag on the bonnet of an eight-hundredweight Austin utility van runabout. He had no false pride and did his job in the van which the War Office was graciously pleased to provide him with, but his commanding officers took a poor view of this new Territorial Army which was being launched and of the way in which it was launched.
Many of us old Territorials in the war who at least were by no means disgracing the reputation of the pre-war Territorial Army, talked long and earnestly of its possibilities in peace. We saw its faults and we believed that those faults could be remedied. But on two things in our talk we insisted, first that the Territorial Army should be wholly voluntary and, secondly, that it should have sufficient money to preserve its pride. We cannot


run an army, Regular or Territorial, on the cheap.
Today many of us are concerned that the true voluntary spirit will be diluted this year. That may be a necessity under today's conditions, but we are also concerned that there appears to be no means of discipline that will ensure that the National Service man who is not a volunteer will complete his service. Many, no doubt, will do so from a sense of duty—the majority, perhaps—but many, or some, will not and, as we read it, there seem to be no means to compel them to do so.
I am sure the only proper basis for this reserve Army is a voluntary basis and that no money should be spared to make it both attractive and efficient on that basis, and that the National Service man, on completing his regular service, should have the option of volunteering for it and serving on the same terms as the volunteer. If he will not take that option, he should simply go to the Reserve and not be trained or serve until such time as it might be necessary to call him up in the event of war. In these circumstances, many will see some sense in a well presented argument on those lines, if it is presented that in the event of war the reservist when recalled—and he will be recalled to whatever unit most needs reinforcement—is in a poor position by comparison with the volunteer who volunteers from National Service to serve in the Territorials to be progressively trained in that Army and to fight, if he must fight, with officers and men whom he knows, and who know him.
Many hon. Members will know how vitally important that is but the argument needs presenting in words in the sense that it is no use being mealy mouthed about the possibility of war. We may well pray that we may never see another war but that does not absolve us from our duty to face the possibility squarely, to put it to these young men before they finish their National Service that their best alternative in their own interest and in the interests of the country is to volunteer. When they have volunteered it is our duty to give them, in the Territorial Army, the very best that money can buy.
I have said that that argument needs presenting in words. It needs presenting also in spirit in that too many of our public men in this country have in the

past decried or do now decry the need for awareness of the possibility of war. It needs presenting in spirit also in that many in all walks of life belittle the needs of the Armed Forces, and, as I hear in this House, belittle the well-proved methods by which the Army achieves its ends. The argument needs presenting, and it is not presented in this country today, with one voice. If it was and if our whole-hearted intention was to make our Reserve Army a thing of national pride, if above all, and this is my point, we relied on the voluntary spirit and rewarded it, we should have no need for concern at our level of recruiting.

8.37 p.m.

Mr. Strachey: We have had a notable series of maiden speeches upon this. Motion and the Amendment. Let me congratulate the hon. Members collectively, because we have all listened to them with the greatest interest. The hon. Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney), who moved the Amendment, had doubts whether there was not some complacency on this Bench as to the position which will arise when the National Service men go into the Reserve Army. I assure him that there is no complacency on that matter, and that above all we fully recognise that the voluntary effort of the Territorial Army will be, I would almost say more rather than less necessary when the flow of National Service men has begun than it was before.
I was very glad to have his co-operation and his response in my appeal to the Territorial Army associations and the leaders to work what will be a difficult scheme in a difficult period, but a scheme which will surely give them new opportunities also and new possibilities of exceedingly useful service. I agree with him that one of the important reasons for there not being even more Territorial Army volunteers than there have been is the missing age group from the war.
I agree also with him in his list of inducements which exist for the Territorial Army potential recruit. The one he mentioned, which was mentioned by other speakers as well, of the use of up-to-date, and if may use such a word, interesting, new equipment and weapons, is probably very important indeed. We do claim to have made very valuable progress in that direction at least though it is a matter involving considerable expenditure to.


equip the Territorial Army, the Reserve Army of the future, with every new weapon as it comes out. He spoke of the worries of the potential volunteer. We are aware of these, and we are doing everything we can to meet them. We do try to design the allowances and the rates so that, at any rate, no volunteer will be out of pocket. If there are cases in which that is not achieved, we do attempt to look into them.
The hon. Member asked me a series of particular questions. One was whether there was not some discrimination in the allowances made for drills and the like—the expenses—between the volunteer and the National Service man when he comes in. No, it is our intention that there should be no discrimination whatever between those two classes, and I think it is very important that there should not be. The hon. Member spoke of the systems of incentives, the star systems, and asked for assurances that they would remain under the control of the commanding officers. There again, we propose no change in the existing systems. Then he asked and I think the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. A. E. Maude) also asked, what penalties in the way of enforcement there would be for the individual National Service man who might seek to avoid his obligations of service in the Reserve Army. Regulations have still to be issued on this matter, but hon. Members who read the National Service Act, 1948. will see the maximum penalties provided for neglect of a training notice. After all, this, like any other law, is a matter which can be enforced by the courts, and if necessary would he enforced by the courts.
Finally, the hon. Member spoke of the important part—and I agree with him here—which nationalised industries could and should play in this matter of Territorial Army recruiting and facilitating the work whether of the National Service man or volunteer in the Territorial Army. It is true that the nationalised industries have not an absolutely uniform code in this matter. But, on the whole, they have been very forthcoming in slightly differing ways in helping us. We would say that they have set a very good example to the industries of the country.
The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Harvey) talked about publicity and

criticised it. That matter also was referred to by the hon. Member for Ealing. South and I agreed with his view that no poster will please everybody. It is common knowledge to anyone who has experience in these matters that all forms of publicity arouse criticism, even the most successful. There is a great deal to be said for what the hon. Member for Ealing, South said in the matter of choosing the very best poster or other means of publicity which experts can recommend and then going on firmly with that bit of publicity, even though it may arouse criticism.
The hon. Member for Harrow, East was keen to see air co-operation with anti-aircraft camps so that they could do their shoots. I am informed by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence that in his experience last year and the previous year, all the A.A. camps which he visited had a very full measure of air co-operation. No one doubts the importance of this, or the great importance of seeing that the A.A. Command does get the maximum amount of the most realistic practice that it can get. The hon. Member for Harrow, East raised the matter of the "T" badge. He agreed that, on the whole, the majority of Territorials do not want this; and I find it difficult to follow him in the view that we ought to force it against the will of the majority. It seems to me to be something about which we should be guided by the majority opinion.
I wish to say a word about the speech of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). He made three points which I think were substantial and upon which I ought to comment. His first point was that he thought that I and he, as strong and determined Socialists, were inappropriate people to ask men to join, say, the Territorial Army today, especially as we were asking for recruits both for the active and the Reserve Armies, in view of the fact that there was in our view an apprehension of aggression—we must say quite simply and plainly—on the part of Russia against Western Europe and this country.
With respect—and I think I can say this simply and plainly—I disagree very much with him on that point. I think that Socialists like myself and my hon.


and right hon. Friends are very appropriate people to do that, because I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire will agree with me when I say that the Russian authorities today dislike—it is not too strong a word to use to say "hate"—us and all we stand for even more than they do all that hon. Members opposite stand for. I think that we must follow that in practice.
The hon. Gentleman raised the second point that it was impossible, in his part of Scotland at any rate, to ask for recruits to the Territorial Army when housing conditions were as bad as they are today. That is really a suggestion by implication that it is impossible to ask men to take part in the national defence effort because the country is not worth defending. We on this side of the House are often emphasising the defects and the blemishes which still exist in this country, but I utterly disagree with him in the suggestion that it is impossible to ask men to defend this country even as it is today and before all those blemishes, of which insufficient housing is certainly one of the greatest, have been removed. We must meet him on that issue.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: My right hon. Friend is, presumably, to make a recruiting appeal. I should like to ask him how he will appeal to the man who has a wife and three children living in one room to defend his country when we are spending 28s. a week per head on armaments and 2s. a week on housing.

Mr. Strachey: I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's figures, but that is the point at issue. With all our defects as a country—and he and I can point them out, though some of them are being remedied—is it or is it not worth defending? I put it to him that it is. That is the simple issue.
His last point was most important. He suggested that there was a choice be-between Socialism and defence. I put it to him that a Socialist economy—an economic system in so far as it is planned—is in a better and not a worse position to maintain defence expenditure. I think hon. Members opposite will find that heavy defence expenditure such as we have to undertake today is a grievous burden on any kind of economic system.
There cannot be any doubt about that. but I am sure that a planned economic system, in so far as it is socialised, is in a very much better position to bear that heavy burden than a laissez faire economy.
The speech of the hon. Member for Ealing, South, was particularly thoughtful. I have already referred to his remarks about publicity. He made other interesting points. For example, he mentioned appeals to large firms to promote Territorial Army recruiting. I was glad that he stressed the trade union aspect of that. I agree with him that this is probably a key to that question. Again on publicity, I thought that he was probably right in saying that we could learn something from the type of publicity used by the Coal Board, by which they have built up the social standing, as it were, and the prestige of that industry most successfully, in that a good deal of what we might call "build-up"—the background type of publicity—is a preparation to the direct appeal to the individual man.
The hon. Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Redmayne) made another series of interesting points, but I thought that he was perhaps a little hard on the military authorities in 1945, because they did have their difficulties and limitations in the reconstitution of the Territorial Army. If they were sometimes unable to equip that Army in the early days with new equipment, it was not altogether unnatural or difficult to understand. I have dealt with the point about the means of enforcing the training notice.
Finally, the hon. Gentleman raised an issue of great substance when he said that he did not consider that the conception of a Territorial Army in which there would be a non-voluntary element and in which the National Service man on the completion of his National Service would have an obligation for part-time service in the Territorial Army, was something on which there would be any fundamental disagreement between us. We are not in disagreement. We think that, whatever in the end the period of National Service may be, and even if it is possible, as we should all hope, that the period of National Service with the Colours can be greatly reduced, yet the conception of universal National Service with the Reserve Army through the mechanism of


the Territorial Army may be a very valuable one indeed.
The hon. Member adjured us—this was somewhere near his phrase—to look the dreadful possibility of a new war in the face. I think we have to do that, because doing it is the best way and the best hope of avoiding it. We do think that, in building up that universal national Reserve Army, with, of course, its indispensable voluntary element and with the obligation for part-time training after the National Service period, we are making the best contribution we can towards looking that possibility in the face and therefore helping to avoid it.

Mr. Tilney: In view of the Minister's statement, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

8.53 p.m.

Major Fisher: I ask for the customary indulgence which the House accords with such generosity to a maiden speech. All of us here, I think, have viewed for some time with great misgiving, the drop in the voluntary enlistment figures for the Regular Army, and, as it was my good fortune and great honour to serve in the Brigade of Guards throughout the late war, I hope I may be forgiven for dealing with this problem in special relation to the Household Troops.
It has seemed to me to be a very melancholy thing that two Regular pre-war battalions of His Majesty's Foot Guards have been eliminated since the war, including, as it happens, the battalion in which I had the privilege of serving for six years. Some people have in the past regarded the Household Troops mostly as gaily-attired toy soldiers who aided the pageantry of royal processions and wasted much of their time on the polish of their buttons, the shine on their boots and the set of their bearskins. Hon. Members may be aware of the three golden rules for the newly-joined guardsman in barracks. "If you see anything that you think should not be there, pick it up. If it is too heavy to pick up, paint it; and if by any chance it moves, then it must be alive and you had much better salute it.'
I wish there were three such simple rules for the guidance of newly joined Members of this House. But I venture to suggest that, despite all these well-known jokes about spit and polish, and so on, no one who has fought with or beside battalions of the Brigade of Guards in time of war would deny that the high standards of duty and discipline, which are instilled into every officer and man from the first day he joins, do result in producing fighting units which rank among the best and most highly trained and efficient in the world.
It seems to me, therefore, a great pity that the number of these Regular battalions should have been reduced, as compared with pre-war, at a time when there is so much need for increased efficiency in our Armed Forces. It may be argued, of course, that reduction in the number of battalions was made necessary by the voluntary enlistment position, and, as we know, this is now very bad even in the Brigade of Guards and is still deteriorating. Before the war, whatever the situation may have been in other units, I think it is true to say that there was not the same difficulty about recruitment for the Brigade of Guards. There are, I think, many reasons for the continued falling off in the recruitment position today.
Let me say straightaway that I do not agree with the suggestion that has been made, and which I thought was even implied by my right hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton), that the appointment at any time of any particular individual as Secretary of State for War is a factor in worsening the voluntary enlistment position. It may be that there is possibly a certain amount of resentment among some officers about what they may regard as unsuitable appointments, but, to be perfectly frank and with great respect, and without wishing to prick the bubble of self-esteem of right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House, I may say I think it is a fact that, so far as the ordinary guardsman or private soldier is concerned, at any given time or under any Government, he has very often no idea of the name of the Secretary of State for War, and cares less. I well remember on parades during the war asking men general knowledge questions. They hardly ever knew the names of distinguished Ministers of the Crown even at that time, with the


exception, of course, that they all knew that the Prime Minister of this country at the time was my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill). I am by no means certain that they would all give the right answer even to that question at the present time.
There are, I think, a number of reasons for the falling off in recruitment today. One or two apply specially to the Brigade of Guards, but others have a much more general significance. First of all, in the Brigade of Guards there is the length of service term which before the war was more attractive in the Brigade than in other regiments, but which is now the same. I do not complain of that, but it may be a minor adverse factor so far as recruiting for the Guards battalions is concerned.
Secondly, there is the matter of dress which, while I have been in the Chamber, has not been very much mentioned today. The ceremonial parades, the regimental bands, the full-dress uniforms, and so on, were undoubtedly an attraction before the war, and, especially from the point of view of the wearers, the scarlet tunics in which guardsmen were allowed to walk out when off duty. It is a fact that the girls simply loved the scarlet uniforms and the guardsmen loved the girls, and, therefore, the guardsmen very much liked the uniforms which invested them with so much glamour. Perhaps that is only human nature, but I certainly think it helped recruiting.
I think a bit of glamour always does help recruiting and that it is worthy of consideration for the Army as a whole because, nowadays, the Army seems to me to be rather drab. A bit more colour would also please and cheer up the people of London who love a show. It would also attract the American and other foreign visitors who cannot see these things in their own country, but who very much enjoy seeing them here. I should like to ask the Secretary of State what his intentions are with regard to full-dress in future. Battalions of guards are existing on the remnants of pre-war stock. There are not nearly enough to go round, and what there are are rapidly wearing out. There are no signs of replacements, let alone of a complete new issue. Those are two reasons for lower recruitment—length of service and the question of dress.
There are other and more serious reasons, which have a wider application. The most important is that National Service kills voluntary enlistment. Men have got to join for National Service, so they use the National Service, so to speak, as a sort of try-out period. and they do not like it. I do not think that is because of the point of view put forward by the hon. Member for Aston. (Mr. Wyatt). I do not think they dislike kit inspections, nor do I think they are humiliated by it. We have to remember that the average boy of 18 who joins up is not just untidy; he has a positive genius for untidiness, and it does no harm at all for him to have to put his kit out in proper order.
No one in my experience has ever enjoyed the initial period of Army training. It is always the worst time, and the result is that men do not sign on for Regular service afterwards. It is. moreover, the view of many Regular officers with whom I have talked, in contrast with the view expressed by the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) in the defence Debate, that National Service men have not, even at the end of 18 months, enough service to make them of much value even as Reservists. Meanwhile, we have to face the fact that there are not enough Regulars to train National Service men efficiently during the 18 months. Everyone is so fully occupied on this individual training that there is hardly anyone really ready to fight.
While I appreciate that National Service cannot be abolished at the present time, there is not one of us who wishes to see it become a permanent feature of our national life. In the interests of efficiency and fighting strength it seems most necessary to increase voluntary enlistment by every means at our disposal. And I do suggest that we cannot possibly over-stress the point made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) in the Debate on defence—that is the need for better pay and allowances, especially for officers, non-commissioned officers and technicians.
I am wondering also, and I am glad here to be able to agree with the hon. Member for Aston, if it would be possible to pay Regulars at a higher rate than National Service men. If that could be done, it would be an inducement to


a man to sign on for Regular service at the end of his conscription period. As the Secretary of State and my right hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton) said, there is also need for more married quarters, of which there is a great and serious lack at the present time.
I hope hon. Members will not feel I have been too parochial in my remarks in talking about the Brigade of Guards. If I have been I hope I shall be excused, and that it will be put down to pride of regiment. But, in all seriousness, that is not a bad thing. The Germans set great store by it before and during the war. We set great store by it before the war, and we have somehow lost these county associations and pride of regiment and so on. There would be great benefit if these things were encouraged in future. I hope that these few facts and points which I have put forward with regard to Regular Army recruitment generally and the Brigade of Guards in particular may be borne in mind by the Government. After all, I am sure that it is the common desire of hon. Members on both sides of the House that we shall derive the maximum efficiency, strength and security from the large sums of money which are being spent, I think rightly, on our defences at the present time.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. John McKay: In accordance with the custom of the House, I wish to congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Hitchin (Major Fisher) on his maiden speech. It was very well delivered, full of facts, and was spoken with every confidence. I am sure that we all look forward to hearing him speak again in future Debates.
I have listened to most of the Debate today, and I have heard many of the old arguments. I should like to deal with some of those arguments. I have often heard some of my hon. Friends speaking on defence, military preparations and such matters, and I particularly have in mind my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies). There are several hon. Members on these benches whose views are similar to his. I have heard them speak on several occasions with such confidence and feeling that I have sometimes wondered whether my own attitude and that of the Labour

Party is right. Their speeches have attacked not merely indirect things but the general policy of the Labour Government. Sometimes when I have listened to those speeches I have felt almost abashed at the thought of contradicting the views expressed in them. Nevertheless, it is time that some of us took a little more courage, and I feel that while we are in a majority, we should be prepared on occasions to give voice to the majority viewpoint. That is what I want to do tonight with respect to the whole question of the Army and the necessity for the Army.
My hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton has great principles. He is a man whom we all admire. We have not, however, reached Utopia yet. Many of us have great ideals and we are glad to have an opportunity of propounding them, but sometimes it is difficult to translate these ideals into facts. While, like the hon. Member for Westhoughton, we all desire peace, it is difficult to obtain it Oil occasions. My hon. Friend said that it was a curious state of affairs that while we are getting more and more co-operation with other countries on defence and, therefore, expecting to reduce the expense of the various nations as a result of acting in unity, the cost of defence is, in fact, increasing instead of decreasing. On the face of it, that may seem peculiar, but we live in peculiar circumstances.
In 1945, at the time of the General Election, the predominant feeling of hon. Members on both sides of the House was that we were on the very fringe of that great ideal, that peace which we all desire. We had Russia with us, Germany was defeated and the great Powers of the world had been brought together in unity. We looked forward with some degree of certainty to believing that at last we should establish peace. We went forward into negotiations with that ideal. But whatever ideals we may have had, and may have, and however good they may be, unless those people with whom we have to live are prepared to work in harmony with those ideals, then the ideals are almost impossible to attain. That is the position we have reached today.
My hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton went on to ask where our line was to be. Was it to be the English Channel, on the Elbe or on the Volga? He spoke of our attitude in attempting to shift our line further forward. In the


first place, we have to decide whether defence is a necessity. If we decide that it is not a necessity, then does it matter where the line is? We should need no line at all. While the Labour Government have ideals, however, they also have to be realistic and to recognise that, much as we desire peace, at the moment peace does not seem to be secure. When we talk about whether our country is worth defending it is wrong to quote one or two cases of people living in unhappy circumstances, in overcrowded conditions, and to use that as an argument to suggest that the country is not worth defending. Because we have not reached economic security, because we cannot fulfil our ideals in our own country, it is wrong to suggest that there is no place in the country worth defending. That is a silly kind of attitude.
What should we be told if we explained the position to men and women working in the factories, even to the men earning less than£5 a week or to the men and women living in overcrowded conditions? If we seek the opinion of the country we shall be told emphatically that if we, as the party in power, believe there is a danger to peace, either in the near or distant future, we must face our responsibilities. It will be a bad thing for the party if they do not face them. We shall be told that if the party governing this country believe that in the state of the world today there is some danger they must accept the responsibility placed on their shoulders, however much opposition there may be in some quarters. People say, "If there is danger see to it that, as a Government, you are prepared for it; and try to keep the peace we want." The Government must see to it, and they must make people confident that they are seeing to it, or it will be bad for the Labour movement in the future.
I do not want to keep the House too long, but there is something else I must say. We have talk of conscription and of the Labour Party's attitude to it. The Labour Party and its members believe in certain things at different times. However, times change, and as times change circumstances change; surely, as intelligent men we must take those changed circumstances into consideration. We must review the position, and consider whether, in the changed circumstances,

our viewpoint ought to change. We must ask ourselves whether the change in the circumstances warrants a change in our viewpoint in regard to conscription. We must ask ourselves as intelligent men, and also as the governing party. I have never been in the Army, and I do not believe much at all in armies, for I do not believe in taking life in any circumstances. I believe, however, that there is a necessity in certain circumstances to fight for one's country.
Personally, I would rather be conscripted into the Army any time than be a volunteer, because the conscript, even though he does not quite believe in the Army, or in the justice of war, or even in the right to conscribe men, is spared the necessity of deciding whether, as a peace-loving man, doubtful of the justice of war, he ought to volunteer for the Army or not; conscription takes the responsibility from his individual soul. So I think that there are times when conscription may be a necessity, and not only a necessity but the fairest method of getting the men we want.
These matters are very debatable, but circumstances and changed times have brought us as a party to a position in which we can see the advisability of taking some action to give confidence to our people that whatever may betide we shall fight and sacrifice for peace and security. I have said before, at public meetings, that so far as I am concerned I would be prepared to sacrifice practically everything—strategic points, territory, anything—if by so doing one could feel sure of peace and security. That feeling of peace and security should be shared by all the countries of the world. It must be international before we can have the peace we want so badly. Strategic points, territory—these things are of no consequence if we can have peace and feel certain of peace, but we cannot be certain of peace until we are first certain that those with whom we negotiate have the same ideals.

9.19 p.m.

Brigadier Clarke: I beg the indulgence of the House for this my maiden speech. I had not the intention of speaking so early in the Session, because I feel that new Members should be often seen but seldom heard. However, as the Debate is on Service matters, and as I left the Service only


three weeks ago, I feel I must get up and speak for the chaps I have left behind me. I have myself suffered two alleged rises in pay and one cut during my service. There was little or no difference except that the cut cost me a little more. That is quite true, and most soldiers will tell you, "Do beware of a rise in pay, because by the time the Treasury get their hands on it, it will result in a out."
I feel that we can get a Regular Army now, if we pay adequately. For too long the Regular Army has been badly paid. That is the reason why we are not getting recruits, and why we are not getting the right type of officer or the right number of officers joining the Army. Some people think that that is not the reason. They like to think so because they do not want to put their hands in their pockets and spend money. I say that we shall not get our Regular Army unless we pay the soldier, the sailor and the airman an adequate wage—a wage that is equivalent to his opposite number in civil life.
That is what we were told the Labour Government achieved in 1945. I say that they in no way achieved that, because the Treasury eventually got their hands on the soldier's pay and would not compare the conditions properly. They said that the soldier got his rations, his clothing, his barracks; and they forgot all the things that the soldier has to do. They forgot that he works overtime and gets no money for it; they forgot that he has to sleep behind a bit of scrub or in a trench and gets no extra pay for that either; they forgot that he has to leave his family to go overseas; they forgot that he has to keep moving his children from one school to another every time there is a whim to move him. That is something that the civilian does not have to do.
The soldier has any number of inconveniences to put up with. He spends many months and sometimes years away from his family and that is worth a bit of extra money. No one is going to suffer these inconveniences unless he gets some compensation for it. I say that the soldier has not been given a square deal, and that we shall not get a Regular Army until we give him a square deal. As soon as we try to do that, and as soon as we pay adequately, we shall get a Regular Army. I think that we shall have to

try that because otherwise we shall have to go on with conscription for ever.
Once upon a time an officer went into the Army because his father and his grandfather had been in it before him, and he may at that time have had a little money to back him. Some officers even used to give their pay to their batmen. Those days have gone; people have not the money now. It is no good going into the Army today purely for tradition because half that has been wiped out of the Army. One cannot guarantee that one will go to the regiment one wants to, and if one gets there, there is no guarantee that one will stay. To me it was worth a lot. I knew that I could go to the regiment of my choice, and that I could say there as long as I wanted to.
Until we can restore the prestige of the Army and pay adequately we shall not get the men. We have to remember that the soldier in modern warfare is getting too old at 40. That also applies to the soldier after he has left the Army. There are not enough jobs outside cinemas and theatres to keep the old sergeant-major with a long row of medals. The man of 40 is now finding it extremely difficult to find a job. Any hon. Member who does not believe that can go down to my constituency and see the 4,000 unemployed there at the moment; then he can judge what chance a sailor or soldier coming back, with no trade and no background, has got to get a job these days. In these days of full employment there are 4,000 unemployed in my constituency, and I say that a soldier cannot get a job there.
That must be borne in mind, because with the present cost of living, a soldier's pension is quite inadequate to keep him nowadays. There was a time when that pension with a little extra from a few odd jobs would keep a man; but now an ex-soldier has to get full time employment in order that he can keep himself with the pension that once would provide for him. Pensions and the cost of living have not kept pace. Nor has our pay risen at the same rate as the cost of living, and that must be recognised otherwise we shall not get the recruits we need.
I should also like to stress that at the moment, owing to the shortage of men in the Regular Forces, directly a man signs on again for 12 years and over, he is


sent overseas again. During the last three years I have had complaint after complaint about men being sent overseas immediately after signing on. That happens not only in the Army but in the Navy as well. That cannot be remedied until we have a Regular Army large enough to allow a man to have a reasonable time at home after he has returned and signed on again. That must be done in order to keep these men in future.
There are many other things I should like to draw attention to, but as time is short I will mention only one other thing. I wish to refer in particular to the speech of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who seems to think that men join the Army to get a house. I think the former Secretary of State for War, now Minister of Defence, rather overstated his case. There has been no rush to join the Army owing to its excellent housing situation. It is not bad; it is a great deal better than some aspects of civilian housing, but it is far from good. On the other hand, we in the Army feel that the barracks which are at present being built are over-luxurious. I certainly feel that personally.
Recently, I have seen barracks being built at Tidworth so luxurious that no soldier would ever have dreamed he would ever sleep in a 'barrack like it. The soldier needs a good barrack; he needs a place where he can sit down and rest, and where there is a fire; but he does not want a mat beside his bed, or a counterpane to go over his bed; he merely throws his boots on it. In my opinion, the soldier would far sooner have an extra couple of bob a day. In fact, the ex-soldiers who were building this barrack block told me, when I was taken round to see these exhibition barracks, that they would far sooner have had an extra couple of bob than this "pansy" array which now goes into the make-up of a British Army barrack. I saw barracks in Germany which I thought were first-class. There was nothing effeminate about them; they were good, manly places where a fellow could have quiet, could keep himself warm, and there were decent beds.
That is all the soldier wants. The soldier requires company; he likes being in a barrack room with seven or eight other chaps. Directly he is put in isolation he feels that he has gone to detention, and he does not like it a bit. I say

that the soldier likes being with his pals. Before concluding this, my maiden speech, I should like to stress once more my absolute conviction that we can get a Regular Army if we pay the men adequately; if not, we shall not get the men.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: It is indeed a privilege to have listened to the maiden speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke). We listened with avidity and interest to a splendid and incisive speech which indicated that we have another informative contributor to this type of Debate. Nevertheless, I am sure that the pleasant and good-humoured way in which the speech was delivered indicates that on another occasion we shall have one more forthright debater in our midst.
I am worried because reality seems to be missing from this Debate. Before developing that, may I say that my information, from Regular soldiers and from soldiers just going into National Service, is that never before in history has the Army had a squarer deal than it has had from the Labour Government during the past five years. Conditions and opportunities for advancement have been improved under this Government.
To develop my point about reality, we seem today, on both sides of the House, to be talking in terms of 1910 and even 1810. The best recruiting officer that this nation ever had was unemployment. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] Hon. Members may shout "Rubbish" or whatever they like. If they will kindly listen a moment they can shout afterwards. In the 100 years of history between 1815 and 1915 this country was at war 38 times and we fought 64 years out of those 100 years. The only time the party opposite could provide full employment was when we were at war.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Check up on the facts.

Mr. Davies: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman is saying that we were not at war for 64 years out of 100 in the century between Waterloo and 1914, he does not know his history.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that in a considerable number of those wars there


were no more than 10,000 or 12,000 soldiers engaged? How could there possibly have been full employment because of war?

Mr. Davies: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has already conceded my point—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—which is that the system of society supported by hon. Gentlemen opposite can only give full employment when we are either at war or preparing for war.

Brigadier Thorp: What is the hon. Gentleman doing now?

Mr. Davies: Despite the scoffing, I say we have evolved by intelligent controls a system of society that is trying to work out a formula of full employment, and our victory in that direction has more or less defeated the old-fashioned method of attracting troops into the Forces.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Absolute nonsense.

Mr. Davies: Hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite can easily fill up the recruiting stations if we once again have two million to three million in the bread line, and that is the way that—

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: rose—

Mr. Davies: I will give way in a moment. That is the way in which the recruiting offices have been filled in the past. I will now give way.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: If the hon. Gentleman will take the trouble to come with me into the Library afterwards, I will prove him absolutely wrong. I will not quote the years; I will just say that at the peak unemployment figure between the last two wars, the actual graph of recruiting went down and that as employment rose—I am not making a party point the recruiting figure went up. Those are facts which cannot be refuted.

Mr. Davies: One of the best recruiting possibilities in the past was the fear of unemployment.

Brigadier Head: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to interrupt? We attach great importance to this.

Mr. Davies: So do I.

Brigadier Head: The hon. Member is doing me a great courtesy by giving way. What he has just said is said all over the country by no less a person than the Minister of Defence—he is always saying it. Our point is that it is founded entirely on a fallacy. If the unemployment and recruiting graphs for the period between the wars are compared, it will be found that when unemployment was high, recruiting, if anything, fell off, and that when unemployment came down recruiting rose. It is very important that hon. Members opposite should realise that, because they have been talking this rubbish for several years without ever checking it with the facts.

Mr. Davies: It is quite true that during the period of power of the Opposition there was mass unemployment. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] May I develop my speech in my own way? I have given way three times. At last I stab the Opposition into movement.
The reality of the situation is this: the type of man going into the Forces—I hate to be a little provocative, especially just after a maiden speech has been made—does not think it is living like a pansy to have a certain amount of privacy in modern life and to be able to live decently in a barracks. The men now coming into the Forces, after three generations of secondary education—and opportunities of advancement exist in the Forces—are very often as good as any of the men who may be commanding them. I believe I am right in saying that they are demanding a higher amount of respect than the old soldier of 20, 30 or 40 years ago. They are demanding that, and they are refusing to go into the Forces under the old-fashioned conditions.
I believe, therefore, that the low recruitment is due entirely to (1) our policy of full employment; (2) the growing standards of life not only in Britain but in various parts of the world. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said this evening—and we all agree on both sides with these three points—that there must be an improvement in conditions and in married quarters. If men are expected to serve they must be able to live decently the family life, whether they are civilians or in the Forces. That is a major problem, and one that has to be faced. Second, welfare conditions must be improved. Third, I agree with the hon.


and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke), that if we want to attract men into the Army as a profession pay must be in ratio with the dignity of the job they are expected to do. I am convinced that by these methods we could attract more people into the Forces.
I am not in entire agreement with the suggestion which has been made from this side of the House that we should have a British Foreign Legion. Heaven forbid that we should once again descend to a system of society where we want mercenaries to defend this little island of ours. Our problem seems to be that we must decide what extent of burden we can afford. Whether we like it or not, Britain is no longer a great world military Power, and we can no longer carry the terrific burdens that we have carried in the past. But that does not in any way mean that we may not be effective. Our greatest effectiveness, therefore, is to carry a military burden in ratio with our national income and economic power.
As was pointed out in the Defence Debate, if we expect to get effective defence, there must be co-ordination, not only in Britain, but in the whole of Europe. I know that the situation has deteriorated, but had we been able to follow the policy laid down by the United Nations Charter, we could have had a very effective defence force for the policing of the world and the burden on the British public would have been much less than it is now. It should go out from this House to the United States of America, to fellow members in the Atlantic Pact and the Commonwealth that we are carrying a burden that is out of ratio with the size of our national income. There should be fair shares in defence as well as in other types of distribution in the world. This little country cannot continuously carry the weight of 7½ per cent. of its national income on defence while Canada carries only 1.7 per cent. of its national income on defence.
I believe the real strength of the country is to be seen in its economic power. If we have small, but effective Forces, Regulars or others, see that our industry is efficient and carry out the most modern technical advances in industry, then, if ever we do have to we shall be able to meet the shock of war. History has proved that the nations which are

strongest in the shock of war are the nations with the most spanners and most sparks for power when war comes. The danger of carrying an over-burden of forces is that thereby we undermine internal standards.
Democracy is something worth defending. It has been said this evening that the prestige of the officer must be maintained; so, too, must the prestige of the men in the ranks. In passing, I would comment that Army education is quite important in the 20th century. I still believe a thinking soldier to be a better soldier than an unthinking soldier. I deprecate the neglect that seems to be indicated so far as Army education seems to be concerned. One of our great generals said to his officers:
The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, and always every time, The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease. comfort and welfare come last, always and every time.
I have forgotten who it was—

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Every general said that.

Mr. Davies: Well, I have not heard hon. and gallant Members opposite say it so far tonight. What I want to emphasise is that by means of Army education, with the type of man who is coming in from the secondary schools and technical colleges we should be able to have men in the Forces whose service will not set them back in whatever type of industry or profession they follow. I believe the time has come for a Select Committee of this House of people from both sides who have full knowledge to investigate the problems of the Regular Army as it is today. The strongest nation in the 20th century is not necessarily the nation which has the largest number of men under arms, but the nation which uses the number of men it has most effectively and which has behind them enough power and technical skill to feed those men if an emergency should arise.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Heathcoat Amory: With one thing which the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) has said I am in entire agreement; that is in the tribute he paid to the most excellent speech which we heard from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke). I


think that 1950 must be a vintage year for maiden speeches because when I think of my trembling mutterings on the occasion of my own, I am lost in admiration of the sang froid and assurance of the excellent maiden speeches we have heard today. I would commiserate with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West, on the effect of his latest promotion, from the Army to this House, which I am afraid has again meant a further cut for him.
I am sorry that the Secretary of State for War is not here because I feel that as an old comrade in arms of his I ought probably to congratulate him on his present appointment. Over 30 years ago he and I were members of the same platoon. As platoon sergeant it was my duty or privilege to keep a pretty close eye on the Secretary of State for War, as I maintained my vigilant watch to see that there was no "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline." I think I can say, to the relief of the Whole House, that I can recollect no military misdemeanour whatever on his part at that time. I cannot remember whether there was a field marshal's baton in his haversack, but I can remember no signs whatever there of the seals of a future Secretary of State for War. I hope that in any success he may achieve in practising the military art at this very high level, he will not fail to pay tribute to the early indoctrination he received at the hands of his old quartermaster-sergeant.
The only points I wish to make about the broad problem are these. First, to ask whether there is enough Commonwealth co-operation in defence. I really do not believe there is. The fact that there is very close co-operation, for example, between Canada and the United States, is something in which I am sure we all rejoice. But the fact which I suspect, that the co-operation between ourselves and Canada in relation to our Armed Forces is not as close as it might be is one about which we have no ground for rejoicing. I ask the Secretary of State for War to pay careful attention to the suggestions that have been made from different parts of the House today for a bolder and more imaginative development of our Colonial Forces. I also wonder

whether the time has not come for the establishment, in parallel to our national Forces of an international Western European Force under its own commander and its own officers. That seems to me the proper place for German participation in the defence of Europe.
I wish to say a few words about the Regular Army. We all agree that an efficient compact Regular Army must be the basis of our Army forces in this country. That I consider is a very generous tribute from an old Territorial officer who has recollections of, on occasions, a good deal of ribald, if friendly, denigration at the hands of his Regular colleagues. I remember an exasperated divisional commander once saying, "Well I suppose an order to a Territorial is at least a basis for discussion." With regard to recruiting to the Regular Forces, I believe that if we want the right type of young man to join the Regular Army it is up to every member of the nation to show the high regard in which we hold our Army; and that we think a little more of anyone who decides to make that his career. The tiny proportion of National Service men who at present decide to re-engage on a Regular Commission is very disappointing.
On the question of pay and allowances, it was the Minister of Defence who said the other day that Army pay was up by 75 per cent. over pre-war. But wages are up a good deal more than that. We may all have our own ideas as to the right level of Army pay and allowances, but I would suggest that the only proof of the right level will be when we get the results. And I suggest that so long as the Treasury controls the finances of this country as it does at present, there is no early risk of us over shooting the mark in that respect.
There is one burden which I feel falls very heavily today on officers, and that is the enormously high cost of temporary accommodation and moves. I do not think that has yet been fully faced. I know that hon. Members opposite sometimes think that we on this side of the House are mainly interested in the welfare of officers. That is really not fair. I would beg the right hon. Gentleman and the whole Government to remember the enormous importance of officers and non-commissioned officers. We know Napoleon's oft-quoted maxim, "There


are no bad regiments, only bad officers." The opposite also holds good; where there are good officers there are always good units. Today I believe that the spirit of the Army is good. If that is so we ought to pay tribute to the officers and the N.C.Os. of our present Army; and we ought to support them in the work they are doing.
I am glad to note that in the Memorandum it says that the improvement in discipline which took place in 1948 has been continued in 1949. That is very good news, and is confirmed by what we see of the conduct and bearing of soldiers about the place. In my opinion the beret has been a success. I hope we shall not have another attack on the beret from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan). I wish to repeat what I said last year, or the year before on the subject of buttons. I consider that the metal button on a battle dress today is quite unworthy of its place. It was constructed for quite another purpose, in which it was intended to be out of sight. I am not appealing for bright buttons on battledress—that would be quite inappropriate. A decent plastic button would improve the whole outfit.
I would say one word about pay debts of other ranks in the Army. Generally speaking, if a man has been overpaid, through no fault of his own, the sum overpaid is recovered from him over a period. In practice that very often involves great hardship. If we turn to civil life we find that most decent employers if they overpay their men—

Mr. Messer: They do not.

Mr. Amory: —do not recover the sum due. I know that when I raised this matter before, the Minister said it was receiving sympathetic attention, and in some cases part of the sum was written off. It is sometimes, but I suggest that rather less niggardly treatment should be given by the Army Pay Office in cases where an overpayment has been made to a man through no fault of his at all.
Then there is the most important question of civil jobs. The importance of a job in civil life at the termination of a man's engagement cannot be exaggerated. I understand from the Minister that the matter is under consideration, but I am sure that we ought to go very

much further than we have gone so far. The Army is in the main a young man's job. Most men leave the Service while still in the prime of life. It is not good enough merely to give these men a chance of having an occupation for the rest of their lives. What many of them require is a chance to start a second career, with opportunities of rising to positions of responsibility.
It is important that technicians in the Army should be kept in touch with similar kinds of technical jobs in civilian life. I am not sure how that can be done, but I was much impressed by a maiden speech by the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. Orr-Ewing) last week. He spoke mainly about Air Force technicians and suggested that closer links should be made with industry. My right hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton) mentioned the same point. I believe that the argument is correct and that something could be achieved for instance in standardising the type of technical experience required.
On the subject of manpower, I only wish to say that extravagance in the use of manpower has always been the besetting sin of the Armed Services, although they are better than they were in that respect. That used to apply to industry also, but industry cannot do it now. The utmost vigilance and continuing pressure must be maintained to ensure that every possible economy is made in the use of manpower and that every substitute for manpower is employed, with equipment designed accordingly. For instance, I should like to see mechanical potato peelers as part of the equipment of even the most mobile sub-unit in the Army.
Some time ago we were anxious about the position of young National Service men in such overseas places as Germany. From my information, the position has improved out of all knowledge, and great credit is due to our military authorities in those theatres. Generally speaking, I believe that overseas is the best place for the National Service man in the Army today. He has better opportunities of training. He is kept more fully on the job and he gets better training in an overseas unit. Information about men in the Army being kept hanging about, which one still gets very often, always from my experience comes from people who are


stationed at home. I suggest that whether a young man gets good or harm from his period in the Forces varies almost in the ratio in which he is kept fully and actively employed.
The other day I asked a young National Service man how much longer he had to serve. He said without a moment's hesitation, "Forty-six weeks, five days, 18 hours and 30 minutes." I am afraid that probably he does not intend to re-engage at the end of that time. I discovered that he was stationed at home. Some of these young men who are at home live much too much for the next weekend, just counting the moments. Then they spend a big part of their money—and they might do worse—in travelling incredibly long distances to pass a few hours at home. That is admirable from the point of view of the British Railways. There are however many young National Service men who, on the contrary, get a great deal of interest out of the Service and, in particular, out of their tactical training when they get into a good unit. I suggest that the tougher the training of that kind, the more likely they are to get interest from it.
I will say only a few words on the Territorial Army. Though I am an old Territorial Army Officer, I realise that I am out of date. The main question is whether the present system will work. We must all do our utmost to make it work. It is a great pleasure anyway to an old Territorial like myself to see the very fine chaps who are in the Territorial Army today, as officers, non-commissioned officers and men. I believe, judging from my own experience, that men who join a particular unit should, if possible, be given some kind of assurance that they are likely to stay in that unit and that, after embodiment, they will not be removed somewhere else. People do get fond of their units. In the last war our experience was that after embodiment our men began at once to be scattered to the four winds.
I want to support a suggestion made by one of my hon. Friends earlier in the Debate about the importance of officers in the Territorial Army receiving instruction in administration. We did not have such instructions before the war, though that may have been our own fault, and the result was that when we were embodied our men suffered from our lack

of knowledge. I hope that matter will be attended to. There is one other point. Will the Minister assure us that he will give Territorial Army commanding officers a little more scope and responsibility? I should like to see commanding officers given rather more funds than they have at present to spend at their own discretion. They know the little things which make a tremendous difference to the welfare of their men, and it is heart-breaking sometimes to find that effort and energy which have to be expended to obtain official authority in advance for, maybe, a cupboard or the hire of a loudspeaker or a conveyance.
One small point about cadets. I read with interest the part of the Memorandum about the Cadet Forces, and it makes quite good reading, but, from my own observations, I have sometimes thought that those in charge of cadet units are straining the rules so far as the minimum age at which they can take boys is concerned. We now see tiny "little shrimps" of boys in the cadets with older and bigger ones. All experience of youth movements in general has shown that you cannot mix small boys and big boys and expect to keep both interested. If they continue to take the "little shrimps," I fear that they will not get the chaps of 16 and 17 whom they require.
Finally, I like these Service Estimates Debates because almost every hon. Member who takes part always speaks and makes his contribution from his own experience with the sole object of helping things on. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that if he will give his wholehearted devotion to the welfare of this great Service for which he is now responsible, he can rely on each one of us helping him forward in every way we can.

10.4 p.m.

Mr. Manuel: I had not intended to enter this Debate, but, as it has proceeded, I have felt more and more that I should make a contribution to it. I do not know whether it is a good thing that the Debate should be so monopolised by hon. and gallant Members of the House. I know that it cannot be avoided, but I feel that as it lends an air of unreality and takes it away from ordinary people and the


soldiers in the ranks, some of us on this side ought to try to clear up the position.
We are discussing the spending of nearly£800 million, and the problem is that, even with this defence expenditure we are not at all satisfied that the Regular Army will be as strong as many would like it to be. I was,confirmed in my intention to enter the Debate when my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made his contribution. He indicated that his solution for strengthening the Regular Forces was the recruitment of Colonial people. He suggested that we should build up a sort of Foreign Legion, recruited, in the main, from the African peoples. He seemed to suggest that if there were this opportunity, we should find the Africans queueing up for the opportunity to join the Regular Forces. I am convinced that that attitude—

Lieut.-Colonel Alport: On a point of Order. Is it in Order, Mr. Speaker, for the hon. Gentleman to refer to British subjects as "foreigners"?

Mr. Manuel: There has been a complete mistake. I mentioned the Foreign Legion, and referred to a previous speech in which it was suggested that we should recruit Africans into a sort of Foreign Legion in the same way as the French nation did at one period. I feel that that type of recruitment would only come about because such people were driven to it by bad economic circumstances, and not because of any great desire on their part to come to Europe. That would be essentially bad, and I do not think that any hon. Member would wish to strengthen our Forces by that type of recruitment.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton was quite amenable to the idea of ex-Nazis, displaced persons, or people of that kind joining such a legion. Let us consider whether we in Britain would like that kind of mercenary recruitment to a stable Force in Europe acting on our behalf. I do not think it would be good at all. We then had a discourse from my hon. and learned Friend on the course of the next war. I do not think it right that there should be this inevitability complex about the next war. It is a wrong attitude altogether, from whichever side of the House it comes. He also spoke about our

having a mobile striking force, and indicated how a force of 20,000 men very rapidly took control of Poland. He made no mention, of course, that this type of mobile striking force would be in competition with the atom and hydrogen bombs.
Such a suggestion leads me to believe that hon. Members on both sides of the House are adopting a wrong attitude towards the current situation. I view with suspicion the fact that the Opposition are still regarding this situation from a completely nationalistic point of view. I believe that both this point of view and that put up by the Minister—he made out a good case from the point of view of Western Union—are wrong and are no real solution for the prevention of war.
We must recognise that the ordinary methods of warfare are now outdated. We must think of a federated Europe and in terms of a police force doing the necessary work there, and not in terms of armies to be lined up against each other either in the East or West or anywhere else. I feel that we on this side of the House are giving a more correct interpretation of what our job should be. We recognise the difficult position of the Minister, but we should make what efforts we can and put out what overtures we can to secure this federation. We recognise the need for huge expenditure on defence, but our duty is to spend money to get rid of economic wrongs. When we get rid of them we shall get rid of the fear of war.

10.12 p.m.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: The hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel), the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) and the hon. Member for Wallsend (Mr. McKay) did on the whole agree that we should have efficient Defence Forces though I did not altogether follow the process of reasoning by which they arrived at that conclusion. I was not altogether in sympathy, for example, with the view expressed by the hon. Member for Wallsend that it would be a bad thing for the Labour Party if this responsibility were not faced. I do not think the hon. Member would expect me to approve of it nor of the views of the hon. Member for Leek on the past. Nevertheless, I think it is a matter for gratification that all three hon. Members should have arrived at the same conclusion that we on these benches propound.
The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has a habit of putting his finger on a rather tender spot and I think the rather synthetic smile with which the Minister of Defence listened to the hon. Member's congratulation upon his success as a recruiting agent was quite well worth watching. I was also very interested in his picture of the Secretary of State for War haranguing the masses of South Ayrshire on the virtue of fighting against Communism in spite of the right hon. Gentleman's earlier contributions towards theoretical Socialism and Communism. One hesitates as to saying what would have happened if anyone on these benches had addressed the new Secretary of State for War in those terms. The hon. Member for South Ayrshire went on to talk about the question of expense on defence preparations. We are all greatly concerned in that matter and we are most anxious to see the country get value for its money.
I want to address the House, if I may, on one particular aspect dealt with earlier, the Territorial Army. I have three fairly short points to make with regard to it. If I may start right up in the stratosphere, I suggest that it is time the Territorial Army had its own representative on the Army Council. The Director-General of the Territorial Army should have a seat on the Army Council. The Territorial Army comprises a very large part of our Defence Force, I hope that suggestion will receive favourable consideration.
Next there is the modification of the structure of the Territorial Army referred to by the Secretary of State. I must declare my personal interest here, because the unit with whom I have had the honour to be associated during the past three years is one of those to be amalgamated. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the reluctance with which these steps were to be taken, and he appealed to the loyalty and good will of all concerned. I am sure everybody will do their best to make a success of the new enterprise, but I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he thinks this intimation has been made just as soon as it could have been. I agree he cannot accept personal responsibility, because he has only been in office for a short time.
The unit to which I am referring was reformed some three years ago, when its

role was changed from that which it had very honourably discharged during five years of war. After a lot of difficulty in getting it started owing to the change of role—it had been an anti-tank unit and became a light anti-aircraft unit—the unit has been built up and it now has 115 volunteers which compares very favourably with many other units. The esprit de corps of the unit had been built up, and it was getting ready to face up to this task of taking over the National Service men.
I often wonder whether the people who make these sweeping changes in the order of battle quite realise the waste of human effort which it entails and the great discouragement it means to those who have given of their best to try and build up a new unit. I do not know now which of the two units is going to disappear, whether it be 349 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment or 521 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. In both cases a new unit was being built up and they are now to be amalgamated. They are in widely separated geographical areas, and this amalgamation means that a great deal of wasted energy will have been expended. I wonder whether we should have allowed so much work to be put into the building of these units before this decision was finally made. However, I am certain that all concerned will do their best to make a success of the new unit.
The next point I wish to raise concerns accommodation in the Territorial Army. It is not possible to have a good unit without adequate accommodation. Accommodation is needed for training, storing equipment and for providing the amenities without which a unit cannot be really effective. I should like to give some examples of what is happening at present. I know of one battery which is operating in one room which it gets once a week in a British Legion Club. That seems to me to be a ridiculous state of affairs. It does not seem to be possible for that battery to deal properly with its National Service men when they come in. In spite of that great disadvantage, they have recruited something like 40 men, which is a substantial achievement. I know another case where a battery is sharing a drill hall with one Territorial infantry unit, two cadet units and one W.R.A.C. unit. All that it has that it can call its own accommodation are two rooms each 10 feet by 12 feet. It seems


to me that it is just "not on" to give the new National Service entry a good idea of what a unit should be under those circumstances. There is another case of a work-shop unit without any of the facilities with which to train its men technically.
We shall not get a good Territorial Army unless we deal with that first matter of providing adequate accommodation. The damage to equipment, the difficulties in training and in building up esprit de corps must be obvious to everybody. It also means that a great deal of money is wasted. I agree that there are usually extenuating circumstances. In the provision of accommodation there is a very complicated procedure to be followed. It starts from the Association and then goes to the Command and then to the War Office; then back again from the War Office to the Command and then to the Association. There are tenders and all the rest of it, and it takes a very long time to go through.
In my criticism I am not attacking any officer at all. I do not believe that there is any personal responsibility on the part of any officer in this matter, but the system just does not deliver the goods. If we were facing a real emergency, in war, the system would be scrapped. In these days we have no 10-year period in which we can anticipate no attack from any foe. We do not know how narrow the margins are. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look into that matter because the system is not delivering the goods, and this is a matter which must be speeded up. There must be real urgency. There must be the kind of drive that there was, for example, in the Ministry of Aircraft Production at one period during the war whereby the goods will really be delivered.
There is another point that I should like to make concerning the period of service of the National Service men. The obligation of service which the National Service man has to put in is quite ridiculous. He has to serve 60 days which, as I understand it, has to be done in three years. He has to do his 60 days of service in three of his four years of compulsory service; that is to say, he has to do 20 days per year. He has to spend 15 of those days in camp. That leaves five days to be spread out over the whole of the rest of the year. He can do his five days

either in six-hour periods which counts as one day, as I think the right hon. Gentleman has explained, or else he can do it in four training periods, which count as one day, or by any combination or permutation of those two things.
That is a ridiculously short time to be devoted to his training. I do not see how we can expect to get him up to the mark in that period of training even if the man is comparatively well trained when he arrives. In many cases, as has been admitted, the man will come from a different arm of the Service, and it seems to me to be almost fatuous to expect to make a soldier of him in that time.
What is the remedy? First, to alter the law and impose a greater obligation, but I will not go into that. The alternative is to encourage the National Service man to volunteer while he is still a National Service man, and I should like the Minister, in his reply, to tell the House how many of the first batch of National Service men who are to go out to the units in July have, in fact, volunteered. I believe I know the answer, and I think it is an answer which should be given to the House. I am told that the fault is not that they have not been told that they can volunteer but that no attempt has been made to point out to them the advantages of volunteering.
I am not quite sure what the advantages are and I hope the Minister will tell me whether I am right or wrong when I say that the advantages to a National Service man of volunteering are as follows: first, he will get a bounty. I understand the amount has not been fixed. I think it should be fixed and I think the widest publicity should be given to the amount of bounty that a National Service man will get if he volunteers for the Territorial Army. Another thing, I am told, is that he will keep any stripes he has acquired during his service in the Regular Army. Further, and this point has been partially dealt with, he is entitled to choose his arm of the Service and, I believe, his unit, subject to certain geographical limitations.
I am not certain whether all of these have been correctly stated, but I know that in one case no attempt at all was made to tell any of the young men concerned what were the advantages of their volunteering at the end of their National


Service. I say "at the end," but I think they have to volunteer before the thirteenth month of the period of their National Service. I suggest that an effort should be made to bring home to them the advantages of volunteering because I believe it is only thus that we shall get them to put in the extra drills without which it is impossible to make an efficient unit.
In putting forward these criticisms I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not seeking to cast any reflection upon the Territorial Army or to convey any impression that these young men will not go into a thoroughly good show. I have always maintained that in the Territorial Army this combination of the volunteer and the National Service man offers a unique opportunity to the volunteer element to provide leadership and to influence young men at an impressionable age. A great opportunity for service to the community lies within the power of the voluntary element, because they will have these young men to some extent under their influence at this very special age. Very great work has been done by the voluntary element in the Territorial Army; I am sure that all of us in this House hope that they will continue to discharge that duty, and that they will receive rather more encouragement from the Government, along the lines I have suggested, in the work they are doing.

10.24 p.m.

Mr. Moeran: Like many other hon. Members on both sides of the House, I have had practical experience of the Service but in my undistinguished career in the recent war I always described myself as a professional civilian. I think that is not a bad thing because there is in the Service great danger of getting so close to things so that we cannot see the battleship for Bofor guns, and any discussion of defence has reality only if it is seen in the context of world affairs and the world situation.
Against that background I am bound to say, with all respect, that many of the contributions I have heard from hon. Members today have had about as much relation to reality as the discussion of how many angels can stand on a pin's head. We have heard talk about bedside mats and berets. but the realities of the world situation are the looming shadow of

atomic fission and the hydrogen bomb, and against those risks, the foreign legion and conscription, and the rest we have heard of, have little meaning or validity.
The only defence of this country or of any other country is to master and dispel that situation which now surrounds all other situations which is that we have two great countries, the greatest in the world by material measurement, which are blindly governed by blind fear of each other—a vicious circle of fear begetting armaments, begetting fear. The only defence of this country is somehow or other to break that vicious circle, because if it results in war, which may otherwise become inevitable, whatever our Defence Forces in this country—and we can be nothing but an inferior Power militarily, even if we spend 50 per cent. of our national income on defence—we shall be dragged down in it.
I do not partake of those fears. I think they are the product largely of neurosis and emotionalism. However, we must realise that we are living in a world which is controlled by fear and which has a pre-war psychology. The Prime Minister summed up the position when he said, "We do not lack the machinery: it is the will to peace which we lack." The point which I want to make is that in that situation we have the memory now of the Kellogg Pact, when in 1928 every signatory Power dismissed force as an instrument of politics. The situation we have to face is—how can we break and dispel this vicious circle of fear begetting armaments, begetting fear. I suggest that what the world is waiting for is not big battalions but moral leadership, and moral leadership which no other country but ours can give; which no other statesmen, no other nation of significance can give; leadership which could not be provided by any other country but ours.
Although I am conscious that in my remarks tonight I am not following the tenor of previous speeches on either side of the House, and although I am only too conscious of my own lack of eloquence and experience to make these points, still I do make them because these things need to be said, and I am sure I am saying them not for myself only but for the common peoples everywhere. What we want, as I said, is moral leadership, and what the world is waiting for is an act of faith—of faith in humanity and in the


future, which might break this vicious circle and this pre-war psychology and pre-war situation. Such an act of faith, as the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has suggested, would be the unilateral reduction of our own Forces, because it is useless waiting for others to give a lead; it is useless in that fear situation, that situation of neurotic and compulsive fear, waiting for other countries to give a lead, because they are waiting for us to give the lead.
A substantial reduction, as a start, of our Forces, and a diversion of them not to works of war but to works of peace, would, I suggest, show the world what a country which believes in peace can do to make a beginning. We might also make a declaration that henceforth we would devote our research into the development of atomic energy not to destructive purposes but to constructive and peaceful purposes. That would be such an act of leadership as would indeed create a new situation in which the existing international machinery would be used to enable the Powers to come together round a conference table.
I know very well the dangers of such a course, but life is dangerous anyway, and we must measure the dangers of any such course against the dangers of the alternative. If we are swept along in the current of present military fashion with other countries, that torrent leads only to an abyss; but if we can break that vicious circle, then we may have created a situation in which something new may emerge and in which other countries may follow our lead. But to be swept along by this current of increasing armaments is only to become automata, to surrender our own powers of self-control. It is the essence of that pre-war psychosis which now afflicts the world that the participant nations are unable to control their own fate.

Mr. Speaker: I am sorry, but the hon. Member is getting a long way from the Army Estimates. I think the general peace situation is really out of Order in this Debate.

Mr. Moeran: I beg your pardon, Mr. Speaker. The point I am making is this. I know it is too much to hope, but I feel with the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South, that I should make the point that the Army Estimates are taking some£16

per head of the population, and if by a reduction of that large sum we not only reduce our expenditure but divert it to such works of peace as I have mentioned, that in itself would be the largest contribution we could make to the peace of the world, and therefore to our own peace. It is with that primary object of reducing our own danger that, in all sincerity, I make this point, while conscious that the Secretary of State for War cannot at this stage accept my recommendations. But I feel it is a point which must be made in any discussion of defence. If it is too great a burden for any Minister or any Government to bear, I would remind the House that the essence of great statemanship is readiness to take new decisions.

10.33 p.m.

Mr. A. R. W. Low: I do not think, after your Ruling, Sir, it would be wise to follow the hon. Gentleman in his last argument, but I would say to him that many of us are absolutely convinced that the best way of avoiding war in future is to be so strong within our economic resources that it is not worth anyone's while to attack us. That is the justification for this very large sum which we are discussing tonight. When the hon. Gentleman suggested that we should have some form of unilateral reduction of armaments but still spend what I imagine would be quite a large sum, although not what we all consider to be enough to give us the proper form of Armed Forces that we must have, I think he was falling between two stools. He does not go so far as his hon. Friend the Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would like, because I verily believe that that hon. Gentleman would rather we had no Armed Forces at all.
In the course of this Debate we have heard some very excellent maiden speeches from many of my hon. and gallant Friends. I think the whole House will agree that we are fortunate to have had their experience, wisdom and understanding of the problems contributed to our Debate. I was very glad to hear the short discussion on the Territorial Army and the right hon. Gentleman's answers to it. I propose now to deal with the wider questions, some of which were covered by the right hon. Gentleman in opening the Debate.
Before coming to criticisms—and it is right that we should criticise, if only to help the right hon. Gentleman to give us the sort of Army we require—I wish to say one or two things about the Army as I have known it over the last year and as some of my hon. Friends have told me it exists. The Minister of Defence will remember that he was kind enough to invite some of us to go to the B.A.O.R. manoeuvres last autumn. Although I do not think anyone has said so on the Floor of the House, I should say that we saw one division, and a little more than one division, conducting themselves extremely efficiently, bearing in mind the short time many of the National Service men had had to train with their formations. We not only saw efficiency in operations and in the maintenance of tanks, vehicles and so on, but also a very high standard of morale. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) was with me and we know that a high standard exists all over the Army.
When I criticise, I do so in no mean or carping spirit; nor do I criticise what is done by officers and men; my object is to offer constructive criticism of the organisation and structure of the Army. Many hon. Members have said today and at other times that something is wrong. Sometimes they put it this way—that out of all the men, 376,000 or more, which there will be at the beginning of the next financial year and the£299 million to be spent next year on the Army, there are very few teeth showing—very few balanced formations. I think one hon. Member opposite said he thought there was no more than one division. I know the Government are so coy about these things that they would never deny a thing like that for fear of committing a breach of security, but I think we on this side of the House know that there is more than one division—[An HON. MEMBER: "Two?"]—and I think more than two.
I wish to take up one thing which the Minister of Defence said in the Defence Debate. Whatever we may know of the number of divisions outside this country, we know there is no division inside this country, and when the Leader of the Opposition said on that occasion that there were not even two brigade groups in this country,

there was no denial from the other side of the House. I do not think the Government would be able to deny it. It has been said as an excuse on behalf of the Government for this pitiful state of affairs that it is because
we have forces widely distributed overseas. We have therefore been unable to create, to the extent we should like, in the United Kingdom, the balanced formations which are desired."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950: Vol. 472. c. 1269.]
What is the situation about the number of our forces outside this country? The Army Estimates do not make it easy to find the full position. In Vote A we are told how many officers and men are outside Europe, that is, about 85,700; but I make a shrewd guess that in Europe there may be 60,000 or 70,000. That means that about 60 per cent. of this Army, this large Army, is in the United Kingdom; and yet it is said that out of the 60 per cent. it is impossible to produce balanced formations. By themselves, these figures show that there must be something wrong; but when one compares the position today with the situation before the war—and I accept what some hon. Members have said from the other side of the House, that comparisons with pre-war days obviously have their limitations—one gets this—and I would say that the contrast is so sharp that I think it will, even allowing for those limitations, accentuate the point I am making.
In 1938, only 55 per cent. of a very much smaller Army was at home, and yet, out of that 55 per cent., we managed to find three divisions at practically full strength and two divisions at a little below full strength. There must be something wrong with our Army today when we produce nothing in the way of balanced formations out of so many men.
Not only does our weakness lie in the lack of balanced formations. We are weak in anti-aircraft defences. We have entrusted this mostly to the Territorial Army, and I ask the Government if they have made up their minds that the antiaircraft defences of this country, in the sad event of another emergency, can be successfully conducted in the same sort of way as they were before; or is it not clear, as I think is probably the fact, that our best defence against air attack, and particularly against rocket attack, is by having a strong mobile striking force in conjunct-


tion with our western allies on the continent of Europe, so that we can hold off enemy rocket sites and airfields.
If the Government have decided that the latter is the better course, then I imagine that the re-casting of the Territorial Army, which has been announced, will not be the last re-casting; but, be that as it may, I think that we are getting the worst of both worlds, because from what I can discover about the anti-aircraft defences, not only are they below strength in men, but they are very poorly equipped. For example, they have predictors of the type belonging to the very early part of the last war. That will not give efficiency, nor, incidentally, will it encourage men to join these units.
In the course of his able speech, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Petersfield (Sir G. Jeffreys), mentioned the question of Western Union. I do not think this is the occasion when one should discuss the many and various problems which the Government have to meet over Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact; but my hon. and gallant Friend said that these two things were important to achieve as soon as possible—standardisation of equipment and assimilation of Staff methods. I say one other thing. if we really believe in Western Union defence, some form of integration of tactical doctrine better than we have today must be attained. The Minister of Defence will recall this point if he remembers the B.A.O.R. manoeuvres.
Having pointed out what I think is wrong, and having, I hope, debunked one of the Government's excuses for the lack of balanced formations in this country, briefly to cover two points which have been most in hon. Members' minds during this Debate. The first is manpower, for the Regular Army in particular, and the second is equipment. We are all very much concerned with regular recruiting. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman, who has just taken on the office of Secretary of State for War, is as concerned already as the Minister of Defence. It is, perhaps, unfortunate for the right hon. Gentleman that immediately he got to the Ministry of Food, he had to produce more food, or was asked to do so; and immediately he gets to the War Office, he is faced with the need for producing more recruits. I seem to remember reading something in

his book about that "Produce More" cry.
I know the right hon. Gentleman is realistic about these things. Let me tell him that somehow more recruits have got to be produced. For many years now, the Government have been trying all sorts of measures to get recruits all sorts of methods short of increased pay. I say to them that until they have tried competitive rates of pay, they have no right to come to this House and say they cannot get more Regular recruits. They have not tried competitive rates of pay as yet, and I will now briefly give them the history of the pay problem since the war.
In the 1946 code, we were told that an attempt had been made to get rates of pay comparable with average wages in industry. This was for "other ranks." They took wage rates instead of earnings. As everybody knows, the soldier cannot earn overtime. The proper comparison is with earnings. What has happened to earnings since January, 1946? They have risen, as we have been told already this afternoon and on many other occasions, by 26s. per week on an average, but in the engineering trades they have risen by over 27s. 6d. per week. As I see it, the rates in 1946 were never strictly comparable, but even if they were, the gap has widened since then. Even allowing for the 10s. 6d. extra, given at the end of 1948, on an average there is a gap of between 15s. and 17s. We cannot hope to compete with civilian trades that way. If that right hon. Gentleman looks at the records inside the War Office, he will see that the Army are particularly short of technicians, of N.C.O.s, of good men, and, I think, of good officers, too.
If we are to have a good Army, we have got to pay more to our technicians, N.C.O.s, warrant officers, and officers. It is often said that we cannot afford it. I know there is the question of the wage freeze, but I am not going to be sidetracked on that at the moment. If we were to increase the average officer's total pay and allowances by 15 per cent. and the average "other rank's" pay and allowances by 15 per cent. overall, that would cost£12 million in the next year. In actual fact, because we would be giving this increase only to Regulars and because we would be trying in an


incentive way to give the better men the increase, we would probably not incur that full expenditure. But what would happen if we were to be successful in getting more Regular recruits? We could—and the right hon. Gentleman knows this very well—reduce the total strength of the Army. If we did that in the active Army, we would have fewer men to pay, fewer men to move, fewer men to feed and clothe, less petrol to be used, fewer men to house, fewer men to equip; and these men, probably, because they were Regulars, would be better able to look after the equipment, which then might last longer.
But those are not the only economies which are possible. I think it is possible for the right hon. Gentleman to do a little more economising in the War Office; although I do not want especially to chase the War Office. I was rather surprised, though, to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that he was basing his views on the secondary importance of pay in recruiting on what War Offices authorities had said. There are many estimable officers—in fact, I am sure there are a great many estimable officers—in the War Office; but some of them have been there for a little time, and it is clear that, at least until three or four weeks ago, if they had gone out and had a word with one brigadier, at any rate, one of my hon. and gallant Friends, they would have heard a lot about pay. If they had gone out and talked to N.C.O.s, warrant officers and technicians, and many middle-aged and young officers, they would have found that the view to which the right hon. Gentleman referred was not in accordance with the views of the vast majority of the Army. If the right hon. Gentleman disbelieves me, may I hope that he will visit Army units? I am sure he will, because I know that when he was at the Air Ministry he made similar visits. If he does so now, he will find out for himself what the truth is.
I now want to say one word about the War Office itself. The House will remember that the Select Committee on Estimates, in a Report at the end of the last Parliament, referred to the fact that the Air Ministry had found it wise to have a joint external and internal Air Ministry inquiry into matters of staff and control. It was recommended by the Select Com-

mittee on Estimates that the other two Service Ministries should do something of the same kind with the object of simplifying control. The tendency today seems to be to build up staffs, and this leads to greater costs and uses up more and more men. Obviously, if you let the people at the centre try to control everything, they are bound to need more men and more money to help them to do so.
I ask the hon. Gentleman who is to reply whether the War Office is taking any further steps to try to cut down the numbers of its staff. If I give one figure, the right hon. Gentleman will perhaps look back with longing to the time when he was at the Air Ministry. Compared with 1939, the numbers of staff at the War Office have risen in the 1950 Estimates by 109 per cent. whereas the numbers of staff at the Air Ministry have risen by only 57 per cent. The curious thing is that since 1939 it is surely the Air Ministry and not the Army which has had the greater need to develop and to adopt new techniques. These figures themselves should, I think, accentuate the importance of this matter to the hon. Gentleman.
I come now to the balance of manpower. I hope that as the Government look into the question of trying to get more Regular recruits and trying to decide how the National Service scheme is to be fitted in with an Army consisting of more Regular recruits, they will not go on with what seems to me to be their stupid blindness to what the present National Service Army really is. We are often told that the one great, good thing about the present National Service system is that it is based on the principle of universality. Everyone, we are told, is called up. My right hon. Friend gave some figures this afternoon to show that this was not so. May I give some different figures of a more simple nature—taking the figures given by the Minister of Labour last Monday? I have worked out that of every 20 men who are to be registered during the next financial year, only nine will be called up; three will never be called up for medical, conscientious or hardship reasons; one will probably volunteer for service of his own accord. Seven will be deferred.
Working on the history of the last three years and the estimate of the Minister


of Labour for the next three years, of the seven who are deferred, four will be called up later, two will be exempted so long as they remain in exempted occupations—coal miner, agricultural worker—and one will be exempted for no reason that I can find; he will simply escape. That does not seem to me to be a universal type of service: it is as selective as any form of selective National Service has even been. I am not trying to champion any particular form of selective service, but am trying to get the House to understand that it is all bunk—to put it at its lightest—to say that the present system of National Service is really universal and is not selective. It is "selective under the counter," and that is the worst type of selective National Service.
The time has come to examine carefully whether the basis of the present National Service scheme ought not to be modified. Let hon. Members think for themselves what will happen if by any chance the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War is wonderfully successful in the next year and gets 30,000 extra recruits for the Regular Army. What happens to the National Service call-up? How does he get it down? I think that the National Service scheme should be so flexible that it can deal with the right hon. Gentleman's success. Why should it not?

Mr. A. Edward Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman explain what he means by "under the counter" discrimination? It is rather a strange term to use.

Mr. Low: It is a loose form of words to explain a process which goes on in a manner which is not fully understood by everyone in the country.
I should like to pass now from manpower to equipment. We have been told by the Minister for Defence and the Secretary of State for War, and in various White papers, that a higher proportion of money has been spent on equipment this year than in previous years. That may be so. I was somewhat perturbed to read in paragraph 41 of the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War:
This provision represents a further phase, both in modernization of the Army's equipment as a whole and also in fitting the Army to discharge its responsibilities under Western Union.

The other half is normal maintenance of the Army and improvement of living conditions. …
I am all in favour of the normal maintenance and improvement of living conditions, but in the course of the last three years we have had it proved beyond a shadow of doubt that to go on reconditioning out-of-date equipment does not give one efficient equipment and tends to waste money. Again, the same Select Committee on Estimates reported that it hoped that the Government would review its re-conditioning policy. Last year it cost£15 million. What is it going to cost this year, and what is the result of the review of that policy?
I am rather amazed, looking at some of the figures in the Estimates, to find that there is being spent on wheeled and tracked vehicles together four per cent. less than last year. That is,£1 million less. That is true, too, of guns and small arms. Are we not spending too little on new anti-tank guns? Is it not about time that we did spend more in that direction? Perhaps one of the sorriest things which happened in the history of our Army before the war was the way in which the anti-tank gun was treated. What about radar, too? Are we spending all we should on that particularly important item?
I do not want to be open to the charge of asking the Government to spend much more and yet giving no examples of the cuts I would make. I am asking for information—whether we really have what the various specious statements in the papers and the Ministers' speeches lead us to believe we have, a measure of much-needed re-equipment. It is my belief that the strength of the British Army lies as much in the quality of its equipment as in the quality of its skilled and trained men, as much in the quality and skill of its trained men as in the quality of its equipment. There must be balance between equipment and manpower. In the last three to four years, when we have debated these problems, it has seemed to me from time to time that we have laid too much emphasis on the manpower and too little on the equipment.
Anyone who has had to fight, for one reason or another, with inadequate equipment or with a shortage of equipment will know how demoralising that can be.
There is nothing more demoralising than to know that you have not the most up-to-date equipment, and it does not matter very much whether it is the enemy in front of you or your friends a thousand miles away. Everyone wants to fight with up-to-date equipment, even looking at it from the most human aspect, for it gives one the greatest chance of success. I hope the right hon. Gentleman, as I think he will, will do all that he can to see that the soldiers of the British Army have the most up-to-date equipment. I am not crying for the moon, I am not expecting it all at once, but I am asking that each year a substantial and necessary step forward should be taken in that direction.
I should like also to emphasise the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), that as we improve our equipment and the skill and training in the Army we are producing the Rolls Royce type of Army. This Army of ours, when it is really skilled and really well equipped, is, as it were, the Rolls Royce which the hon. and learned Gentleman talked about. It is wasteful to use that magnificent Army in the wrong way in peace-time. I do not think, for an example of what I mean, we have yet discovered how to employ the modern unit—the infantry battalions or even the modern air force—in the rôle of maintaining law and order in peacetime. I hope the right hon. Gentleman and his advisers will give this full consideration now and in the months ahead. We have only to think back to Palestine and to Malaya. We know that wonderful things have been and are being done there, but bearing in mind the tremendous superiority we have in skill and equipment we surely could do better if we really knew the way.
I shall sum up in this way. The justification for this large expenditure of money and men in the Army Estimates is that it will enable the British Army to play its full part, with the other Defence Services of Britain and our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty and the British Commonwealth, in winning the "cold" war and preventing the "hot" war. If our Army is to be enabled to play its part in the best way with the least waste, I am sure that some changes will have to be made in the present structure of the Army.
We must certainly have more Regulars as quickly as possible. If we go on as we are going now, we shall be running down and down every year. We have often heard that Russia will be strongest in 1952. It seems that if we go on as we are today, with the Regular Army growing smaller every year, by 1952 we shall be weaker and not stronger. I do not want to over-paint the picture, but right hon. Gentlemen on the Government Front Bench know that as the British Army grows stronger, and is known to be stronger and more efficient, the danger of war grows less. As the British Army grows weaker—and it will if the Regular strength grows less—and is known to grow weaker, the danger of war grows stronger. I am sure that the House has made up its mind which of these two courses it wants us to take. I ask the right hon. Gentleman in his new office to enable us to do all we can to look after the British Army, with its fine traditions, its great past, and its even greater future.

11.8 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Michael Stewart): We have heard a Debate ornamented by a number of distinguished maiden speeches, and I should like to join in congratulating those hon. Members who on this occasion have made their first contribution to our Debates. If I do not refer to some of the notable maiden speeches made on the subject of the Territorial Army, or make more than a few and particularised references to the Territorial Army. the House will appreciate that it is because that question has in the main been dealt with on the Amendment, and I am now replying to the general Debate.
The hon. Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Low) used the phrase "winning the 'cold' war and preventing the 'hot' war." I do not suppose that he likes those terms any more than I do, but they do in a rough and ready fashion summarise the two major problems that face our Army. We have, on the one hand, to keep, or if necessary to restore, the peace in a number of different parts of the world. We have to see to it that the ordered decency for which this country endeavours to stand in the world is backed by sufficient force to make the word and example of this country a reality.
The performing of that task, which may be popularly described as winning the "cold" war, requires the expenditure of money and resources in certain directions. It is, for example, particularly expensive in manpower and in expenditure on movements. The other task, that of making reasonable provision against the occurrence at some future date of a much greater emergency, turns our attention to expenditure in rather different directions—for example, to the building up of effective ordered formations which will be of help to the defence of Western Europe as a whole, and to the spending of increased money on more modern forms of equipment. We have to try to strike a balance between these two matters, and I think I am right saying that there has been a tendency throughout this Debate to underestimate the importance of the immediate or, if we like, "cold" war task. I suggest it has been underestimated because the more successful we are in meeting those immediate commitments the smaller is the chance of our ever having to meet a great and terrible contingency.
I would invite the attention of my hon. Friends, who raised some of the larger issues of war and peace and defence, to this point: that when we are concerned with what may appear to them as trifling points with a particular aspect, with a particular campaign at the present time, or the location of some comparatively small force in our whole problem of defence, we should bear in mind all the time that the more successful we are in performing this immediate task of keeping the peace the less the danger that we shall ever have to think in terms of a whole world given over once again to war.
To put the matter bluntly, if this country were ever to find itself in a position where it had to abandon the Malayan Peninsula to chaos and anarchy, or to say that it could no longer interest itself at all in events in Germany, is there any doubt that to that extent the chance of sanity and reason prevailing in the councils of the world would have been reduced, and the danger of a major conflict in human society very greatly increased? I have perhaps over-laboured that point, but I want hon. Members to realise that when they set their hearts on certain objectives, with which we are all concerned—the building up of proper

formations, the expenditure, as soon as we are in a position to afford it, of more money on more modern equipment for the Army—we all know that, important as those objectives are, to pursue them to the exclusion of carrying out what remains the immediate "cold" war task—

Brigadier Head: I think the main objective on which hon. Members on this. side of the House have set themselves is. an increase in the Regular element of the Army. Surely that objective, which is our main objective, would simplify the task of dealing with the "cold" war and would not operate against that task in any way?

Mr. Stewart: I was coming to that in a moment. I think the hon. and gallant Member will admit that those other objectives have been mentioned, and naturally and rightly mentioned, but we must not underestimate the importance of pursuing these immediate tasks. While I am on that point, and before I turn to the question of the Regular Army, which the hon. and gallant Member mentioned, may I deal with a matter which was raised by the right hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton) in the course of his speech? He referred to the question of reinforcements in Malaya. I should like to make it clear that, while it is reasonable to hope, and indeed reasonable to expect, that the military Forces as now strengthened will prove sufficient for the present operations, we are not proposing to close the door to a re-assessment of our requirements should circumstances arise which make that re-assessment desirable. I think that will make the position clear to the right hon. Gentleman.
I think I should add this about the campaign in Malaya. Some time ago it was very gravely in doubt whether we could get at all the support and goodwill of the bulk of the population there in the campaign against the bandits, not because they had any political sympathy with those endangering the peace in Malaya, but because the ordinary population were afraid, afraid that we could not give them proper protection if they co-operated with us.
While I do not wish to underestimate the grave difficulties that still remain in that military campaign, one notable


thing has occurred over the past 12 months, that is, the change in the attitude of the general population. We are now witnessing in this month a much higher degree not merely of passive goodwill but of active co-operation. That is some measure of the success which the military operations have had so far, and it is a good augury for the success they will have in the future.
As the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) has said, whether we think of the Army in relation to the more long-term or the more immediate tasks, there is general agreement that we must try and build up the Regular forces. The right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate for the Opposition mentioned a number of ways in which that could be done. He asked that we should keep the status of the Army high in the eyes of the public. Is he correct in suggesting that in recent years it has had a tendency to go down? I am sure it is not necessary to urge the right hon. Gentleman to read the works of Rudyard Kipling; I am sure he has done so. if he will cast his mind back to these writings, written by one who on this matter at least was writing from knowledge, he will know that there is a constant stream of most bitter complaint against the public of that time for not according proper respect to the Army. One of his writings was quoted by the hon. and gallant Member for Colchester (Lieut.-Colonel Alport). That is only one example out of many.
I think it is partly due to the fact that this country is an island that certain episodes in our history have caused the nation as a whole never to have the affection for the Army that is accorded to another Service. Let us hope those days have now passed away. I can see no evidence for the suggestion that in the eyes of the public the Army does not stand in high esteem.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aldershot, and many other speakers in all quarters of the House, raised the question of pay. It has become an exceedingly common practice in all Defence Debates to suggest that the way out of any difficulty is to find more money from somewhere. Indeed, that practice is not confined to Defence Debates; it is the

almost invariable response of the Opposition whenever any difficulty in public administration is presented to them. The right hon. Gentleman urged that something could be done that would not be expensive, but his hon. Friends soon flung that barrier aside. We had a suggestion from the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) that would have cost, though he did not total it up, at least£10 million. The hon. Member for Blackpool, North mentioned a sum of£12 million,£2 million more than the sum, we were assured in the last Parliament by the Leader of the party opposite, would be the cost of all the measures, both civil and military, they had proposed in their election programme.

Mr. Low: The hon. Gentleman is being very unfair. I purposely said, for example, if he chose to increase the pay by 15 per cent. I did not say that that was the right answer, because neither my hon. Friends nor I have the available knowledge of how the pay code is worked out. It was my opinion that we wanted to reward the technicians, N.C.O.s, warrant officers and officers.

Mr. Stewart: But the hon. Gentleman did commit himself to a figure of£12 million, or rather less. I am pointing out first how that compares with the figure put forward by the right hon. Gentleman who was leading for the Opposition—

Mr. Lyttelton: I cannot allow these misrepresentations to get abroad. If the hon. Gentleman wants me to give an estimate, I think that about£5 million or£6 million on one side would solve the problem. I said in my speech, and I repeat, that there would be greater saving than that by an increase in the Regular Army—which we might not realise in the first six months. My belief is that we can increase the Regular Army and decrease the intake of National Service men at no public cost.

Mr. Stewart: We are now being offered a figure of£5 million or£6 million. The last pay increase for the Forces cost£12 million in public money and that sum was described by hon. Members opposite as derisory. Now we are asked to believe that a sum of half that would be sufficient to meet the problem. I am


not going to deny the genuine difficulties which certain people in the Service of the Crown, in the Armed Forces, do face over their incomes. I would agree that particular groups mentioned by hon. Members opposite, certain ranges of officers, certain ranges of N.C.O.s and technicians, are faced with the problem of making ends meet, or compare very unfavourably with their opposite numbers in civilian life.
But I am suggesting that the proposals put forward in this field so far have completely under-estimated the real difficulty of the problem and have assumed that by a very moderate increase, almost a tinkering with the figures, gigantic results would be achieved in an increase in Regulars. There is not sufficient evidence to support that view. Neither can we say that if we spent a certain amount more on the pay of Regulars, that would bring in more Regulars and that we should then get rid of the National Service man. Something can be said for that point of view, but it often runs into the fallacy of the town council who decided that, as their gaol was too small, they would build a new one, using the materials of the old gaol for the purpose and, in the meantime, they would keep the prisoners in the old gaol.

Sir Herbert Williams: Ha, ha.

Mr. Stewart: It is pleasant to see that the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) has decided at last to grace the Debate with his presence and has made a characteristic contribution.
I am sure we are right to look not only to the question of pay. I am not disputing its importance, but I am inviting hon. Members opposite to consider the matter a little more seriously and realistically than they have hitherto done. The question of bounties, raised by the right hon. Member for Aldershot, is under consideration. It is quite a complex problem, but I hope we shall be able to find a satisfactory answer to it.
In regard to married quarters, some calculations were offered as to the number built for men in the Services compared with homes built for the civilian population. It was suggested that if we had treated the Services as we had treated the civilian population, we should have built

not 3,000 but 15,000 married quarters so far. It appeared to me that that calculation was based on the incorrect assumption that all Regular soldiers are married, an assumption that is very far from correct. It is true, of course, that there was a real difficulty shortly after the war when, inevitably, the size and location and general set-up of the Army were matters bound to be in doubt. It was not possible, immediately, to decide where was the proper place to site married quarters. That, unavoidably, gave us a late start, but it is not by any means true to say that we have not done anything in the years since the end of the war.

Mr. Lyttelton: The hon. Gentleman asserts, without producing anything to support his assertion, that they are encouraging figures. Can he now tell us what would have been the number of married quarters which would have been the equivalent of the very poor building programme which the civilian population has had?

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman might have stated more fully the basis upon which he was making his calculations. If he is looking at the number of families in the population as a whole, and the number of new homes both permanent and temporary which have been provided and the number of married soldiers—if that be his basis, I should have said that six thousand would be nearer the figure. I cannot be held to that figure, because I did not start the argument, and I have had no chance to look it up.

Mr. Lyttelton: Then the War Office have done half the building, and they wonder that recruiting is going down.

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman is very ungrateful when I have got his arithmetic right for him. I have pointed out what were the reasons why it was not possible to have the priorities, and I am not going to repeat that line of argument now, as he did not challenge it at the time. I say that we are entitled to take credit as a result of the legislative action taken in the last Parliament, which will result in a greatly increased production of married quarters.

Brigadier Head: Surely the hon. Gentleman will agree that it is only fair to say that before this legislation was in


troduced the Royal Air Force was away ahead of the Army in its building of married quarters?

Mr. Stewart: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must also agree that for reasons connected with the whole nature of that Service, it is easier for the Royal Air Force to decide where to site its married quarters.

Brigadier Head: That will not do.

Mr. Stewart: I have mentioned among the incentives which will help to build up the Regular Army one which was referred to by the right hon. Gentleman, and that is a proper return to civilian life for the long service soldier of the Regular Force. This is particularly important, not only in getting men to enter the Army for a limited period, but in getting them to continue their engagement, if on a short engagement, and become long-service soldiers. In that field we have made considerable progress. In recent months we have steadily added to the total number of guaranteed vacancies for ex-Regular soldiers which are secured outside in the service of the Government, with local authorities, with the nationalised industries and, to some extent, in the service of private industry. So far, the full effect of this is not apparent because, in conditions of full employment such as now prevail, there is no particular difficulty presented to a Regular soldier leaving the Army in securing suitable employment outside.
The provision we are making is that, if ever at any future time that situation should alter, we can still say to the man who is prepared to take on long service that there are guaranteed vacancies for him. As we all know, it is not only important that there should be full employment, but it is very important that the population should believe that there continues to be full employment. I have mentioned, then, those matters affecting Regular soldiers.

Sir G. Jeffreys: Will the hon. Gentleman answer one question? Has he considered what I suggested and what others have suggested; that is, countervailing economies which might be made on administrative services, on staffs, on noncombatant and semi-combatant branches of the Army, and in fact, in general on

what can be called the various frills of the Army, which do not contribute directly to fighting efficiency?

Mr. Stewart: Yes; I will assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that I have not forgotten that point, and that I will be referring to it again before long. / had been speaking of the Regular Army. May I now say a word about the National Service men? The hon. Member for Blackpool, North, assured us with great emphasis that National Service was not universal. I must say that it seems to me to be knocking down an Aunt Sally which he himself had first put up. What did he mean by suggesting that we had under-the-counter selective service? I am bound to say, if I may borrow an expression which the hon. Member used, that to suggest we have an under-the-counter selective service is "bunk." How can it be put under the counter when he was able to set before us an elaborate analysis based on information supplied to every member of the public as well as himself? We all know there are numerous exceptions, and that a considerable body of our young men do not go into the Armed Forces, but where that happens it happens for reasons that have been debated in this House and which have been accepted by the nation as a whole.
If it is suggested that we ought to make further exceptions, then we must be told on what grounds they are to be based, and what sort of people are to be excepted. It may well be, since there are already some people who are not called up, that we ought perhaps to add further categories to those who are deferred, and possibly defer for a longer period. But we should want to know what categories are to be so added and for what reasons.
The hon. Gentleman, and I think other speakers, did comment on how the period of 18 months' National Service worked out. Here we have to strike a balance between the effect on the national economy, on the one hand, and what will enable one to make proper use of the man's service on the other hand, on the assumption—the correct assumption at the moment, I think—that one has not only to train him but to use him as a trained soldier. I see no reason to believe that if we altered the period from 18 months in either direction, we should get


any better balance between the needs of the Service and the national economy than we have at present. The general opinion among those qualified to know is that in this period of service the young man does give valuable service to the Army while he is there, and that he will bring to the Territorial Army that degree of training which will make him capable of playing a useful part in that Force.

Mr. Low: The hon. Gentleman accused me of having invented the idea that National Service was not universal. I was only really reproducing something that the Defence White Paper states:
The idea that the present principle of universality of National Service should be abandoned. …
This idea is negative in this White Paper. I was really only following it up.

Mr. Stewart: I must congratulate the hon. Member on the triumphant, if somewhat belated, success of his research. The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that in the Defence White Paper, and elsewhere, definite facts and figures are given in the light of which the word "universality" must be interpreted. I happily make him a present of the debating point which he has scored.
If I may now turn to the question of the Territorial Army and the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd), I doubt if we could have reached a solution with regard to the re-organisation referred to any sooner. The hon. and learned Member will appreciate, and the House will appreciate, that there are a great many different co-ordinates which have to be.brought together to give one the right answer. You have to consider what order of battle you want for the Territorial Army, to what extent you are going to make up the establishment of each unit in time of peace and, on the other hand, what volunteers you have for each unit, what National Service men there are within a proper radius of the unit, and what kind of service they have been trained for. All these things have to be put together.
This meant a detailed investigation of the area around every Territorial centre in the country. I would suggest that the devoted work done in the example mentioned, and no doubt elsewhere, is by no means wholly wasted. Even though

there must be some of these changes and some amalgamations, the work already done, and the example already set by unselfish voluntary service in the Territorial Army, will not go to waste and will bear its fruit in the character of the men who have been influenced by that example.
Then, with regard to accommodation, I think we may claim that in recent years considerable progress has been made in providing proper accommodation for Territorial units, partly by the use of powers of compulsory purchase, partly by building, partly by conversions and adaptations. The hon. Member for Blackpool, North, asked about volunteering by National Service men, and the answer, I think, to the rhetorical question which he put is exactly what he expected. At present we have no knowledge of people now doing full-time service volunteering for the Territorial Army. I would agree that we must try to put before them, in more emphatic and definite form than we have done so far, what are the advantages to be obtained—advantages to themselves and to the community—by entering upon voluntary engagements.

Mr. Low: My question was by no means a rhetorical question. My information was that of a batch of 450 only one man volunteered.

Mr. Stewart: We are in agreement as to the actual position. I think we all know that young men of this age are not in the habit of looking very far ahead.

Mr. Lyttelton: What about "Let Us Face the Future"?

Mr. Stewart: "Let Us Face the Future" was addressed to people of voting age. I think we may reasonably accept that whether these young men who are actually doing their National Service with the Territorial Army will volunteer, will be largely determined by how they find life in the units, and what sort of welcome they get there. My own conclusion, from the number of Territorial units which I have visited while I have been in my present office, is that there will be, despite the misgivings which I think many people have, a genuine determination to make these young men welcome, and to create an atmosphere in which they will be glad to take on a voluntary engagement.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: May I follow up the point. I do not think there is any controversy. There are certain definite advantages to the National Service man in that he can retain any rank that he has in the Regular Army. I should have thought that was a strong point.

Mr. Stewart: I thought I agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman on that point. I have spoken of the Regular Army, National Service and the Territorial Army. A number of hon. Members took up the question of colonial troops. I ought to mention that the reduction in the number of troops to which reference is made in the Estimates does not include any reduction in the number of Gurkha troops, and includes only a small reduction in the number of African troops—and that in relation to a body of African troops engaged in a particular task which is now coming to an end. Indeed, in general this reduction is due to the disappearance of certain tasks for which certain rather specialised types of troops were required.
There is, however, one real difficulty about increasing the size of the colonial Forces at the present. Notable services have been and can be rendered by colonial troops, but the body of colonial Forces is of somewhat specialised forces capable of being used, for example, in certain parts of the world. At the moment we find it rather better to use the available resources to increase our general forces than to increase somewhat specialised forces.
The hon. Member for Blackpool, North, mentioned equipment—particularly, I think, equipment for anti-aircraft purposes. It is to that purpose that priority for expenditure on equipment is given at the present time. Hon Members will find on looking at the Estimates that there are certain types of equipment on which less is being spent this year than last. That is simply because in certain fields we have spent to a point at which another claimant for priority comes in, and at the moment the chief claimant is anti-aircraft equipment—in which term I include radar.
As to the re-conditioning of equipment. including vehicles, up to a certain point it is proper to pursue the policy of continuing to re-condition—particularly when we bear in mind that it is important not

to interfere with the country's export programme, on which the strength of the whole economy depends. After a time that process of re-equipment by reconditioning ceases to pay dividends, and we must therefore expect as time goes by to see less spent on that and more spent on the provision of new equipment.

Mr. Lyftelton: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the point, can he reassure me in the matter of radar and wireless, in which there is such a sharp fall.

Mr. Stewart: It was that to which was referring. Signals and wireless equipment are one matter on which we have spent to such a point that other claimants for priority come in. Radar equipment required for anti-aircraft purposes still occupies the first priority position.
Some reference has been made to the War Office and headquarters staffs, and to a variety of administrative economies that could be made. The hon. and gallant Member for Petersfield reminded me of that a short time ago. The House will like to know that it is proposed to hold an inquiry in the War Office comparable to that held in the Air Ministry, and while we have every reason to believe that we shall get useful results I would urge the House to realise that we cannot expect from it some miraculous reduction and a great saving in money. I would invite the attention of hon. Members to the very considerable reduction in Vote III, the number of civilians having fallen from 8,750 to just over 7,000, as between the year just ending and the year about to commence. That is the last of a series of reductions that have occurred in recent years.
As to what have been called the frills of the Army—those things which do not directly contribute to fighting strength—surely the more mechanised and modern forces become the more people we are bound to have who, although not contributing directly, nevertheless really do contribute to the Army's fighting strength. An army with vehicles and modern equipment cannot do without a considerable body of services, all the men in which could be said not to contribute directly to the fighting strength. We have looked again and again for unnecessary


frills, and I believe that there is remarkably little which would merit that description. I am not prepared to accept the case of the field bakery—

Brigadier Head: Are there any mobile bath units?

Mr. Stewart: I cannot charge my memory with them at the moment, but I should hesitate to say that they do not contribute directly to the efficiency of the Forces. I am sure the hon. and gallant Gentleman is well aware that one of the big problems in certain hot climates is the prevention of infections of the skin. It is perhaps a major health problem in hot climates.

Brigadier Head: But not in Malaya.

Mr. Stewart: We ought not to consume the time of the House in pursuit of the mobile bath unit and the field bakery fascinating though such paths may be. We have searched very diligently for any particular administrative economies that might be made.
The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) declared with great emphasis that the military machine was always asking for more. He did us less than justice, for this time we have asked for less than in the previous year. I think that his general argument was replied to effectively by the hon. Member for Wallsend (Mr. McKay).

Sir G. Jeffreys: The hon. Gentleman spoke of including in possible frills various mechanised services, presumably corps like the R.E.M.E. and the R.A.O.C. Those corps were very far from my mind. What I thought of as frills was something which has no particular skill, the Pioneer Corps, which did not exist before the last war. It is a new corps. Is it necessary in peacetime? What about the Army Catering Corps, with its expensive headquarters? Could not it be made a branch of the R.A.S.C.? What about the Army Educational Corps? It has swollen to an enormous size compared with what it used to be, and it does not add to fighting efficiency.

Mr. Stewart: I was coming to the question of conditions of service which will take up some of the points of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I think that he will agree that where any particular

service is developed to the point where it is desirable to have a separate corps, as in the case of the Army Catering Corps, no one would wish to be doctrinaire on that matter. It is a question of assembling facts and evidence from experienced people. From time to time we have considered whether a new corps should be created, or whether one of the existing corps should be destroyed, and we endeavour in the light of the available evidence to reach the most economical conclusion. I shall, as always after a Debate of this kind, review in the light of what has been said these administrative questions which are constantly under our eye.
I am surprised that he should have described the Army Educational Corps in these terms, more particularly at a time when we have a large number of National Service men in the Army, and after a period when the education of the whole nation was seriously impaired. We have now reached in the Army the position where we are taking in the young men whose education has been seriously interfered with in the war years. Several compliments have been paid to the improved morale, discipline and spirit of the Army, and I am grateful for them, but you cannot maintain a record like that unless you do preserve these welfare and education services which paid such very good dividends in the improvement of health, morals and general welfare of the troops in Germany two or three years ago.
Several hon. Members have dealt with the general conditions of service. Hon. Members opposite are inclined to place great stress on what is called "spit and polish." There are important reasons for that, but I would invite them to consider this: in the last generation the difference in education, general outlook, and way of life between officers and men has narrowed, and general standards of public health, decency and behaviour have greatly improved. It is not necessary, to preserve decency and cleanliness, to have some of the rigid and inflexible rules which may have been necessary one or two generations ago.
May I also say that I would agree that the considerations I have advanced have sometimes led me and some of my hon. Friends to underestimate the importance


of maintaining proper standards of cleanliness and discipline. What I am hoping we may now do, in all quarters of the House, is to approach this question in the light of the facts of modern life and see what is the proper balance between reasonable freedom and the preservation of reasonable standards of smartness, cleanliness and discipline. I have formed the impression, in the many visits I have paid to units in the past two years and a half, that there is a great deal less unnecessary chivvying of men about, and that we have managed still to preserve proper standards of cleanliness and smartness. It is a matter on which I shall always be glad to receive the opinion and experience of hon. Members.
The hon. Member for Blackpool, North, said it was right to criticise but that he criticised in no carping spirit. It is right that my right hon. Friend and I should be criticised. But if we criticise, we should not moan. We all know that we have to face certain things in the Army today that we do not like. It is no good, because we do not like the idea of National Service, talking as if it can never be made a success, and as it the Army is likely to be ruined if there is National Service. There are some things we have to face. We cannot spend as much on the colourful side of the Army as we would like. It is important that we should none of us do anything to create a general atmosphere of discouragement.
Let us remember, at least, what we have managed to do. In many parts of the world we are restoring, or have restored, and are keeping peace. Our example is one of the main things which has made possible any project for the combined defence of Western Europe. We have carried through very notable measures of reorganisation, of which the reorganisation of the Territorial Army, mentioned earlier this afternoon, is an outstanding example. We are discovering, for the first time in the history of this country, how to make a form of

National Service and the provision of trained Reserves work. I do not think, added together, a few years after a war, that these things amount to a record of which any Government need be ashamed.

Mr. Harold Davies: May I ask my hon. Friend if he could get on record the figures of recruitment during the period of unemployment, to illustrate the difficulty we are meeting? I was challenged from the other side of the House tonight and told I was wrong, but I have now taken the trouble to find out the figures. They illustrate that unemployment in 1931—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Milner): We cannot have a second speech from the hon. Member.

Mr. Harold Davies: I consider it is important that there should be on the record the figures of recruitment during the period of unemployment. From the 1936 Army Report, I have seen that unemployment in 1931 was—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: All that has been said before; I heard it before.

Mr. Harold Davies: I want to make sure the Opposition heard it as well.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1950–51

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Resolved:
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 467,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of His Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1951.

To report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. R. J. Taylor.]

Resolution to be reported Tomorrow; Committee also report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

WAR OFFICE (IRREGULAR PRIVATE WORK)

Motion made, and Question proposed. "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. R. J. Taylor.]

11.59 p.m.

Sir John Mellor: The War Office Printing and Photographic Department, which is called C.I. Reproduction Services, and which is situated at 5 to 6, Old Cavendish Street, just off Oxford Street, is in a substantial building on four floors and I think about 70 people are employed there. I understand it is an absolute War Office rule that no private work should be done, but in September last the police made an investigation and discovered that private work had been done in War Office time and with War Office material.
That work had been done between November, 1948, and March, 1949. It consisted in the preparation of a number of loose-leaf catalogues for a company called Glass Developments, Ltd., scientific instrument manufacturers, of Brixton, and it involved a considerable amount of photography, photoprinting and other preparation. Altogether it required some three cwt. of paper. It is the fact that the senior executive officer who at the material time was administratively responsible for this establishment was the brother of the managing director of Glass Developments, Ltd. and this senior executive officer in November, 1948, introduced his brother at these premises in Old Cavendish Street to the technical officer in charge and to the principal photographer.
Following that introduction, work upon these loose-leaf catalogues was put in hand. The managing director of the company visited the War Office premises on more than one occasion and a considerable number of glass articles, which bore the name of Glass Developments, Ltd., were photographed, and photoprinting done which involved many members of the staff. Ultimately, the finished work, which was of a substantial character, was dispatched in hampers to the company.
On 16th December last, the then Secretary of State for War made a statement in answer to a question by me:
The number of man-hours expended on the work irregularly performed is not known,

since, in breach of standing instructions, no record was kept of time worked on the job.
As the War Office was being robbed, I think it scarcely surprising that no record was kept. The then Secretary of State continued:
The paper used weighed 3¼ cwts., the greater part of which was the weight of the manilla covers. The paper appears to have been part of the daily floating stock of very much greater volume drawn for the ordinary REPORT, 16th December, 1949; Vol. 470, c. 370.]
It seems to be rather surprising that it was a practice to keep no record of stock appropriated to a particular job. The police found some specimens of this catalogue on the premises of the company when they went there, but the bulk of the work had already been distributed to the trade and therefore the actual quantity which was produced is a matter of guesswork.
On 6th December last, the then Secretary of State for War made this statement:
The value of the work is estimated at about£115. The cost of the paper was£25."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th December, 1949; Vol. 470, c. 1700.]
Therefore, it will be seen that the transaction was not only large, but also was of some substantial commercial value. It would have been produced entirely at the expense of public funds if it had not been that the police intervened and that the War Office extracted£115 from the company. I should have thought that this involved a prima facie breach of the criminal law and that it would have been appropriate for investigation in the courts instead of in a hole-in-the-corner way in the War Office. This, at least, must be admitted by the Financial Secretary, that there was a very serious breach of Civil Service discipline, a breach by four senior officials in a department in which they hold very responsible positions.
On 13th December, when I inquired about what action had been taken, the then Secretary of State said:
Suitable disciplinary action has been taken in each case."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th December, 1949; Vol. 470, c. 2510.]
On 14th March, I asked the present Secretary of State what disciplinary action had been taken and he replied that suitable


action had been taken. In other words, he told me to mind my own business. If the Secretary of State for War will not say what action was taken, I will. These four officials only suffered a few weeks suspension from duty on half pay. To the best of my knowledge and belief the most any of them suffered was seven weeks suspension from duty on half pay and the least was one week. As the Parliamentary Secretary knows, in one case this was not the first offence of this character.
These men have been dealt with in the Department although the punishments, in my submission, were purely nominal, and of course I cannot reopen the individual cases. What I do say is that if such trivial punishment is to be meted out by the War Office for such grave offences, the discipline, morale and self-respect of those employed in the War Office must inevitably suffer. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary if he will give the House an explanation of this extraordinary treatment. I also ask him why this department is retained. Why does the War Office require this place for photography and photo-printing? Why cannot its functions be transferred to the Stationery Office? Is it a fact that it is required for some secret work? If it is, I should say that it ought to be placed in much more reliable hands.

12.9 a.m.

Sir Herbert Williams: I happened to hear something about this case before I came back to this House. I do not know whether my information is accurate, but I am told that the police knew all about this, and that is rather confirmed by what my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir J. Mellor) has said, namely, that the police went to the place, where they discovered these catalogues printed at public expense for the benefit of a private firm. That seems very near to stealing. I hope we shall be told why, when that was reported in the appropriate quarter, no steps were taken to initiate a prosecution. This is really a first-class scandal. It may be that only£115 was involved. It may have been more—no one knows the facts—but why did not the police, or the Public Prosecutor, take steps to make sure that these people were prosecuted?

12.10 a.m.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: In listening to the case put forward by the hon. Baronet, I must say that I found it extremely disturbing information. As the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) said, this is not a matter of the sum involved—£120, or whatever it may be—but the fact that certain officials of considerable standing should have so far failed in their duties as to permit such things. I think that this reveals somewhere a very grave laxity, and I feel that when the traditions of the British Civil Service, with its fine record—a record higher than almost any in the world—are at stake, it is most deplorable that the Secretary of State at that time should have taken such a light view of the whole proceedings.
I can only assume that he took a light view because of his action, and the Financial Secretary has an opportunity to put it to the public through this House that the War Office, and the Civil Service as a whole, will not permit this sort of thing among officials, high or low. There should be a full inquiry with a further report to this House and further steps should be taken because, in the interests of the British Civil Service, which, I agree, has a difficult and responsible job, and in the interests of this country. the matter should be thoroughly threshed out. The whole thing should be taken as far as it is possible to take it, and I hope we shall be told this evening what steps have been taken to see that there is no repetition.

12.12 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Michael Stewart): I would say first that I agree with the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir J. Mellor) that this is a very disturbing matter, and I appreciate the concern he has shown by bringing the matter before the House tonight and by putting Questions. It is not necessary for me again to go over the facts of what occurred. Those facts are as have been described, but for, I think, two very important exceptions. which I shall come to in a moment. It is always a matter of very great concern when a member of the British Civil Service does not prove entirely worthy of the very high trust reposed in him. It makes a case of any kind such as this seem worse.
The two points on which I part company with the hon. Baronet are these. It is not correct to speak of a hole-and-corner investigation. The fact is that the War Office were informed by the police that they had information about this case, and in accordance with regular practice we invited the police to make a thorough investigation. The full facts of the matter and the conclusions of the police went to the Director of Public Prosecutions. He expressed the view that there was no ground to support a criminal prosecution. Strictly speaking, I think everyone will agree with the verdict—I think it was the verdict of the hon. Baronet—that there is only one word which can apply to the use of public time and materials for a private purpose.
At the same time, however, serious as any breach by a civil servant may be, we must get a sense of proportion in considering this very grave indiscretion and neglect of regulations. It is also a fact that this matter is materially different from deliberate corruption. If it had been established that any of these people had received personal gain for obliging the firm in this way,. or that they had got in this way any hope of personal gain, it would have put the whole matter in a very different light indeed. But the careful investigation that was carried out, both by the police, and later, which is the normal procedure, by a board of inquiry in the War Office—although it did establish, as I say, grave indiscretion and very serious disregard of regulations—produced no grounds for supposing that any of the civil servants concerned had either gained anything themselves out of the transactions or acted with any hope of personal gain.

Sir J. Mellor: Will the hon. Gentleman agree that the police took the view that the evidence very closely supported a criminal prosecution and that it was after discussions between the War Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions that it was decided not to prosecute?

Mr. Stewart: I have been guided definitely by the view of the Director of Public Prosecutions, which was not a view we suggested to him, but a view which he presented to us. In face of that, I do not see really that we could have acted other than in the way in which we did act. I think we were right, in

view of the facts and in view of the opinion tendered to us, not to make this a matter of criminal prosecution.
There then arises the question of the disciplinary action that we took. In addition to the action referred to by the hon. Baronet, the two junior and less responsible people received a reprimand and a warning. The two more senior people received a severe reprimand. I know what the reaction of hon. Members and the general public on first hearing that may be. They may say that is only a form of words, but I have made inquiries and I find that is very far from being the case. It is something which will stand in these men's way for the rest of their careers in the Civil Service and which will be a definite hindrance to them and a constant reminder of the serious irregularities that they have committed. I feel that, considering the nature of their offences and the nature of the action that has been taken, we have tried to hold the balance correctly between the need to vindicate the honour of the Civil Service, on the one hand, and the desire not to behave in a disproportionately and unreasonably harsh manner, on the other.
There remains the question of what precautions we are taking against any similar occurrence in the future. Clearly there can be no absolutely certain check against a breach of trust by somebody in whom it is felt proper to put trust. For that sort of thing we must look to a much wider field, at the whole method whereby the Civil Service is recruited and standards of conduct are maintained. We came to the conclusion, following examination of this case, that we must have an expert examination of the system of control of materials in this Department, since if we could have had a closer control of materials these matters might have been detected before the abuse reached any serious stage at all. If that expert examination suggests measures we can usefully take. we shall take them forthwith.
The question has been raised by the hon. Baronet of why this reproduction service exists at all and why the whole work is not done by the Stationery Office. That is not particularly for any security reason. It is true that some of the work which it does could be done by the Stationery Office, but it also does work of


a type that the Stationery Office does not provide for—certain types of photography, the microfilming of overseas corespondence and so on, which we cannot get done in the Stationery Office. That is one reason for the maintenance of this unit. If you have a unit for that kind of work, it is often economical to group with it certain other types of work which could be done by the Stationery Office. I do not feel, therefore, that there is any danger either to security or to the honour of the Civil Service or even to economy by the maintenance of this section. I hope that the further facts I have been able to lay before the House tonight will convince them that, unfortunate and undesirable as this whole episode has been, we have done our best to deal with it in an appropriate manner.

Sir H. Williams: Then if the civil servant in question had walked away with

the paper for his own benefit, his action would have been theft; but if he gave the paper to his brother, it would be an action which was undesirable but which did not fall within the category of theft?

Mr. Stewart: It would be undesirable to answer hypothetical questions reflecting on the repute of a civil servant which may imply censure on him. I am not going to be saddled with hypothetical questions of this kind.

Sir H. Williams: Was not his brother head of the firm?

Mr. Stewart: I do not think any useful purpose would be served by discussing this.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-one Minutes past Twelve o'Clock.